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Background: English health-care commissioners from the NHS need information to commission effectively.
In the light of new legislation in 2012, new ‘external’ organisations were created such as commissioning
support units (CSUs), public health departments moved into local authorities and ‘external’ provider
organisations such as commercial and not-for-profit agencies and freelance consultants were encouraged.
The aim of this research from 2011 to 2014 was to study knowledge exchange between these external
providers and health-care commissioners to learn about knowledge acquisition and transformation,
the role of external providers and the benefits of contracts between external providers and health-
care commissioners.
Methods: Using a case study design, we collected data from eight cases, where commercial and
not-for-profit organisations were contracted. We conducted 92 interviews with external providers (n= 36),
their clients (n= 47) and others (n= 9), observed 25 training events and meetings and collected various
documentation including meeting minutes, reports and websites. Using constant comparison, data were
analysed thematically using a coding framework and summaries of cases.
Results: In juggling competing agendas, commissioners pragmatically accessed and used information to
build a cohesive, persuasive case to plot a course of action, convince others and justify decisions. Local
data often trumped national or research-based information. Conversations and stories were fast, flexible
and suited to the continually changing commissioning environment. Academic research evidence was
occasionally explicitly sought, but usually came predigested via National Institute of Health and Care
Excellence guidance, software tools and general practitioner clinical knowledge. Negative research
evidence did not trigger discussions of disinvestment opportunities. Every commissioning organisation
studied had its own unique blend of three types of commissioning models: clinical commissioning,
integrated health and social care and commercial provider. Different types of information were privileged
in each model. Commissioners regularly accessed information through five main conduits: (1) interpersonal
relationships; (2) people placement (embedded staff); (3) governance (e.g. Department of Health
directives); (4) ‘copy, adapt and paste’ (e.g. best practice elsewhere); and (5) product deployment
(e.g. software tools). Interpersonal relationships appeared most crucial in influencing commissioning
decisions. In transforming knowledge, commissioners undertook repeated, iterative processes of
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contextualisation using a local lens and engagement to refine the knowledge and ensure that the ‘right
people’ were on board. Knowledge became transformed, reshaped and repackaged in the act of
acquisition and through these processes as commissioners manoeuvred knowledge through the system.
External providers were contracted for their skills and expertise in project management, forecast modelling,
event management, pathway development and software tool development. Trust and usability influenced
clients’ views on the usefulness of external providers, for example the motivations of Public Health and
CSUs were more trusted, but the usefulness of their output was variable. Among the commercial and
not-for-profit agencies in this study, one was not very successful, as the NHS clients thought that the
external provider added little of extra value. With another, the benefits were largely still notional and with
a third views were largely positive, with some concerns about expense. Analysts often benefited more than
those making commissioning decisions.
Conclusions: External providers who maximised their use of the different conduits and produced something
of value beyond what was locally available appeared more successful. The long-standing schism between
analysts and commissioners blunted the impact of some contracts on commissioners’ decision-making.
To capitalise on the expertise of external providers, wherever possible, contracts should include explicit skills
development and knowledge transfer components.
Funding: The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.
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Glossary
Analytics A term used to refer to quantifiable data such as activity and performance data produced by
health-care analysts.
Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care A collaboration between
universities and their NHS partner organisations.
Commercial provider An organisation that supplies health care or services to make a profit. Also known
as ‘for profit’ and ‘private’.
Dashboard A succinct data set that identifies performance against commissioning key performance
indicators. Normally comes with a red, amber, green rating.
Joint Strategic Needs Assessment (JSNA) A priority-setting exercise carried out by public
health departments.
NHS provider An organisation that provides health-care services to the NHS, for example a hospital.
Not-for-profit An organisation that supplies health-care or services without the aim of making a profit.
Examples include social enterprises.
Primary care provider An organisation that offers primary care services such as general practices.
Quality, Improvement, Productivity and Prevention (QIPP) A Department of Health-led initiative to
transform NHS services to make £20B of efficiency savings.
Secondary care provider Another term for hospital.
Unscheduled Care Board Subcommittees of commissioning organisations that focus on hospital issues.
World Class Commissioning An assurance programme instituted by the Labour government in 2008,
designed to improve commissioning practice in primary care trusts, which were the primary local
commissioning organisations from 2001 to 2013.
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List of abbreviations
A&E accident and emergency
AHSN Academic Health Science Network
CCG Clinical Commissioning Group
CLAHRC Collaboration for Leadership in
Applied Health Research and Care
CSU commissioning support unit
FESC Framework for procuring External
Support for Commissioners
GP general practitioner
HRG Healthcare Resource Group
IT information technology
JSNA Joint Strategic Needs Assessment
NICE National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence
NIHR National Institute for Health
Research
PBC practice-based commissioning
PCT primary care trust
QIPP Quality, Improvement, Productivity
and Prevention
SECI socialisation, externalisation,
combination, internalisation
UCB Unscheduled Care Board
WCC World Class Commissioning
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Plain English summary
Health-care commissioners purchase health services for local populations, so they need good-qualityinformation. The aim of this study was to explore how commissioners obtained, modified and
used information to inform their decisions. We were specifically interested in the knowledge obtained
from external organisations such as management consultancies, Public Health and commissioning
support units.
In eight case studies, we interviewed 92 external consultants and their clients, observed 25 meetings and
training sessions, and analysed documents such as meeting minutes and reports. Data were analysed
within each case study and then across all case studies.
Commissioners used many types of information from multiple sources to try to build a cohesive, persuasive
case. They obtained information through five channels:
l interpersonal relationships
l people placement (e.g. embedding external staff within client teams)
l governance (e.g. national directives)
l copy, adapt and paste (e.g. best practice guidance)
l product deployment (e.g. software tools).
Furthermore, commissioners constantly interpreted (and reinterpreted) the knowledge to fit local
circumstances (contextualisation) and involved others in this refinement process (engagement). External
organisations that drew on these multiple channels and facilitated contextualisation and engagement were
more likely to meet clients’ expectations. Sometimes there was little impact on commissioning decisions
because the work of external organisations targeted and benefited the commissioning decision-makers less
than the health-care analysts.
The long-standing split between health-care analysts and commissioners sometimes limited the impact of
external organisations. Contracts should include explicit ways to transfer knowledge from external
organisations to commissioners drawing on multiple channels to maximise benefit.
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Scientific summary
Background
Recent history suggests that there will always be some mix of public sector, clinician and commercial
involvement in health-care commissioning in the English NHS, even if the balance shifts under successive
governments. As a result of new legislation in 2012, the NHS landscape has changed remarkably. Several
functions that were formerly considered ‘internal’ in health-care commissioning structures now have
external status. For example, public health departments moved to local authorities and analytics
(i.e. data production, management and analysis) became the remit of external organisations known as
commissioning support units (CSUs). These ‘external’ organisations want to influence and work with
commissioners, along with commercial and not-for-profit agencies, freelance consultants and the voluntary
sector. The aim of this research was to study knowledge exchange between these external agencies and
health-care commissioners. Our research questions were:
1. How do health-care commissioners access research evidence and other sources of knowledge to aid
their commissioning decisions?
2. What is the nature and role of agencies that provide commissioning expertise from the public
(e.g. Public Health), private (e.g. commercial providers) and other sectors (e.g. not-for-profit)?
3. What are the processes by which health-care commissioners transform information provided by other
agencies into useable knowledge that is embedded in commissioning decisions?
4. What are the benefits and disadvantages?
In addition to these research questions, given the timing of this study, another objective was to learn more
about the types of commissioning in operation. This study took place from 2011 to 2014.
Methods
Using a case study design and ethnographic techniques, we collected data through interviews,
observations and documentation from early 2011 to mid-2013. Because our interest was in knowledge
flows between health-care commissioners and external providers, cases were selected only where
commercial or not-for-profit agencies had been contracted. All cases were given pseudonyms. Four were
cases of commercial and not-for-profit providers working across multiple commissioning organisations.
These included:
l Heron – a multinational commercial company with a suite of tools and mixed UK/non-UK staff, offering
analytics and project management.
l Jackdaw – a small, international, not-for-profit offering one tool.
l Swallow – a national commercial company with a suite of tools, staffed largely by ex-NHS personnel,
offering analytical and commissioning expertise.
l Swallow Tool – an exemplar of Swallow and NHS clients [primary care trust (PCT), acute and
community providers] working together to audit best place of patient care using an electronic tool.
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We also independently recruited four commissioning organisations located in areas where our commercial
and not-for-profit providers were contracted. These four cases were geographically bounded
commissioning agencies [former PCTs, now Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs)] and included:
l Carnford CCG – struggling financially, highly collaborative with its health-care providers and reliant on
the use of tools and the data produced from those tools to influence commissioning decisions.
l Deanshire CCG – relatively confident as a commissioning organisation, focused on governance,
carrying out some innovative projects in partnership with commercial providers.
l Norchester CCG – financially challenged, emphasis on (ideally academic research) evidence-based
policy-making, piloting new ways of commissioning contracts, with substantial aid from commercial
and not-for-profit providers.
l Penborough CCG – creating an integrated network of health and social care provision with a heavy
emphasis on public involvement, historically extensive use of commercial and not-for-profit providers
and freelance consultants.
Data sources included 92 interviews with commercial and not-for-profit providers (n= 36), their clients
(n= 47) and others such as freelance consultants, lay representatives and local authority professionals
(n= 9). We conducted 25 observations of training events and meetings and collected various
documentation including meeting minutes, reports, websites, marketing material, press releases and
e-mails. Using a constant comparison method, data were analysed thematically through the application of
a coding framework and summaries of entire case sites. Cross-case analysis was conducted. Emerging
findings were continually discussed and refined in regular team meetings throughout the study.
Results
Models of commissioning
Three functional types, or models, of commissioning were identified from the data: ‘clinical’, ‘integrated
health and social care’ and ‘commercial provider’. Different kinds of knowledge were privileged in the
different commissioning models. Local clinical knowledge from general practitioners (GPs) about service
provision was prioritised in clinical commissioning, service user experiences of care were key in integrated
health and social care, and commercial providers prized high-quality process and outcome data to ‘drive
decision-making’. Nonetheless, every CCG case site had its own unique blend of commissioning models.
With the commercial provider model, the provider won an outsourced contract to take over all
commissioning responsibilities for a NHS team. Along with high-quality data, accountability and tight
performance management of providers was stressed (‘no data, no payment’). Without mechanisms to
transfer commercial provider skills into the NHS/CSU, the NHS clients effectively became completely reliant
on the commercial provider, as the contract was expected to run for at least 10 years.
Knowledge acquisition
Commissioners sought out information to build a cohesive, persuasive case for commissioning
decisions. Commissioners purposefully looked for information to identify which course to take and
navigate a way through. Knowledge was acquired, modified and transformed in manoeuvring it through
the system. They juggled competing agendas, priorities, power relationships, demands and their own
inclinations – to make the ‘best’ decision circumstances allowed. Just as there is an ‘art of medicine’,
this was the ‘art of commissioning’.
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Sources of information for commissioners included people (such as clinicians, commissioning managers,
analysts, patients and the public, commercial and not-for-profit providers, and freelance consultants) and
organisations [such as local public health departments, CSUs, health-care providers, Department of Health,
the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and think-tanks such as The King’s Fund and
the Nuffield Trust]. Tool-based information came from software tools from commercial providers, national
benchmarking and local dashboards. Academic research was occasionally explicitly sought, but usually this
was present in a form that was already digested, transformed and embedded into NICE guidance,
software tools, the clinical knowledge of GPs and local briefings. Disinvestment opportunities highlighted
by academic research did not appear to trigger debate or influence commissioners’ thinking.
Local data often trumped national or research-based information in persuading commissioners on a course
of action. Conversations and stories were important, as oral methods were fast and flexible, which suited
the changing world of commissioning. Unsolicited documentation was ubiquitous and often sent
electronically. Commissioners used internet search engines such as Google™ (www.google.com) and
Google Scholar™ (www.scholar.google.com) to find required information. Once acquired, indeed in the
very act of its acquisition, information went through many transformation cycles to be rejected, filtered
and/or modified before further dissemination.
Knowledge acquisition was interwoven with knowledge transformation in multilayered, multifaceted and
nested ways. The five main conduits through which knowledge flowed were:
l interpersonal relationships, whereby commissioners sought information held by others with whom they
had ongoing relationships
l people placement, whereby commissioners accessed information embodied by external consultants,
who were placed among them with particular skills and experiences
l governance, whereby commissioners were expected to act on information from elsewhere
(e.g. Department of Health, NHS England teams) or set up internal structures and processes in their role
as publicly accountable, statutory organisations
l copy, adapt and paste, whereby commissioners accessed information from initiatives elsewhere which
might be locally applicable
l product deployment, whereby commissioners accessed information held in electronic or non-electronic
tools and methods.
Commissioners employed the knowledge transformation processes of contextualisation to apply a local
lens and engagement to refine the knowledge and ensure that the right people were involved and
on board.
Face-to-face encounters were important in facilitating interpersonal relationships. People placement and
product deployment implicitly relied on creating interpersonal relationships. Of all the conduits,
interpersonal relationships appeared most crucial in influencing commissioning decisions. Without this
comingling of conduits, commissioners struggled to interpret data outputs without interpreters on hand.
External providers
External providers were contracted for their knowledge, skills and expertise in many areas including project
management, forecast modelling, event management, pathway development, software tool development,
analytics and stakeholder engagement. Commercial providers could bring a specialist ‘big picture’ view,
offered an independent view to challenge local stakeholders, drew in knowledge from international and
national sources and sometimes just filled capacity gaps.
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Trust and usability (i.e. ease of use) influenced clients’ views on the usefulness of external output. The
motivations of Public Health and CSUs were more trusted, but the usefulness of their output was variable;
for example, some thought that Public Health overstressed the inequalities agenda at the expense of
more valuable outputs such as service evaluations and evidence reviews (high trust+ variable usability).
Freelance consultants were perceived as less threatening than commercial providers. Their output was well
contextualised to their client, as often freelance consultants were former employees of their clients and so
had useful local knowledge (high trust+ high usability). In contrast, although commercial consultants
often had ex-NHS or public sector backgrounds, they were sometimes viewed as threats, either to
the stability of the NHS or professionally by particular individuals. The usefulness of their contribution
was variable and they lacked local knowledge (low trust+ variable usability). Not-for-profit providers
encountered less hostility than commercial companies. Sometimes commercial and not-for-profit agencies
were subcontracted by other commercial/not-for-profit suppliers and client trust was further challenged
if clients were not allowed direct access to the subcontractors.
Benefits and disadvantages
The definition of ‘successful’ contracts was largely based on client satisfaction that the objectives had been
met, although some contracts stipulated cash savings (e.g. one contract required savings of £200M over
4 years). Other signs of a successful partnership were that the outputs were still in use, contracts were
extended or the external provider was recontracted for other work.
The long-standing schism between analytics and commissioning in the NHS was particularly notable in this
study. Participating commercial and not-for-profit providers tended to deploy software tools for better data
generation. In assessing impact, commissioners often could not identify benefits because the work of
external organisations targeted and benefited health-care analysts more than commissioners. External
providers had difficulty persuading, either directly or indirectly, the decision-makers to make use of the
new knowledge. In addition, those supplying software tools sometimes offered ‘solutions looking for a
problem’ rather than developing solutions in response to real problems identified and experienced by
their clients.
Within this study, overall impact by commercial and not-for-profit providers on commissioning
decision-making was patchy. In one contract, NHS clients generally thought the contribution of the
external provider was comparable with public sector input and added little of extra value. This contract
ended early with the commercial provider payments docked for poor performance. In another, the
relationship was better, but at the time of fieldwork (2012) the benefits were more notional than actual,
as it was early days. With a third external provider, clients were quite impressed with some examples of
excellent work, but a minority questioned if the benefits justified the expense. This external provider was
recontracted by two commissioning organisations, which suggested good levels of client satisfaction,
although with one contract we were unable to obtain enough NHS client views to form a firm conclusion.
A primary reason for unsuccessful contracts was that clients did not want to work with external providers.
Contractual relationships were sometimes ‘forced’ because of concerns around NHS performance and
sometimes procured without their involvement. At other times, frontline operational staff did not identify
the same need for assistance as their colleagues or external providers were contracted in response to
Department of Health directives. Another hindrance was lack of clarity around the brief, often because the
client was not entirely clear about the problem or the desired outcome. The rapidly changing nature of
the commissioning environment made it difficult to keep the brief relevant; successful external providers
continually reconfigured objectives.
External providers who really understood the health-care market and could add extra value were more
appreciated, as were those who incorporated a way of transferring knowledge so that clients were not
dependent long term. Good relationships between the external provider and client also facilitated better
knowledge exchange. Knowledge exchange was possible only if both sides were receptive.
SCIENTIFIC SUMMARY
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Conclusions
By easing the way for greater competition between commercial, not-for-profit and other external provider
involvement in the NHS, new legislation in 2012 led to the creation of a number of new ‘external’
organisations that were intended to aid commissioning. These included CSUs, and public health
departments within local authorities, as well as commercial and not-for-profit agencies and freelance
consultants. One consequence of this proliferation of competing organisations among our case studies
was to curtail freely exchanged knowledge transfer. The growing multiplicity of organisational boundaries
not only frustrated knowledge exchange but also established substantial barriers to the NHS clients’ scope
for strengthening commissioning skills within the NHS by learning from these external providers.
Where knowledge exchange occurred, external providers who maximised their use of the different
conduits and produced something of value beyond what was locally available appeared more successful.
The long-standing schism between NHS information producers (analysts) and users (commissioners)
blunted the impact of some contracts on commissioners’ decision-making. To capitalise on the expertise of
external providers and consider legacy planning, external providers and their NHS clients should include
explicit knowledge transfer components within the contract, where possible.
Funding
Funding for this study was provided by the Health Services and Delivery Research programme of the
National Institute for Health Research.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Changes to health-care commissioning during the lifetime of
the study
Recent history suggests that there will always be some mix of public sector, clinician and commercial
involvement in NHS health-care commissioning, even if the balance shifts under successive governments.
This research spanned 6 turbulent years within the NHS, during which that balance changed considerably.
This study was conceived in 2008, at the time the then Labour government emphasised improving the
competencies of commissioners through World Class Commissioning (WCC).1 At this time, NHS
commissioning was mainly led by managers in about 150 organisations known as ‘primary care trusts’
(PCTs). The main vehicle to draw on clinical expertise was known as ‘practice-based commissioning’ (PBC),
which was established in 2005, and later promoted under the WCC initiative. PBC, however, struggled
to engage clinicians.2 Meanwhile, commercial providers were gaining greater ground with the advent of
the Framework for procuring External Services for Commissioners (FESC), launched in November 2007.
FESC was an initiative whereby 14 commercial providers went through an authorisation process and were
approved to aid PCTs in commissioning health-care services.
When this study was designed and submitted at the outline stage in August 2009, NHS health-care
commissioners were defined as ‘PCT managers’, clinical input to commissioning was relatively minimal or
variable across the country and the outlook for commercial companies was promising.
This changed substantially after funding for the study was awarded in June 2010. After the 2010 election,
the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government brought in a major NHS reorganisation with
the stated aim of transferring commissioning power from managers to clinicians, specifically general
practitioners (GPs). With Liberating the NHS,3 PCTs were to be abolished by April 2013 and their
commissioning responsibilities allocated to over 200 Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and NHS
England. Public Health, which for many PCTs had been an important conduit of research evidence, moved
to local authorities. The analytical function of PCTs was hived off into independent commissioning support
units (CSUs) expected to be self-sufficient by 2016. A major impact of the Health and Social Care Act of
20124 was to externalise much of what had been previously internal to local commissioning organisations
(e.g. analytics, Public Health).
Unsurprisingly with this degree of flux, identifying the ‘commissioners’ became increasingly difficult during
fieldwork, as PCTs moved into PCT clusters, shedding staff through reconfigurations, CCGs emerged
out of General Practice Commissioning Groups and PCTs, and CCGs negotiated the transition of
commissioning responsibilities. PCTs no longer contracted commercial companies for commissioning
support, as PCTs were soon to be defunct, and neither did CCGs, as CCGs often did not hold budgets
because they were in shadow form. The term ‘external provider’ became synonymous with ‘commercial
provider’, although the implications of Liberating the NHS3 meant that the health-care market was
increasingly open to not-for-profit organisations such as social enterprises and the voluntary sector.
When fieldwork began in early 2011, a commissioner could be defined as either a PCT manager or a GP
commissioner and clinical input was increasing, but contracts with external providers such as commercial
companies and not-for-profits were limited. Protests led by groups such as 38 degrees (www.38degrees.
org.uk) and Keep our NHS Public (www.keepournhspublic.com) were common, because of fears that
Liberating the NHS3 would privatise the running of the NHS. Moreover, the proposed changes had limited
support from doctors, without whom they would flounder.5 In the summer of 2011 in light of the
controversy, the coalition government instituted a ‘pause’ for further consultation, which added confusion
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and delay to the commissioning reforms and our project. Over the 2 years of data collection since, the
situation has settled and it is possible to delineate commissioners and those who provide commissioning
support and advice. This culminated with authorisation of CCGs in April 2013.
At the time of writing (early 2014), about 60% of the commissioning budget and contingent
responsibilities lay with CCGs, which had substantial clinical leadership. Commercial companies were
steadily increasing their business, with the aid of the ‘Lead Provider Framework’ which included assured
suppliers of health and social care support services.6 These suppliers were winning contracts from CCGs
and, in some cases, forming partnerships with CSUs, many of which employed former PCT staff. In
addition, a host of external providers taking multiple organisational forms had sprung up.7,8
Research questions and objectives
Throughout the span of the study, our chief interest was exploring knowledge exchange processes
between those responsible for NHS health-care commissioning with others internal and external to their
organisations, even as those classified as ‘internal’ and ‘external’ were continually changing. We used
the term ‘knowledge exchange’ (rather than ‘knowledge transfer’ or ‘research implementation’) as
information, research evidence, expertise, skills and innovations such as research-based software are all
forms or applications of ‘knowledge’, and ‘exchange’ best describes how knowledge is transformed
through the interaction of two or more parties. We wanted to know what knowledge was needed, where
it was obtained and how it was transformed and fed into NHS commissioners’ decision-making. Although
we had a particular interest in research-based evidence, for the purposes of this study all sources of
knowledge were included.
The reorganisation of commissioning following the 2012 Health and Social Care Act4 impacted on our
exploration of the research questions. The upheavals were a major part of the context in which the
participants in our research were operating, and the impact of the Act was a running theme throughout
our data. However, that process of change was a unique event that we were not funded to evaluate.
Although this inevitably remained an important part of the context, we eventually took the view that it
should not form a major part of our analysis.
The focus of enquiry on knowledge exchange remained constant, although the research questions and
aims were regularly updated because of the changing NHS landscape. By adopting a qualitative approach
using ethnographic techniques, the study was flexible enough to adapt. Moreover, it complemented other
research commissioned by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Services Delivery and
Organisation research programme such as the use of evidence in health-care management decisions,9
health-care managers’ use of and access to management research,10 management practice among middle
managers and GPs11 and the commissioning of long-term conditions.12 Those studies have given a valuable
picture of how PCT managers and GPs drew on research evidence and other sources to inform their
commissioning decisions. This study builds on that literature by providing early insight into CCGs and the
growing band of external purveyors of knowledge and information including commercial providers,
not-for-profit agencies, CSUs and Public Health.
The study was structured around four research questions. They were:
1. How do health-care commissioners access research evidence and other sources of knowledge to aid
their commissioning decisions?
2. What is the nature and role of agencies that provide commissioning expertise from the public
(e.g. Public Health), private (e.g. commercial providers) and other sectors (e.g. not-for-profit)?
3. What are the processes by which health-care commissioners transform information provided by other
agencies into useable knowledge that is embedded in commissioning decisions?
4. What are the benefits and disadvantages?
INTRODUCTION
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In answering these questions, this study had the following objectives:
(a) to describe models of commissioning expertise, including private (e.g. commercial providers) and public
sector (e.g. clinical consortia, specialist commissioning)
(b) to elucidate how diverse health-care commissioners and other providers of commissioning expertise
access, assimilate, integrate and utilise managerial and clinical research
(c) to establish how existing professionals with expertise in commissioning from the public (e.g. Public
Health practitioners) and private sector (e.g. management consultants) transform and market their
managerial and clinical knowledge
(d) to examine how knowledge is exchanged between commercial agencies and public sector bodies and
how that knowledge is embedded and applied in the commissioning process
(e) to explore the perceived benefits and disadvantages of these exchanges
(f) to identify actionable messages and disseminate them to commissioners, policy-makers and external
providers using effective knowledge exchange strategies.
Structure of this report
The next chapter of this report covers the methods used in the study, including information on the case
sites. Chapter 3 is the first results chapter and discusses the nature of commissioning. Chapter 4 covers
models of commissioning to provide greater understanding of what commissioners do, before going on to
describe the contributions of others such as commercial providers to commissioning processes. Chapter 5
focuses on the knowledge acquisition and Chapter 6 discusses knowledge transformation. Chapter 7
covers the role and function of external providers. Chapter 8 offers in-depth accounts of three contractual
relationships. Chapter 9 reports the benefits and disadvantages of these processes and Chapter 10 details
the key findings and implications of this study.
Box 1 summarises the key points of this chapter.
BOX 1 Key points of Chapter 1
l The aim of this research is to study knowledge exchange between those responsible for commissioning
NHS services and external agencies.
l Since this project was conceived in 2008, the NHS landscape has changed remarkably as a result of the
organisational changes set out in Liberating the NHS.3 Consequently, several functions that were formerly
considered ‘internal’ in PCT structures (e.g. analytics or Public Health) now have ‘external’ status.
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Chapter 2 Methods
Research design
The aim of this research was to study knowledge exchange between NHS commissioners and internal and
external agencies. We chose a case study design as case studies are useful in answering exploratory
questions, especially when the investigator has little control over events and when the focus is a
contemporary phenomenon with real-life context.13 Within the cases, we collected data through a variety
of ethnographic techniques such as semistructured interviews, observations and documentary analysis.
We provide more details about data collection and analysis later in this chapter, but first, we discuss
recruitment. Because of the complexities, a major portion of this chapter is dedicated to explaining how,
who and why we recruited participants as we did. This detail has been provided also because the scientific
advisor from our funders, NIHR Health Service and Delivery Research, asked for a full description to give
guidance to those wishing to study commercial providers in the future, as this has rarely been accomplished
before in this context.
The phenomenon in this research was knowledge exchange, but identifying case boundaries proved
challenging. Reassuringly, Ragin and Becker argue that it is counterproductive to have strong
preconceptions of the case boundaries as this hampers conceptual development. Instead, researchers need
to continually ask themselves ‘What is the case?’, to reconfigure what is inside (and outside) case
boundaries and reclarify the phenomenon under study.14 This was certainly our experience.
Initially, our intention was to construct cases around contracts of 6 months’ duration or more with
significant knowledge exchange between commercial providers and their NHS clients. These criteria were
selected to exclude one-off consultancy activities such as contract negotiation or pathway development,
where knowledge exchange was presumed to be minimal. Our assumption was that each contract would
clearly engage a set of external providers and their NHS clients and data collection would involve gathering
sets of accounts from both.
Ethical permission was obtained from South West Research Ethics Committee 2 on 25 November 2010
(10/H0206/52). Local research governance approvals were obtained from all 11 PCTs where the study
external providers were working. Service support costs were agreed to cover the study costs of
participants, but no one asked for financial reimbursement for taking part.
Recruitment of external providers
To recruit commercial providers, our starting point was that the study lead (LW) had a long-standing
relationship with the chief executive of one commercial provider. Relying on these types of prior contacts to
recruit study participants is an accepted feature of ethnographic15 and case-study research.13 The chief
executive first informally sounded out the key leads from other commercial providers verbally and then by
e-mail, furnishing an information sheet about the study, which was then supplied by the research team.
Where a commercial provider showed interest, contact details were supplied to LW, who followed up with
a telephone call and further written information. Only two commercial providers were approached and
both agreed (see Recruitment and data collection via the first commercial provider and Recruitment
and data collection via the second commercial provider for further details). We attempted to recruit a
third commercial provider without this introduction and received no response.
Through our work with Swallow, we encountered a not-for-profit agency that offered a software tool
marketed and supported by Swallow. Given that our fieldwork with Swallow and Heron suggested
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that antipathies towards the for-profit sector might hamper knowledge exchange, we recruited this
not-for-profit (Jackdaw – pseudonym) to learn more about how such organisations fared (see Recruitment
and data collection via not-for-profit agency for further details).
Four CCGs located in areas where Swallow and/or Heron had worked were also recruited (see Recruitment
of Clinical Commissioning Groups for a fuller explanation). Through fieldwork with these CCGs, we
encountered many other external providers offering support to commissioners including freelance analysts
and former NHS commissioners, for-profit organisations with particular subject and methods expertise
and not-for-profit agencies lobbying for particular patient groups. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1,
several units that started out as ‘internal’ moved to external provider status such as Public Health.
Wherever possible, we interviewed these providers to augment our understanding of the type, range and
usefulness of external provider input to commissioner decision-making.
Recruitment and data collection via the first
commercial provider
Data collection started with Swallow, a medium-sized UK-based commercial company that worked
exclusively with public sector clients in health, education and government. Offering a suite of software
tools for invoice validation, auditing best place of care, risk prediction and predictive modelling, Swallow
consultants often had NHS or public service backgrounds in analytics or commissioning.
When fieldwork began in early 2011, Swallow was engaged in two contracts that met our criteria, but one
was nearly finished; we therefore chose the second, which was just beginning the second of 4 years.
Worth over £20M with 40–50 Swallow staff involved, this contract was one of the largest ever negotiated
between commercial providers and NHS commissioners. With the contract covering an entire region, the
aim was to deploy the suite of software tools to the analytics units of local commissioning organisations,
train NHS analysts in using the tools and supply ‘wrap around’ support from consultants with
commissioning expertise to help commissioners translate output from the tools into commissioning
decisions. Importantly, the contract dictated that although Swallow staff could operate the tools and
recommend actions to ‘realise benefits’ (estimated at £200M), the NHS staff were tasked with putting
those recommendations into effect. Swallow received payment only once both parties agreed that the
‘deliverables’ had been met.
With respect to our study, this contract afforded multiple avenues of enquiry (and potential cases), as several
commissioning organisations were involved. Interviewing began with the Swallow director and programme
manager for the contract. Through snowball sampling, we interviewed a further 13 Swallow staff including
analysts and those with commissioning expertise, making a total of 15 Swallow interviews. We also observed
one internal and one mixed Swallow/NHS meeting and one informal and three formal training events led by
Swallow staff for NHS participants. Moreover, Swallow was particularly generous in sharing documentation
such as training materials, progress reports, PowerPoint (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA, USA)
presentations and software guides.
By the end of the summer of 2011, saturation was reached with Swallow professionals, as little new
information was emerging, but further data collection with their NHS clients was necessary. Wherever
possible, we approached NHS staff observed and named in interviews by Swallow staff; however, few NHS
staff agreed to be interviewed, partly because of the heightened turbulence resulting from the recent
reorganisations and possibly because our independence might have been questioned as our introductions
had come via Swallow. We planned to recruit more through future observations, as the changes in the
NHS settled. However, our potential pool of NHS clients suddenly dried up as Swallow was bought out by
a much bigger company (Tern), which abruptly discontinued involvement in the study in September 2011,
preventing the identification of potential new candidates. In total, we interviewed 10 NHS staff in direct
contact with Swallow before losing access.
METHODS
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This left us with murky case boundaries. The data did not fall neatly into matched Swallow–NHS accounts
within specific geographical areas around a clear contract, partly because of the paucity of NHS data
but also because Swallow consultants worked across several PCTs, making data concentration more
difficult. An exception was the use of a Swallow tool for auditing best place of care.
Developed in North America, this tool consisted of care standards informed by research-based evidence
and expert opinion. Clinical auditors applied the standards in real time, inputting data from patient notes
to determine if current inpatients were in the best place of care. A previous audit using this tool at a local
hospital had not been very successful. Swallow staff had exclusively conducted the first audit and their
results were challenged by the acute providers. Nine months later, a second audit was initiated, which
coincided with our fieldwork. This second audit was led jointly by the PCT and acute and community
providers with Swallow support. In this instance, we interviewed the Swallow tool lead, observed a
NHS/Swallow planning meeting, interviewed four NHS staff (two commissioners and two senior provider
managers) and attended a CCG meeting where the results of the audit were presented. Documentary
evidence included meeting minutes, the audit tool template, the software product guide, a draft action
plan for the PCT, an audit report and e-mails between LW and commissioners several months after
the audit.
This body of evidence gave useful, balanced information about the phenomenon of knowledge exchange
between commissioners and commercial providers and so became a separate Swallow ‘case’ known as
‘Swallow tool’. Other Swallow interview, observation and documentary data were amalgamated into this
second distinct Swallow case, albeit with only a few NHS accounts dispersed across several geographical
areas known as ‘Swallow’. Some NHS participants appear in more than one case study and only three are
exclusive to the ‘Swallow’ case. The Swallow data provided valuable information about the methods and
mind-set of Swallow consultants. Moreover, two of the commissioning organisations ultimately recruited in
the latter half of fieldwork were located in the region of the original Swallow contract.
Recruitment and data collection via the second
commercial provider
Shortly after our contact with Swallow was prematurely terminated, data collection started with Heron
in the autumn of 2011. Heron was a UK subsidiary of a much larger international company. Heron offered
software tools for invoice validation and risk prediction, in addition to an electronic tool that advised
GPs on the most clinically effective and cost-effective medications for their patients during consultations.
Heron’s staff of around 130 people with analytical, project management and clinical backgrounds included
approximately 10% who were North American. Again, data collection started with senior leaders,
specifically the head of Heron UK and a director, and continued with Heron personnel identified through
snowball sampling. At the close of fieldwork, saturation with Heron was reached, with 16 interviews with
project managers, analysts and clinical staff, one observation of a training session and documentation such
as marketing brochures, e-mails and the website.
Findings emerging from Swallow suggested that little knowledge exchange with commissioners occurred
in the early to mid-point of contracts. So, with Heron, we wanted contracts that had either finished or
were towards their end. Data collection started with Heron during the ‘hunger gap’ between the PCTs
disbanding and CCG authorisation in the autumn of 2011 to summer 2012, when few commercial
opportunities arose. Our quest to find mature or completed contracts was well timed, because Heron had
four contracts with former PCTs that met our criteria. This was rapidly reduced to three, because
relationships with NHS clients at a fourth site were somewhat precarious. Although Heron were not averse
to including this site in the study, they felt that limited knowledge had been exchanged, compared with
the others.
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One contract was for Westhide (pseudonym). Starting in 2009, the remit of this 3-year rolling contract was
for Heron to directly manage a portfolio of contracts with a group of acute trusts offering specialist care to
patients with rare conditions. This provided unique insight into how commercial providers would manage
commissioning responsibilities if these functions were outsourced. Unfortunately, although we interviewed
four of the eight frontline Heron staff working on this project, only two NHS participants were willing
to be interviewed. One was interviewed in 2012 when we were in the field and she suggested three
other possible NHS participants, none of whom agreed to be interviewed. In fact, two sent an identically
worded e-mail:
Many thanks for your e-mail but I am going to have to decline your request to assist with
this research.
Surmising that perhaps the timing of interview invitations was unfavourable, we made a final attempt to
find NHS candidates for this potential case in early 2014. Three new NHS names were suggested, of whom
one responded to requests for an interview. Although this was better than before, two NHS client
interviews were not sufficient to include Westhide as a case site in its own right. Instead, its data formed
part of the ‘Heron’ case study (see Chapter 4, Commercial provider commissioning model).
Heron also put forward a second contract with Deanshire. We contacted the NHS project manager lead for
Deanshire on several occasions by e-mail and got no response. Heron also contacted this lead on our
behalf without success. Eventually, we bypassed this individual, requested permission to recruit the CCG
directly from its board and were given approval. Three NHS participants subsequently interviewed had
contact with Heron.
In contrast, recruiting from the third Heron contract was relatively smooth. The ‘Penborough’ contract
initially ran for 2 years and was renewed for a third. It had three aims: (1) to increase the competency
of commissioners for WCC assurance; (2) to develop a community engagement model to feed into
commissioning decisions; and (3) to support the integration of health and social care in commissioning.
With a few reminders and some prodding, three NHS participants with direct contact with Heron
were interviewed.
Once again our data did not neatly fall into paired Heron–NHS accounts around a clear contract, except
for Penborough. So, we separated out the Penborough data into their own case (see Penborough, below)
and amalgamated the 16 Heron interviews, one observation, documentation and five NHS participant
interviews into a case called ‘Heron’.
Recruitment and data collection via not-for-profit agency
As previously mentioned, having collected data from two commercial providers, we were interested in
learning more about the not-for-profit sector. Our point of contact with Jackdaw was a Swallow NHS
participant, who took part in Jackdaw training. This training came about when the Swallow contract was
renegotiated (for a second time), following the takeover of Swallow by Tern in the summer of 2011.
The NHS negotiators stipulated greater contact between the original developers of Swallow’s tools
(i.e. Jackdaw and several other companies) and the wider NHS clients.
Jackdaw was a very small not-for-profit provider, which had developed and refined a risk prediction tool
through research carried out over 30 years, and continued its strong links with academic institutions. At
the time of data collection, the UK branch of Jackdaw consisted of one full-time consultant who reported
to a managing director in Europe, both of whom were interviewed. Through didactic, online webinars,
the knowledge exchanged in this particular case study was between Jackdaw staff (nationally and
internationally) as tool experts and seven NHS clients of diverse backgrounds (analytics, commissioning)
from different commissioning organisations to help the NHS clients become ‘superusers’. We invited all
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seven NHS participants to interview and three accepted. We also ‘observed’ a virtual webinar session.
Data were collected from May 2012 to January 2013.
We would have liked to have recruited further not-for-profit organisations, but the only other potentially
suitable candidate did not respond to requests for interview. Thus, our conclusions about the role of
not-for-profit agencies are somewhat tempered.
Recruitment of Clinical Commissioning Groups
By May 2012, when data collection with Swallow and Heron was complete, concerns were rising about
the lack of NHS participation in the study. Moreover, preliminary findings suggested that capturing impact
on commissioning decisions was difficult, as it was largely analysts who benefited (or not) from the use
of the software tools. This meant that answering our research questions about how commissioners
(i.e. decision-makers) accessed, transformed and used external knowledge was impeded. We had shied
away from more direct recruitment of CCGs as commissioners’ attention was understandably absorbed
by changes in the NHS. However, in the summer of 2012, we decided to proactively target the CCGs
where Swallow and Heron had been most active, inviting staff from these CCGs into the study regardless
of their previous level of contact with Swallow and Heron. Two CCGs were recruited from Swallow’s
geographical patch (Norchester and Carnford) and two from where Heron had previous contracts
(Penborough and Deanshire).
Norchester
To recruit Norchester, LW opportunistically met an influential Norchester GP at a conference. This
academic GP agreed to an interview and then liaised with the chief operating officer of the CCG on our
behalf to recruit the CCG.
Norchester CCG was a highly research-aware organisation, largely because of the involvement of this GP
academic. Although Norchester was in an affluent area in England, the CCG was facing considerable
financial challenges with targeted savings of over £20M by 2014. Nationally known for its pioneering
initiatives, the CCG’s primary, somewhat high-risk, strategy for reducing unsustainable spending was to
modify about 40% of their contracts by (1) rewarding providers on the basis of achieving outcomes such
as fewer deaths in hospital rather than activity (e.g. number of procedures) and (2) commissioning a lead
provider who then subcontracted other providers. Information and knowledge to support this work came
from local CSU analysts employing Swallow’s risk prediction tool and several commercial and not-for-profit
agencies with expertise in Public Health, contracting, business case development and condition expertise.
Norchester was split into localities of different sizes; the largest locality covered a population of 150,000.
The CCG was in considerable flux during the first period of fieldwork (summer 2011), which had stabilised
by the second period of fieldwork (December 2012 to May 2013), shortly before authorisation. Public
Health and CSU colleagues (formerly known as the ‘Decision Support Unit’) were colocated in the same
building, although some Public Health professionals also worked in local authority premises. Participants
for Norchester were selected on the basis of involvement with Swallow and its tools and role in
organisation (e.g. senior leaders). Again, snowball sampling was the principal method of identifying
appropriate candidates. Data collection is itemised in Table 1.
Carnford
We were directed to Carnford via a Swallow NHS participant. Carnford covered a 210,000+ population
with generally low deprivation in England, and was one of several CCGs operating in the same county.
They were under serious financial pressure, having received one of the lowest allocations in England, and
felt that ‘operating at the edge of bankruptcy’ had been normalised in their area. There was a lot of
interest in data and tools as a route to finding solutions to their problems, and those offering knowledge
based on research evidence were enthusiastically received. Public Health and the local CSU were both
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03190 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 19
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Wye et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
9
working closely with the CCG to find ways to provide the knowledge and support they wanted, but the
CCG had also engaged an external provider with an accountancy background (Bullfinch: pseudonym)
to work on a number of specific projects.
Our first interview was with a GP who was using the Swallow risk prediction tool for end-of-life care.
This GP was a member of the Unscheduled Care Board (UCB) that reported to the ‘Clinical Cabinet’, which
was described as the CCG’s ‘engine room’ where clinical priorities were identified and work streams were
monitored. Perhaps because our entry point was via the UCB, data for this CCG were more operational
than strategic. Participants for Carnford were selected on the basis of role in the organisation (e.g. senior
leaders, purveyors of research or data) and involvement with Swallow and its tools. Observation at
meetings and snowball sampling were the principal methods of identifying appropriate candidates. Data
collection ran from May 2012 to May 2013 and is itemised in Table 2.
TABLE 1 Data collection for Norchester
Data type Data source
Observations and associated documents
(two observations, total duration 5 hours
50 minutes, 28 documents)
CCG shadow governing body meetings December 2012 (held in public,
10 meeting papers) and January 2013 (not held in public, 18 meeting papers)
Interviews (11 interviews, total transcribed
duration 8 hours 4 minutes)
Four members of the CCG shadow governing body: a CCG accountable
officer (GP), two locality leads (both GPs), and a practice manager
Four analyst/information staff: a PCT lead analyst, a chief information lead,
a PCT/CSU analyst and a freelance analyst
CCG R&D lead (GP), ex-PCT chairperson (GP), CCG associate director of
strategy and governance
Additional documents (11 documents,
seven websites)
CEO’s report November 2013, commissioning report Phase 1 March 2013,
report of workshop event January 2013, three board papers November 2013
Questions to the board September and December 2013, statements on
procedures of limited clinical value from 2009, 2012 and 2013 (accessed
from Norchester website 6 December 2013)
Websites of three organisations working with the CCG
CEO, chief executive officer; R&D, research and development.
TABLE 2 Data collection for Carnford
Data type Data source
Observations and associated documents
(five observations, total duration 13 hours,
12 documents)
November 2012 (five meeting papers), January 2013 (minutes only) and
February 2013 (four meeting papers) meetings of UCB
March 2013 meeting of Clinical Cabinet (agenda only)
May clinical reference group meeting (agenda only)
Interviews (11 interviews, total transcribed
duration 6 hours 55 minutes)
Five members of the Clinical Cabinet: CCG accountable officer/Clinical
Cabinet chairperson, unscheduled care lead (also chairperson of UCB),
research/education/innovation lead, IT lead and Public Health representative
Three other members of UCB: lead on integrated care teams, integrated
services programme manager (contractor), and Public Health consultant
CSU information analyst working with UCB, CSU director of performance and
development, and a freelance analyst who was involved in evaluating risk
stratification tools for the local PCTs
Additional documents (five documents,
one website)
Briefing paper from Public Health on unplanned hospital admissions, two issues
of the local ‘Clinical Bulletin’, and two ‘pathway tool project’ documents
CCG website
IT, information technology.
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Penborough
Penborough CCG had contracted Heron for 3 years. This CCG covered a population of about 160,000 and
was in the most deprived quintile of local authority areas in England. NHS commissioners in Penborough
had a history of working in close partnership with the local authority to achieve an integrated
commissioning strategy for health and social care. With the Health and Social Care Act 2012,4 this
partnership was maintained and many key staff from the former commissioning structure were retained.
Working collaboratively with providers, the local authority, the community and other CCGs was an
ethically driven approach, but was also seen as the most efficient and effective way of commissioning.
They were idealistic, positive and regarded themselves as an effective commissioning organisation. They
also had the confidence to openly admit in CCG board meetings and interviews where improvements
could be made.
As stated previously, our entry point to this CCG was two Heron consultants. In keeping with a CCG that
prioritised patient involvement and integration with social care, this case had the broadest range of
participants. These were selected to include senior leaders, and those involved with Heron and its tools,
but also to reflect the organisation’s focus on including knowledge from clinical, managerial and
community perspectives. Observation at meetings and snowball sampling were the principal methods of
identifying appropriate candidates. Data collection took place from February 2012 to May 2013 and is
itemised in Table 3.
TABLE 3 Data collection for Penborough
Data type Data source
Observation and associated documents
(five observations, total duration
12.5 hours, 54 documents)
Three sequential bimonthly public meetings of the CCG governing board,
covering January to May 2013. Documents: 14 to 16 papers available in
advance of each meeting
One bimonthly CCG governing board workshop (April 2013).
Documents: agenda and copies of two presentations
One monthly meeting of the council formed of representatives from each
practice in the CCG (May 2013). Documents: agenda and copies of
four presentations
Interviews (12 interviews, total transcribed
duration 7.5 hours)
Seven members of the CCG governing board: chairperson, vice chairperson
(who is also chairperson of the Council of Members), finance director/deputy
chief executive, Public Health director (who is also lead for well-being and
prevention), sustainable services director, adult social care advisor and GP
representative (who is also clinical lead for the unscheduled care)
Four other CCG members: deputy chief finance officer, innovation and
research lead, service manager lead for unscheduled care and community
representative for unscheduled care
Two staff from private provider Heron Ltd who had worked with the
organisation before the transition to CCG structure (joint interview)
Additional documents (seven documents,
two websites)
Set of six documents and one web-based tool relating to business
case/service proposal development processes
Memorandum of Understanding with Public Health
CCG website
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Deanshire
Coterminous with its local authority, Deanshire was a county-wide CCG serving a largely rural population
of approximately half a million. The practices making up the CCG were organised into localities, each
of which nominated a representative to sit on the Clinical Operations Group, the ‘engine room’ of the
CCG. Deanshire had a somewhat conservative ethos in ensuring that the CCG ticked the right boxes and
was seen to be above board, possibly to maintain its reputation as a leading commissioning organisation,
but there were also several examples of innovative, inspiring projects focusing on improving patient care
carried out by committed staff.
Like Penborough, Deanshire had formerly contracted Heron but our entry point to this CCG was
through the director of commissioning development, who suggested that we focus our enquiry on two
commissioning initiatives: the reablement project and the acute stroke project. Work on the reablement
project began in 2010 and rollout of the redesigned reablement service across the county was ongoing at
the time of data collection. The acute stroke project was at a much earlier stage and grew out of broader
work around stroke, which had been instigated by the CCG in response to poor outcomes in Deanshire.
Heron’s presence in the data collected from the CCG was minimal, largely because the contract had stopped
several years prior to fieldwork, but other commercial providers of commissioning expertise were visible.
These included a commercial company that had worked on the reablement project and a project
management contractor who was working on the acute stroke project. Participants for Deanshire were
selected basis of role in the organisation (e.g. senior leaders) or in one of the two projects which had been
selected as foci. Observation at meetings and snowball sampling were the principal methods of identifying
appropriate candidates. Data collection took place from January to April 2013 and is itemised in Table 4.
TABLE 4 Data collection for Deanshire
Data type Data source
Observations and associated documents
(four observations, total duration 9 hours
45 minutes, 43 documents)
December 2012 CCG governing body public meeting. Documents: agenda
and 10 meeting papers
February and May 2013 Clinical Operations Group meetings (March/April
meetings closed to non-CCG members). Documents: agenda and eight
meeting papers (February), plus agenda and 17 meeting papers
Acute stroke project meeting in February 2013. Documents: agenda and
four meeting papers
Interviews (14 interviews, total transcribed
duration 9 hours 44 minutes)
Seven members of the CCG: governing body chairperson, clinical operations
group vice chairperson, director of clinical commissioning development,
director of strategy and patient engagement, head of pathway development,
head of federation development and a commissioning manager
One member of local authority staff, who had worked with the NHS
commissioners on the reablement project, and one Public Health consultant
Five commercial providers of commissioning expertise: two staff each from
two large companies which had worked in the area, and one project
manager who worked as a contractor on the acute stroke project
Additional documents (one document,
one website)
‘Prioritisation principles’ document for planning
CCG website
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Summary of cases and data collection methods
At the completion of fieldwork, eight cases were identified from the data and we had a spread of data
with NHS and external provider accounts. In total, we collected interview data from 92 participants
[47 NHS clients, 36 external provider consultants and nine other participants (e.g. freelance consultants,
lay representative and so on)] and conducted 25 observations.
Interview participants were sent information sheets electronically before interviews and written
(or recorded) consent was obtained. The initial topic guide was devised by the research team and covered
type of information wanted, sources of information, and how that information was accessed and fed into
decision-making. The topic guide was regularly revised as new questions emerged and others appeared to
have been answered. Interviews were face to face or by telephone, depending on the preference of the
participant and practicalities. Lasting 20–60 minutes, all interviews were recorded and transcribed.
Prior permission to observe activities was obtained by researchers before attending events. Chairpersons
and training leads mentioned the research and researcher’s presence at the start of events, sometimes with
the researcher absent from the room. Observation notes were taken, with the help of an aide memoire
based on the research questions. Notes taken during observation included details of who was present,
room layout, verbal exchanges, participant reactions and researcher reflections. Observation notes were
typed up as soon as possible after the data were collected. All interview and observation participants were
given pseudonyms.
A range of documentary data were collected to supplement, confirm and challenge emerging findings
from interview and observation data. These included meeting minutes, reports, websites, marketing
material, press releases and e-mails. These data fed into the second phase of data analysis (Table 5).
Data analysis
Several theoretical influences were present in our thinking while we were analysing the data, including
ideas from the knowledge management literature.
Brown and Duguid’s notion16 of the ‘social life of information’ was useful. They argue, for example, that
innovative knowledge ‘flows in social rather than digital networks’, and see successful innovation as
dependent on ‘the bringing together of abstract information and situated knowledge’. They emphasise the
importance of local knowledge and the role of social networks in grounding knowledge in practical
contexts. They stress that informal exchanges such as stories are key to the way that knowledge moves
through organisations.17 Consequently, the notion of ‘communities of practice’ was also key to our
analysis, as an important way in which people share knowledge and also connect informally and formally
across boundaries, such as departments, disciplines and organisations, to share expertise and learning and
to develop knowledge-in-practice.18,19 Gabbay and le May’s work on collective mindlines provides a further
dimension to the role of collective sense-making in primary care decision-making.20,21 These ideas are
concordant with Weick’s analyses of collective ‘organisational sense-making’, where context and
understanding are mutually enacted.22
Nonaka’s model of knowledge creation,23 which describes how knowledge is created and assimilated, also
seemed relevant. This suggests a sequence of conversions of knowledge between tacit and explicit that
enable people in organisations to share (mostly practical) knowledge. This author originally described a
continuing cycle of socialisation (learning how things are actually done day to day in that organisation),
externalisation (exposing implicit and tacit knowledge, e.g. through story-telling and mutual observation),
combination (of that explicit knowledge with other sources of knowledge often in guidance documents,
manuals or intranets) and internalisation (by individuals working in that environment). However,
subsequent critiques have suggested that this so-called ‘SECI cycle’ misunderstands the nature of tacit
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knowledge and that a more nuanced view is required. Cook and Brown, for example, argue that
organisations come to know by ‘bridging epistemologies’ in a process of productive enquiry termed a
‘generative dance’.24 Nonetheless, the underlying SECI elements still seemed germane to the way
commissioners might treat knowledge.
Analysis was guided by constant comparison methods, whereby data were compared across categories,
continually refined and fed back into further data collection (and analysis) cycles, as is usual with
high-quality qualitative studies.25 Preliminary analysis started in June 2011, a few months after data
collection began. The research team had regular face-to-face meetings every 6 months and teleconferences
in between (about every 6–8 weeks). In preparation, individual team members were sent two to three pieces
of data (e.g. two interviews and an observation) and asked to read through these documents, identify
emerging themes and key learning points, reflect on the research questions and suggest any possible new
questions for the topic guide. Covering all eight cases, eight batches of data were analysed and
discussed successively.
The next phase of analysis began in May 2013, when fieldwork came to a close. The research associate
(EB) developed a coding framework, in collaboration with LW and AC, based on the research questions.
Using NVivo software (QSR International, Warrington, UK), she systematically coded cases independently.
In addition, EB and LW developed 20–50-page case summaries for each case. Drawing on all interview,
observation and documentary data for each case, these summaries included a ‘thumbnail sketch’, key
findings, details of data collection and useful quotes. Each summary was structured into:
l models of commissioning
l external providers
l knowledge/information accessed
l knowledge transformation processes
l benefits/disadvantages.
From October 2013, every member of the research team read the summaries independently and wrote up
their reflections. Drawing on the research questions, each researcher conducted a cross-case analysis,
identifying key themes common to the cases as well as discrepant data. In January 2014, we held a
day-long meeting to discuss and agree themes. As in past team meetings, discrepant data were debated,
with data confirming/negating particular positions presented, until agreement among the group was
reached. In fact, disagreements tended to be more about nuances rather than clear differences
in perspectives.
A final stage of analysis took place while writing up the report. Data were compiled and compared
separately for each of the five domains (e.g. models of commissioning, external providers) from the data
summaries, analyses from previous team meetings and sometimes the sound files from digitally recorded
steering meetings. Draft chapters were produced, distributed to the team for comment and revised.
One key question was whether or not to undertake, as part of this report, a substantial analysis of the
impact of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act4 on the world we were studying, or whether or not to
allow it be included just as a part of our findings on knowledge exchange. The arguments in favour of the
former were that we had considerable (if serendipitous) data about the NHS participants’ experience of the
changes, that these underlay the relationships that underpinned the knowledge exchange, and that this
unique context needed to be explicated in full. The counterarguments were that we had not designed our
data gathering to answer questions about that context. Our job was to understand knowledge exchange
between the various agencies involved, whose changing roles would inevitably emerge as we presented
the findings. What mattered for our study was that commissioners were always operating in difficult
organisational and political circumstances, and so we should focus not on the features of a unique event,
but those that were likely to be common to a wide range of circumstances. There was also, it must be
said, an underlying set of political tensions to our debating this point: the desire to provide evidence that
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exposed the disruption to commissioning versus the professional necessity of maintaining the political
neutrality of a research report about knowledge exchange. Our final decision was that although the results
and discussion chapters refer to the vicissitudes created by the 2012 Health and Social Care Act4 as it
pertains to knowledge transfer, we would not explicitly present data on the impact of this Act on the NHS.
Challenges
There were several challenges in working with commercial and not-for-profit providers. The first concerned
research governance. External provider consultants moved around NHS organisations quickly and freely,
but as researchers we could not. For example, initially the second audit using the Swallow tool was
planned for the week after the stakeholders’ meeting. This audit was to take place in two settings: an
acute and a community trust. To understand more about informal ways of exchanging knowledge, the
research team were keen to observe the audits in practice. However, obtaining the necessary permissions
from these two NHS settings took several weeks. In this instance, the date of the audit was fortunately
postponed and local permissions came through for the acute trust in time. Other opportunities were
missed, though, because local governance processes were not quick enough.
Research governance issues also affected the study methodology. In the original protocol, we had planned
to shadow five commercial consultants over several time periods to observe where they obtained their
knowledge and how this was fed into client decision-making; but, in addition to difficulties with research
governance processes, which meant that the research team was unlikely to have permission to enter the
same premises as the external consultants, a further complication was that few consultants were willing
to be observed. They were highly (and understandably) sensitive to the impression an accompanying
researcher might make on their clients. Several also voiced concern about patient confidentiality, fears
that were not assuaged on presentation of documents evidencing local research and development
permissions. Moreover, external consultants were highly autonomous and readily refused requests to
take part in shadowing, despite their line manager’s encouragement. So, we abandoned the idea of
shadowing and instead carried out observations of meetings and training events, which helped to identify
study participants.
Another challenge centred around anonymisation and confidentiality. Given the commercial sensitivities of
the data, transcripts, summaries and observation notes were password protected. It is always problematic to
write an account of this sort while holding to one’s assurance to participants that the data will be kept
anonymous and unattributable. In drafting this report, the demands of providing enough information for
‘rich description’ were weighed against the possibilities of unmasking. This was challenging in an arena
where commercial providers knew their competitors well. In addition, the commissioning organisations were
also quite distinct. Thus, in presenting quotes, participants’ professional backgrounds are cited and a
distinction is made between NHS and external providers, but employing organisations are not identified.
In order to not single out the one not-for-profit provider, this company and its two commercial competitors
have all been identified as ‘commercial provider’. We have done our very best to maintain anonymity by
giving the sites fictional names and using false names for specific individuals, but, inevitably, some readers
will still be able to identify the sites. We hope that participants will accept that anyone who recognises a site
will probably already be close enough to them to be well aware of most of the matters raised, and that no
harm will result.
Dissemination
As this was a study about exchanging knowledge, dissemination of findings to target audiences such as
commissioners and external providers was an essential part of the original bid. Accordingly, we put
forward the idea of setting up a reference group of interested commissioners and external providers from
the case sites who would act as a dissemination group, helping us to find key messages for wider
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dissemination throughout the lifetime of the study. This plan was modified, because early attempts to feed
back to commercial providers as ‘critical friends’, with a view to having them subsequently join such a
dissemination reference group, created significant consternation.
For example, in March 2011, a few months after fieldwork began with the first case (Swallow), we were
asked to furnish Swallow with our observation notes of a Swallow team meeting. These were raw data,
noting who sat where and who talked to whom, and appeared fairly innocuous. However, subsequently, a
Swallow team member got in touch to say:
I have to say I wasn’t aware you’d be feeding back in this way. I’d certainly value an opportunity to
discuss your interpretation of my performance given what has been written.
E-mail, 21 March 2011
We subsequently learnt that several members of the team were under consideration for promotion and felt
that our account of their behaviour (e.g. X looking at computer) did not reflect well on them. For a short
time, the continuing participation of Swallow hung in the balance. Ultimately, a key senior leader decided
that the notes were not prejudicial and they should continue with the study. Unsurprisingly, those who
had objected refused all further invitations to take part in the study.
Moreover, we were becoming increasingly aware of the commercial sensitivities of our research. Although
regular feedback to research participants through reference groups was our original intention, we did
not want to endanger the study. Consequently, we left dissemination to towards the end, although an
independent academic met with us mid-study to identify any emerging findings.
Significant dissemination opportunities arose about 9 months before the study ended. A NHS manager
was seconded from a commissioning organisation and attached to the project to develop and carry out
knowledge mobilisation. Modelled on the defunct Service Delivery and Organisation Management Fellow
scheme and paid for by local Research Capacity Funding, this NHS manager became invaluable as the
study drew to a close. She helped to interpret the commissioning data (e.g. reports, business cases),
clarified anomalies in the data and identified local commissioners who would be willing to develop a
knowledge mobilisation strategy. The outputs of this work are presented in Chapter 10 and Appendix 1.
Reflexivity and the research team
The use of external providers in NHS commissioning is highly sensitive and controversial. We were aware
of the potential research team members to unwittingly view the data through preconceived prejudices.
To address this, three measures were adopted.
The first was the composition of the research team. This included two commissioners (one clinical and one
non-clinical) and academics with policy, management, Public Health and methodological backgrounds.
The research team also had a mixture of views including sceptics and those who were more neutral about
the contributions of commercial providers, including one who had previously worked for a commercial
provider. Thus, throughout the duration of the project, team members challenged each other’s views.
The second was the introduction of explicit reflexive activities when fieldwork began (January 2011) and at
our final analysis steering meeting (January 2014). The key question asked of all team members was:
What are your preconceptions, assumptions, prejudices and views about: a) the use of external
providers in the NHS, b) the implications of the White Paper [Liberating the NHS], especially shifting
commissioning to GP consortia?
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Team members provided either written or verbal accounts, which were recorded and transcribed. Interestingly,
these individual accounts charted a similar trajectory with regard to the use of external providers. The more
sceptical members of the team initially had an ‘antipathy’ towards commercial providers that ‘softened’
through data collection with Swallow consultants, as this agency was ‘populated with people who shared the
ideology/aims of the NHS [and] genuinely wanted to make a difference to patient care’. However, once
the senior management team at Swallow was replaced and former Swallow interviewees found jobs
elsewhere, original ‘fears/prejudices were (utterly) confirmed’. These were not shifted much with further
collection of Heron data. Meanwhile, those with more neutral views remained relatively constant. However,
overall team members did develop a more nuanced perception of the advantages and disadvantages of
commercial providers. With regard to the implications of Liberating the NHS,3 the team was unanimous in
having serious concerns about the abilities of GPs to take on their new commissioning roles.
Another measure to encourage reflexivity was that the final steering group meeting was chaired by an
external academic with a background in knowledge exchange. Apart from summarising key findings and
helping us to clarify our thoughts, an important task of this chairperson was to ensure that suppositions
and hypotheses were backed with data. However, interestingly, the research team reached consensus with
rapid accord.
The impact of these activities was that as we were aware of each other’s (and our own) preconceptions,
we became quite adept at ensuring that contributions were challenged, especially during analysis. Often,
the contributor themselves would flag up that a particular insight might be due to a preconception or
attitude. It meant that the team frequently questioned each other and explored assumptions.
Box 2 summarises the key points of this chapter.
BOX 2 Key points of Chapter 2
l Using a case study design, although the phenomenon under study remained constant, identifying the case
and its boundaries was challenging. Eventually, eight cases of knowledge exchange between NHS
commissioners and other agencies emerged. Four were case studies that had external providers as the unit
of analysis and four had a commissioning organisation as the unit of analysis.
l Data collection included 92 interviews of NHS and external provider staff, 25 observations of meetings and
training events and documents such as meeting minutes, websites and marketing brochures.
l Challenges included variable willingness for potential interviewees to participate, slow research governance
processes that stopped researchers from shadowing external consultants, safeguarding of commercially
sensitive data and maintaining participant anonymity.
l Our initial intention to disseminate findings as the study progressed was reversed early on because of
sensitivities around data sharing. Instead, a NHS commissioner was seconded into the team towards the
end of the project to set up a group of commissioners to identify actionable messages. Similarly, she also
worked closely with a former commercial provider consultant to develop actionable messages for
this audience.
l Given the controversial nature of this project, the research team considered it appropriate to generate and
share their observations about their own preconceptions and changing views at key points in the
study trajectory.
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Chapter 3 Processes of commissioning
Introduction
Before presenting findings about how commissioners access, transform and apply knowledge from
different sources, greater awareness is needed of what health-care commissioners actually do. It is also
important to contextualise this study by elucidating how commissioning was understood at the time
of fieldwork.
This chapter presents background information from other literature (e.g. Department of Health and other
studies) and findings from our own data. The background section begins with a brief history of
commissioning and contracts. This is followed by a discussion of theoretical models of commissioning and a
description of ‘real-life’ commissioning from other studies. The chapter concludes with findings from our
study on the various pressures that commissioners needed to satisfy when making commissioning decisions.
A brief history of commissioning and contracts
Commissioning in England and Wales has had many incarnations. Before 1991, the commissioning of
health care was carried out by local authorities. With the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act,26 the
Conservative government created ‘purchasers’ and ‘providers’, whereby purchasing was carried out by
health authorities and family health service authorities, the latter focusing on general practices. Primary
care groups were established in 1999, bringing together health authorities and family health service
authorities. Primary care groups, however, were short lived, and by 2002 they had amalgamated into the
larger organisational form of PCTs. PCTs were allocated about 80% of the NHS budget, incorporating
Public Health and community health services. They were also responsible for the broad clinical governance
of general practices and some types of contracts with general practices, although GPs were still personally
responsible under law and professional regulations for their clinical practice.11 In April 2013, as part of
the Health and Social Care Act 2012,4 PCTs were abolished and their functions distributed among local
authorities, CSUs, NHS England and CCGs.
Clinical Commissioning Groups became the latest attempt to involve clinicians in commissioning. The first
was in the 1990s, when the Conservative government brought in GP fundholding. Fundholding general
practices negotiated their own contracts with hospitals, made decisions about which providers and services
they would use and often deployed surpluses to develop innovative new services. GP fundholding was
abolished by the Labour government in 1998 in response to accusations that it had been creating a
two-tier NHS.27
‘Total purchasing pilots’ were another variation of general practice commissioning that also operated in the
1990s.28 Results from an evaluation suggested that the level of achievement varied widely between pilots and
included reductions in the length of stay and emergency admissions. However, total purchasing pilots were
also associated with higher direct management costs per head and needed heavy financial investment in their
organisational development. In 2005, PBC was introduced. This gave general practices the power to spend
NHS allocations locally, but the engagement of GPs was patchy,2 perhaps partly because no real funding
followed the decision-making.
As commissioning organisations have evolved with more (or less) clinical input, so have the nature of
provider contracts. Initially, most contracts were ‘block’, whereby an amount was agreed for a
predetermined set and number of activities. The disadvantage of block contracts was that those providers
that performed more than the anticipated number of activities did not get paid for this extra work.
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In 2003–4, Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) were established, and so instead of paying an average
price for an activity, activities were split into different clinical categories that were aligned on a cost basis.
However, more detail was still needed and so ‘payment by results’ was brought in, whereby each patient
event had a HRG converted into a price for individual item billing. A limitation of payment by results was
that often activities outside acute hospitals had no set price, such as those carried out in community
services. Moreover, the emphasis continued to be on activity rather than quality of care or outcomes.
More recently, interest has grown in ‘outcomes-based commissioning’, whereby payment is contingent on
meeting an agreed set of outcomes. Sometimes more than one provider is necessary to deliver these
outcomes and a lead provider will subcontract relevant services from other providers. The advantage of this
approach is that services are purchased on the basis of needs but, thus far, outcomes-based commissioning
has proved difficult to implement, with substantial resistance from powerful acute hospitals.29 Another
contractual innovation originating from social care is ‘micro commissioning’, whereby clients/patients have
personal budgets and agree a care package in collaboration with social workers/GPs. Outcomes-based
commissioning and micro commissioning are still relatively rare within the health-care sector, although we
encountered both during this study. Generally, we found that commissioning organisations tended to use a
combination of block and activity-based contracts when negotiating with providers.
What do commissioners do?
Definitions of commissioning
A literature review by the University of London found many definitions of ‘commissioning’, which varied
across public sectors.30 In asking for definitions of commissioning from our study participants, a NHS
commissioning director said that ‘ideal’ commissioning was the ‘right balance’ between ‘strategic focus on
needs assessment and service strategy delivered through contracting’ utilising Public Health and analysts to
understand needs, commissioning staff with service specific knowledge to ‘build up a picture of what the
whole system needs to look like’ and contracting staff ‘with technical skills to make sure that we use
the contracts to deliver that’ (Paula, NHS senior commissioning manager).
Other answers included ‘everything but provision’ (Donald, CCG chairperson) but others argued that
provision was also a form of commissioning, as every time a GP issued a prescription or made a referral
it had commissioning implications (Jen, commercial consultant). A long-term conditions study also
concluded that the ‘strict separation’ of commissioning and provision was notional.31 The definition of
commissioning has even inspired several YouTube™ videos (search www.youtube.com under ‘what
is commissioning?’).
Commissioning frameworks
An early, simple conceptual framework of purchasing (the forerunner of commissioning) was suggested by
Øvretveit and colleagues using the plan-do-study-act model.32 Several years later, the Department of
Health developed a much more complex model to include functions such as assessing needs, designing
services, managing demand and managing performance (Figure 1).
The Institute of Public Care split commissioning activities into commissioning and procurement. They
expanded and refined the framework to include other common commissioning activities such as gap
analysis, business case appraisal, service evaluation, development of service specifications, contract
management, performance management and resource allocation Figure 2. Clearly, over the past 20 years,
the role of commissioners has evolved substantially.
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FIGURE 1 Commissioning framework. Source: Health Reform in England: Update and Commissioning Framework.33
Copyright Yorkshire and the Humber Public Health Observatory.
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FIGURE 2 Institute of Public Care model of commissioning. Reproduced with permission from Developing
Intelligent Commissioning Yorkshire and the Humber Joint Improvement Project. Commissioning Model: IPC Joint
Model for Public Care. URL: www.yhsccommissioning.org.uk/index.php?pageNo=594.34
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The literature
In comparing these frameworks with ‘real-life’ commissioning, recent studies found that the work of
commissioners is complex, disjointed, mutable and fast paced. Moreover, high-quality, effective
commissioning is difficult to achieve, not least because the link between commissioning processes and
outcomes is tenuous.
In their study of health-care middle managers in four PCTs,11 Checkland and colleagues concluded:
The generic managerial work undertaken by PCT middle managers was messy, fragmented and largely
accomplished in meetings . . . [There was] evidence of confusion and overlap between the various
commissioning teams and groups. Managers struggle with this and appear to compensate by dividing
up their personal responsibilities into ‘pieces of work’.
p. 11
The aim of an action research study led by Smith and colleagues was to learn more about the ‘nitty gritty’
of commissioning long-term conditions in three PCTs.12 Based on their findings, plus previous work, they
suggested that there were two cycles of commissioning. The first was the annual contractual cycle, which
was labelled as ‘transactional’. The second cycle was ‘interpersonal’, built on trust, common values, and
established and new networks. They identified nine activities of effective commissioning (e.g. getting the
balance right between interpersonal and transactional aspects, strong focus on monitoring and using
information to inform review). The researchers also detailed seven key themes:
1. The ‘commissioning cycle’ is a misnomer as developmental commissioning running over many years ran
in parallel with annual contractual aspects of commissioning.
2. An ‘extraordinary’ level of effort went into commissioning, and this often seemed ‘disproportionate’ to
the anticipated or actual outcomes.
3. Many different individuals carried out commissioning tasks including managers and clinicians from
providers, GPs, voluntary sector representatives and PCT commissioners. Clinicians’ role was primarily as
champions for change.
4. Money was at times peripheral, with the majority of spending remaining in block contracts.
5. Changes brought about through commissioning were incremental. Success was more likely with
‘bite-sized’ completion of tasks within a wider plan.
6. External drivers such as national guidance played a powerful role.
7. Commissioners within this study worked within a context of uncertainty, as fieldwork took place while
PCTs were winding up and CCGs emerged.
In our study, participants also mentioned the fast-paced nature of commissioning, whereby those providing
support had to be highly flexible to changing needs.
You have to go in with a blank sheet of paper and almost listen to their requirements from the
ground up again and see has the landscape changed? Commissioning requirements are a moving
feast. Does your tool still – is it still relevant?
Randall, freelance analyst
Our study participants highlighted several processes, skills and viewpoints necessary for commissioning not
previously mentioned. With their strategic overview, commissioners took ‘a whole systems approach to
the way we develop services and pathways’ (Jane, NHS commissioning manager), because providers may be
overly focused on ‘their services, their staff, their accountability’ (Abbie, NHS commissioning manager).
Furthermore, leadership and persuasion skills were crucial to link providers together and manage tensions that
competing agendas invariably generated. Commissioners, however, did not just have to influence providers.
Successful commissioners also continually worked with and competed against their commissioning colleagues.
For example, in one CCG we observed a commissioner present a business case for a lymphoedema service to
the CCG board. The board had to consider the merits of funding this business case compared with several
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others recently submitted by other local commissioners; the lymphoedema business case was in direct
competition with other proposals.
Having outlined the processes that commissioners engage in and provided a flavour of the shifting,
challenging nature of their role, the rest of this chapter focuses on results from our study. The next section
covers the reasons that prompted commissioners to look for information and the various pressures they
needed to satisfy.
Commissioning decision-making
Observations of CCG meetings, reinforced and explored through interview and documentary evidence
such as CCG meeting minutes, suggested that the push for commissioners to seek information arose
either because they were told to take a course of action or because they wanted to take a course of action
and they needed to find out how best to proceed. In both situations, which occurred commonly across the
sites, relevant information was necessary to justify the decision and to persuade others to approve and/or
follow the suggested course. Decision-making was assisted through repeated cycles of finding information,
persuading others, justifying proposals, finding more/different information, persuading others, etc.
The impetus when commissioners were ‘told’ might be a top-down edict from the Department of Health
or Strategic Health Authority; for example, the implementation of NHS 111 and ‘telehealth’ were major
national initiatives during fieldwork. One CCG found that generating their own data from the first few
patients using telehealth (specifically looking at hospital utilisation) was helpful in beginning to persuade
some sceptical colleagues and to start developing an ‘evidence base’ to justify the decision. Commissioners
might not have agreed with the directive or believed in its merit for their local population but, regardless,
such activities became a ‘must do’ which led to the search for viable supporting information.
Alternatively, commissioners sometimes looked for information when no predetermined course existed.
Sometimes, local information prompted changes. For example, in response to service user feedback one
commissioning organisation needed information to develop a reablement project for those with long-term
conditions. To help to decide a course of action, persuade others and justify their decisions, commissioners
drew substantially on several sources including mapped patient pathways, shadowing key clinicians and
meetings between service users and senior commissioners. These senior commissioners needed to be
convinced of the priority of the problem and merit of the proposed solution to allocate funding and give
senior-level support.
In either situation (being told to or wanting to make changes), commissioners searched for and pulled in
information, when information was needed. Commissioners required information to build a cohesive,
convincing case. In comparing GP decision-making with GP commissioner decision-making, one participant
said that as a GP the decision was between the GP and the patient, but as a commissioner the decisions
‘have to stand up to extremely close, possibly legal scrutiny and have to be owned by the organisation’
(Angus, GP commissioner). As they came from publicly accountable organisations, commissioning decisions
had to be resilient to challenges from many possible directions.
For example, challenges might come from clinicians and health-care provider organisations that needed
to make changes themselves in order for the initiative to be a success. We encountered multiple examples
of this, including commissioners in two case site CCGs who were rolling out risk assessment tools to
general practice staff, with variable success.
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Service users and the public sometimes needed to be persuaded. In one CCG, engaging the public was a
way to smooth the introduction of potentially unpalatable service alterations.
You’re talking about moving one thing to another site: people see that as closure. It’s a political
football . . . This engagement of lay members is to get them to kind of carry the message and hold you
to account before – rather than at the end stage going, ‘Well we didn’t feel like we were involved in
this,’ you carry them through.
Vidur, GP commissioner
Given the political nature of the NHS, the press sometimes posed challenges. Commissioning organisations
wanted to avoid negative media attention. In observations of the boards of two CCGs, managing media
coverage was an issue. In one, a GP commissioner’s remarks had been misconstrued, leading the local
newspaper to headline that the board planned to close some hospital wards. In the other, the board
discussed managing a local protest by the political group ‘38 Degrees’, which objected to the opening of
the NHS to commercial companies. A GP commissioner from a third CCG predicted that some of their
future decisions about using commercial providers would probably result in headlines.
You could see tabloid press headlines, ‘Money from NHS spent by non-NHS manager doing
consultancy work’.
Anthony, GP commissioner
Commissioners also needed to build a persuasive case to convince those with a policy or performance
management role, such as the Department of Health and Strategic Health Authorities (and now NHS
England area teams). National or regional directives could take the form of goal setting such as the
NHS Outcomes Framework or specific targets such as ‘95% of patients attending accident and emergency
departments should be seen within 4 hours’. In addition, there was general commissioning guidance such
as the development of commissioning strategic plans and the Everyone Counts: Planning for Patients
2013/201435 from the national NHS Commissioning Board. Commissioning organisations followed national
and regional directives with varying degrees of enthusiasm and compliance. For example, one CCG went
through the process of tendering services for the ‘any qualified provider’ requirements, although they were
perfectly happy with their current provider.
Again it was an example of centralisation of things coming down from above. They said that we had
to put out two or three services to any qualified provider. So the cluster decided what we should do.
And one of them was ultrasound, non-obstetric ultrasound, which we have an absolutely excellent
service provided by the hospital, even routine ones are done within a week, brilliant service. So why do
we do it? So there’s all this process and people – they ended up with a list of seven providers. But,
you know, it was a complete waste of time and money.
David, CCG chairperson
Sometimes commissioners were keen to follow national mandates, as these aligned with local agendas.
For example, one CCG capitalised on national policy leanings on commissioning lead providers to
subcontract to other providers. Several board documents mentioned that local activities had had
substantial ‘interest from Number 10’ (i.e. the Prime Minister’s office) (board meeting papers). Another
CCG exhibited resistance to several national directives and consequently experienced pressure to comply.
GP commissioner: I just see how the world works and the pressure that organisations are put under
if they don’t conform. You know, these words like, ‘You are at risk. Your organisation is at risk.
You are at personal risk for this.’ And that’s not a nice thing to be (sic) on your shoulders.
Interviewer: Because things are different here?
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GP commissioner: Yeah, or because we don’t agree with national diktat. We don’t think this works
and we want to do this.
Interviewer: Yeah, so you’re identified as risky?
GP commissioner: Yeah and then you get lots of phone calls, and the chief exec gets phone calls, and
he has to speak to you going, ‘Oh I’m getting a lot of flak about this. Can you not just smile sweetly
and say you’ll engage?’
Vidur, GP commissioner
Although commissioners were less likely to need to justify their decisions to this audience, ‘evidence
purveyors’ were another source of pressure. ‘Evidence purveyors’ were those that generated or located
data or knowledge that might inform decision-making, such as Public Health, CSUs, Strategic Clinical
Networks, Academic Health Science Networks (AHSNs), Collaborations for Leadership in Applied Health
Research and Care (CLAHRCs), commercial and not-for-profit providers working in collaboration with the
CCGs and academic researchers. The ‘evidence’ they provided might be unsolicited or be couched in such
a way as to be experienced as a pressure, for example the championing of the recommendations from the
annual Joint Strategic Needs Assessments (JSNAs) carried out by Public Health. There was considerable
variability in terms of the level of impact made by these external agencies across the commissioning case
sites. Although their role is discussed in-depth in a later chapter, commissioners in one CCG in particular
were, apparently, highly influenced by Public Health.
I think two areas where we’ve made a big difference is around diabetes, in terms of using a
combination of the evidence from local data and from national audit, in conjunction with the evidence
of what worked, to actually persuade CCGs that – to look at the way that they are commissioning
diabetes services, and the model, and to think about that . . . and around the evidence for diabetes
education. The other area would be in evidence for cardiac and pulmonary rehab and in the familial
hypercholesterolemia where we did a bit of work and actually have used the evidence of effectiveness
of screening . . . to actually get all the CCGs to agree to commission a service which we didn’t
have before.
Sandra, Public Health consultant
In addition to managing these external forces, commissioners also had to convince their internal colleagues
within their particular organisational culture. Sometimes, a particular ethos permeated an organisation,
which meant that certain decisions were more acceptable than others. In one CCG, the optimistic, ‘can-do’
culture influenced decision-making. The term ‘cynical’ emerged in several interviews as a pejorative term
applied to those who raised queries about the feasibility of certain plans.
From the provider stuff, I think I’ve got the experience to know what is possible and what probably
isn’t, and probably being a realist . . . what the cynics call realism, and it’s supposed to be cynical,
I’m accused of that sometimes. I think it’s just being realistic.
David, CCG chairperson
In summary, commissioners had to influence and collaborate with many external and internal interested
parties to build a cohesive case for taking a particular course of action. This included clinicians and
other health-care providers, service users, the public, the press, national and regional policy and
performance managers, evidence purveyors and internal colleagues (Figure 3).
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03190 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 19
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Wye et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
25
Not all forces came into play in every decision-making process and there was also variability in the strength
of each, as a proposal traversed through different stages. Invariably, however, in the centre of this web of
these pressurising forces, the commissioners juggled competing agendas, priorities, power relationships,
demands and their own inclinations – to make the ‘best’ decision circumstances allowed. Just as there is
an ‘art of medicine’, this was the ‘art of commissioning’. Thus, to a large extent, commissioning was a
matter of pulling together the appropriate knowledge and information that would satisfice (a portmanteau
word of satisfy and suffice introduced by Simon in 195636) competing agendas, and manoeuvring the
implications of that knowledge through a complex system (Figure 4). Box 3 summarises the key points of
this chapter.
National and regional
performance managers
The press
Service
users
Clinicians
Internal colleagues
Evidence
purveyors
Health-care
providers
The public
FIGURE 3 Pressures on commissioners.
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FIGURE 4 Commissioning as satisficing: (1) the naive view and (2) the view suggested by our data.
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BOX 3 Key points of Chapter 3
l Health-care commissioning is messy, fragmented and fast paced.
l Commissioning activities include needs assessment, service design, performance management, business
case development, development of service specifications, service evaluation, contract management and
resource allocation.
l Commissioners sought information to build a cohesive, convincing case to inform or persuade others take a
course of action.
l Commissioner juggled competing agendas, priorities, power relationships, demands and their own
inclinations – to make the ‘best’ decision circumstances allowed. This was the ‘art of commissioning’.
l Commissioning largely consisted of drawing together the appropriate knowledge and information that
would ‘satisfice’ these competing agendas and manoeuvring that knowledge through a complex system.
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Chapter 4 Models of commissioning
Introduction
Having discussed the nature of commissioning in general, we now set out the specific models of
commissioning identified in this study. The term ‘model’ is used in respect of broad functional types and
not, for instance, conceptual frameworks or programme theories. The three models of commissioning
were clinical commissioning, integrated health and social care commissioning, and commercial provider
commissioning. Although versions of the first two models have existed for the past two decades, the
third model of commercial provider commissioning is new within the English NHS context.
We make no claim that these are the only three models, but they are the ones that emerged from
interview and observation data, and were categories imposed by the researchers, not the participants
themselves. Moreover, the models were not mutually exclusive. For example, all of the CCG sites exhibited
variants of the clinical commissioning model; the integrated health and social care model was dominant in
one commissioning organisation with pockets evident in two others; the commercial provider model was
the rarest, as we only found one example where commercial providers had taken over commissioning
activities wholesale.
A key point to make is that in drawing together the entire data set, commonalities across the CCG case
sites are perhaps overplayed. In fact, the CCG case sites were highly heterogeneous in their configurations
and in how they operated. Every CCG case site had its own unique blend of commissioning models to
help find its way in balancing and managing competing demands. Moreover, each commissioning model
emphasised a particular type of knowledge. The principal argument of this chapter is that different models
of commissioning necessarily demand different types of knowledge.
Clinical commissioning
National policy
Although various policy changes have aimed to involve clinicians in commissioning, the 2012 Health and
Social Care Act4 brought about a seismic change by establishing over 200 CCGs to replace PCTs across
England. Clinical in this case means GPs, as the majority of CCGs were led by GPs,37 although each CCG
had a secondary care consultant on its CCG board and a nurse lead for quality. In April 2013, GPs became
responsible for 60% of the NHS budget, principally to commission acute and community services. There
was substantial variety in how CCGs were configured. For example, some CCGs were a small ‘fleet of foot
commissioning body buying in what it needs’ (Simon, CCG chairperson) and some had their own in-house
finance and analytical departments.
Although all general practices were legally obliged to belong to a CCG, CCGs were membership
organisations, where interested clinicians could opt in (or out).38 As one chairperson said:
Being part of a CCG and being involved in the CCG are two separate things.
Malcolm, CCG chairperson
The hope was that as local general practices participated in decision-making, they would abide by those
decisions, change their behaviours and ‘play by the rules’ (Tom, CCG chairperson). As one CCG
chairperson mentioned in an account of dealing with unengaged GPs, ‘you keep looking at the CCG as
this third party over there when actually the CCG is you’ (Malcolm, CCG chairperson). However, during
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fieldwork, several participants worried that general practices would withdraw, unless the ‘central command
and control’ style of the NHS was eased to permit more local autonomy.
What we have tried to do is generally take on board the expectations of this redesign, which was to
put clinicians at the heart of it, and so we have embedded clinicians throughout the organisation at
pretty much most levels, to lead and drive the commissioning. And, as I said, it’s a challenge for us,
because whatever is being said, there is still a top-down command and control, a tight grip wanted
from the centre at the NHS management line, to ensure and assure that we are going to deliver
20 billion pounds savings. And I absolutely understand that. Versus the expression ‘going to let
1000 flowers bloom’ to allow the GPs to expand and be creative. And I think management at the local
level has got that difficult relationship to manage. Because it won’t take much to pee the GPs off and
make them walk away from this.
Sarah, NHS commissioning manager
The contribution of clinical commissioners
This section refers mainly to the contribution of GP in their role as commissioners rather than as providers
of care. According to one participant, the same GP ‘noisy lights’ still held commissioning roles, as had
previously been the case (Patricia, commercial consultant). However, other long-serving commissioning
managers from more than one study CCG case site noted that CCGs were more clinically driven than
previous commissioning organisations. One commissioner with over 25 years’ experience commented that
at board level the clinical commissioning had wrought ‘much more conversation and thinking about . . .
clinical knowledge’ (Carla, NHS commissioning manager). One GP clinical lead believed that clinical
commissioning meant that raw data were interpreted with a ‘clinical eye’, which would reduce instances of
drawing misleading conclusions that might lead to unfair resource allocations to general practices (Patrick,
GP commissioner).
We regularly observed clinical input to commissioning decisions in observations of CCG meetings.
For example, in one CCG the group were looking at an unscheduled care dashboard to attempt to identify
patient groups that could be diverted from hospital. Two GPs had prolonged discussion about cellulitis,
applying their clinical knowledge to interpret information from the dashboard.
[Anthony continues getting Teresa to open different bits on the dashboard. He says there are lots of
areas which appear to be ‘low hanging fruit’, and mentions cellulitis. He says ten people a month
were being admitted with that, and asks why they weren’t being cared for in the community
[he says something about what treatment would be], and also says something about the mindset
around admissions.]
Ralph: Be a bit careful about whether it is actually cellulitis they are being admitted for – often it is
because there has been a social care breakdown.
Anthony: But they still should not be an acute admission – in that case they should be admitted to a
nursing home.
Ralph: It is still not as simple as putting in a venflon. Anthony says that this kind of data still gives
them a way to look at things which need sorting. He says DVTs are another example.
Meeting observation
Several participants, including GP commissioners, commented that an advantage of involving GPs in
commissioning was that GPs were ‘closer’ to patients, which made decisions more ‘real’. GPs also had
useful local knowledge of how the health-care system worked. Although during fieldwork the specific
contribution of GPs was still being worked out, several participants mentioned that GPs were well suited
to developing services and designing patient pathways. We observed many examples of clinical
commissioners involved in service redesign and provision, such as establishing a GP role in hospital
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emergency departments. In addition to service development, GP commissioners were identified by
participants as having an important role in challenging their hospital consultant colleagues.
It’s so predictable . . . you always go through the same process that they [hospital] are particularly hard
done by, they have cut everything to the bone, and there’s all these vital initiatives that [the local
health-care economy] must have, and we’re so far behind everywhere else, and GPs are wonderful,
they only refer things that absolutely need doing, and we never see anybody for a follow up, and all
this stuff, you know, this comes out. And finding places, clinical areas where you can begin to change
behaviour is hugely difficult. So what I think we have to do, as GPs, is to try and anticipate and
understand those areas. So this is what I regard as almost the only bit that GP commissioners add value,
is that we hopefully can see through the guff that our clinical colleagues in specialties will put up and
begin to challenge some of that. But of course that’s quite difficult. They are the experts and so on.
Angus, former PCT chairperson and GP
To change GP behaviour, this participant said that GPs liked information that suggested they were ‘in the
middle’ of the pack and that if they were not, their behaviour could be shifted, but only if the data were
trustworthy (Angus, former PCT chairperson and GP). Another agreed saying ‘If there’s a really good
arguments, if you can see the graphs, see the numbers people will almost change overnight because they
generally want to do the right thing’ (Patrick, GP commissioner). One chairperson from another CCG
recounted that ‘one of the powerful phrases’ he had heard from a GP was ‘show me the data and I’ll sort
myself out’.
So a lot of the time people just don’t know that the way they’re behaving clinically is at variance with
their colleagues. They may not know that they ask for 50% more ultrasound scans than anybody else.
And if you point that out to them, then they can actually say, ‘Oh OK, right, every time I write
ultrasound scan perhaps I should go and talk to a colleague and say would you have done that,
should I be doing something differently?’ So it’s not necessarily being done in a judgemental way; it’s
being done in a sort of actually just to inform you and see if you can solve the problem yourself.
Tom, CCG chairperson
Another CCG chairperson recounted two examples of behavioural change due to peer review. Once was
when data suggested that his own behaviour with X-ray referrals meant that his practice was the second
highest user of X-ray services in the CCG, and the other instance was with a GP colleague.
We’ve got a GP who has been known about by the PCT for years, who spends exactly twice as much
on drugs as anyone else in our group. [PCT chief executive] would go round and plead with him.
He’d be very polite, give him tea, coffee, biscuits, anything he liked, but what really mattered [was]
controlling his prescribing expenditure. Since he’s had peer review, and charts up on the wall showing
where he is with his peers, he’s accepted mentorship from one of our GP leads, you know, and he’s
starting to make some progress. In other words, he’d flick a V sign at the, you know, the managers,
but he doesn’t do that to his peers.
Martin, CCG chairperson
Challenges
During fieldwork from 2011 to 2013, several challenges were noted facing the introduction of CCGs. GPs
carried out their commissioning duties in addition to their ‘day job’ as GPs. In working two jobs, interview
participants had widespread concerns that GPs had insufficient time for commissioning. Moreover, several
voiced fears that if pushed to choose, GPs would keep their clinical jobs because their commissioning
activities were extraneous. At least one GP commissioner voiced the attitude of many in stating that he
was still mainly a ‘jobbing GP’ (Anthony, GP commissioner).
Several participants noted that GPs needed to shift from their ‘provider’ stance to a wider population
perspective, mindful of the wider system. Without this wider system view and an understanding of the
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impact of their decision-making, GP commissioners could inadvertently make the situation worse. For
example, one participant was concerned that GPs might not have sufficient understanding of the financial
implications of service changes. He gave a complicated account of how if some hospital services were
moved into the community or private sector, the hospital would still have the same overheads and this
would be passed on to commissioners’ bills. Commissioners would then become trapped because the costs
at the hospital would stay the same (or increase) and they would also be paying for a similar service
elsewhere, in effect paying twice. He believed that the only way to actually save any money was to take
entire services out of the hospital and commission them elsewhere, such as the British Pregnancy Advisory
Service (Joel, commercial analyst). This was quite a sophisticated argument, possibly unknown to many
GP commissioners (or, indeed, NHS commissioning managers).
Another commissioning manager gave a different example of how inexperienced GP commissioners could
accidentally create more problems.
I think – engineering analogy coming again – it’s really easy to try and fix something at one part of the
system and make it worse somewhere else. So you can focus around a particular issue, let’s imagine
you look at a rapid response community service, and you employ a team of nurses to respond to
medical crises that would normally have ended up in A&E [accident and emergency], and it looks like
you’re doing a really good job. You’re recording the fact that you’re avoiding all of these admissions,
but what you’re not recording is what happens to those people in 30 days, 90 days, whether they’re
going back in twice as many times. So that’s just an arbitrary example of how easy it is within all of
this to try and focus on something and fix something, but actually make it worse somewhere else.
Alan, commissioning manager
Given these concerns, fears were commonly voiced from NHS commissioning managers, commercial
providers, Public Health professionals and the GPs themselves that GPs lacked the necessary skills.
I mean where do we get the expertise? . . . You know, are GPs born managers? . . . I now find at the
end of my career that slightly perversely I’m having to sort of learn new skills to supposedly support
the care of my patients.
Roger, GP commissioner
An experienced commissioning manager identified those skills as understanding legal duties and
responsibilities such as budgets, managing contracts and poorly performing providers and identifying and
interpreting information, especially around costs and cost utilisation (Paula, NHS senior commissioning
manager). Although some GPs had previously been involved in commissioning, it was a major leap from
project-based PBC to strategically managing million-pound budgets across whole health economies in
CCGs. For some, amassing this expertise within 2 years was daunting. In fact, when asked what he would
do when the PCT dissolved, one CCG chairperson responded candidly, ‘Cry’ (Martin, CCG chairperson).
However, these data were collected from 2011 to early 2013, when CCGs were still in the authorisation
phase; their confidence may have grown as they moved from shadowing PCTs to full responsibility.
Having worked internationally, analysts from one commercial provider expressed several other concerns
about the implications of the policy of clinical commissioning on data collection and interpretation.
One pointed out that with the slimming down of commissioning, those left had to be more multiskilled.
An American analyst commented that by shifting financial responsibility to providers, which was also a
trend in the USA, ‘there should be a pretty heavy incentive for these groups to have analytics so they
can manage their populations’ (Sergio, commercial analyst). Another analyst agreed noting that GP
commissioners were not going to understand cost and utilisation modelling and so there was a ‘kind of
commissioning support service that will be probably more essential now than even it was before’ (Brenda,
commercial analyst). Tim thought that the advent of CCGs meant lots of smaller contracts with smaller
data sets, which were more difficult to manage. This would increase the amount of analyst time needed to
reconcile those data sets (Tim, commercial analyst).
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Integrated health and social care commissioning model
Definitions and challenges
The second model identified from our data was integrated health and social care commissioning. Often
known as joint commissioning, this has been a policy feature since the split between Health and Local
Authorities in 1991. Some policy initiatives focused on pooling health and social care budgets, initially with
the Health Act Flexibilities in 1999 and later in 2006.39 Most recently in the 2013 Spending Review, the
government committed £3.8B to the ‘Better Care Fund’ by ‘top slicing’ a proportion of funding allocated
to CCGs into pooled funds for health and social care.40 This was not new money.
In general, the NHS has been responsible for health care, while local authorities deliver social care, for
example help with bathing and dressing for the frail elderly living at home. However, clarifying needs as
health or social care can be challenging, with some care recipients experiencing duplication while others
fall through the gaps. A major reason for disagreement is that health and social care have separate
budgets, and so the classification of a particular need as ‘health’ or ‘social’ care has financial implications.
One participant, with a specific remit to develop joint commissioning, commented that health and social
care were not ‘easy bedfellows’, partly because their approaches to commissioning came from ‘medical
research’ and ‘social science’ mind-sets, respectively. He noted that despite ‘desperate’ attempts to
integrate health and social care, ‘it’s very, very hard because . . . it’s two silos with a lot of aggro’, which
was mirrored from government level to the local system (Percy, former PCT chief executive officer and
Department of Health senior manager, now freelance consultant). Moreover, a recent study found that
despite widespread perceptions of the benefits for patients, there was limited evidence that joint
commissioning improved outcomes,41 although a former King’s Fund fellow argued that such evidence was
difficult to generate, partly because other initiatives might also have had an impact on outcomes.42
Examples from the Clinical Commissioning Group case sites
The level of involvement of local authorities into NHS commissioning strategically varied across CCG case
sites. In one, a Social Services representative sat on one of the key CCG decision-making forums but did
not make any comments in any observed meetings. In two others, Social Services representatives attended
and made several contributions. The fourth was striving to be a fully integrated organisation and not only
included local authority representatives (who appeared to be highly influential in observations of meetings),
but also articulate elected councillors. At operational level within the CCG case sites, integration of health
and social care took forms such as integrated health and social care teams, jointly funded collaborative
projects and overarching programmes.
In one commissioning case site, the integrated services programme was repeatedly discussed at meetings
of the UCB. This programme sought integration of different health sectors (i.e. acute and community) as
well as health and social care. It emphasised operational changes, such as improving information sharing
so that social care needs could be identified and addressed within health assessments. An integrated care
team made up of a GP, a community matron, a community nurses and an adult services social worker
aimed to offer ‘joined up care’ to those with long-term conditions (press briefing). Another prominent
initiative integrated a walk-in centre and a GP out-of-hours service with the emergency department so that
all urgent care was located in one place. A joint discharge scheme had been set up and the first few
patients had been through this successfully. The UCB were considering joint care packages to prevent the
delay of discharge from hospitals because of questions about the appropriateness of health or social care.
With regards to impact, at one UCB meeting a ‘taking stock’ discussion noted positive culture change, for
example with providers from hospitals and community sharing information, but joint commissioning was
not yet a reality. Instead, in an interview, the freelance consultant leading this work commented that
the intermediate aim was to develop joint service specifications, which he coined as ‘complementary
commissioning’, before pooled budgets were achievable. Participants were generally enthusiastic about
this programme, but more progress was needed.
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In a second commissioning organisation where we found evidence of integrated health and social care
commissioning, 11 organisations from across voluntary, health and social care sectors worked together to
support individuals ‘to get back on their feet following treatment in an acute or community hospital’
(briefing paper, January 2012). The impetus for this initiative was feedback from patients that their needs
were not being met. With help from a commercial agency using a methodology focused on patient
experience, the project team mapped current services and detailed five patient pathways. They also carried
out service user consultations, stakeholder engagement and shadowing exercises. The shadowing included
professionals from different organisations observing each other at work and teams of professionals from
both social and health care (including senior managers) visiting service users. This was particularly insightful
in clarifying service user needs.
So we took a group of professionals, occupational therapists, physiotherapists, social worker, care
worker . . . So they went into somebody’s home . . . they learnt [that] having a professional doing
something led to a greater quality of interaction. So you can sit down with a cup of tea and say, ‘I’m
here to listen to you. Tell me about yourself,’ but they got a lot more in terms of understanding what
was going on with that person from working with them around helping them to walk or helping them
to do something, that was consistent. It just was a more natural conversation. They’d bump into the
MBE medal on the wall and have a conversation around that, and there were things that helped them
[professionals] to understand what mattered to them [service users].
Daniel, commercial consultant
From these activities, the team reported to the CCG board:
Assessment and treatment was undertaken in silos – the results of this validated the observations from
our initial shadowing work that service users felt passed from service to service without being fully
understood or [having] the things that mattered to them addressed in a meaningful way. The
consequences of this for the system are a huge amount of unnecessary cost, duplication, waste,
inefficiency and low morale with services responding to a significant amount of failure demand, seeing
the same service users again and again.
Briefing paper
The intervention designed was an integrated service consisting of NHS staff (occupational therapist,
physiotherapist) and social services professionals (occupational therapist, social worker, care worker
supervisor). This was piloted at a GP surgery and then spread across the locality with five further integrated
teams. The integrated teams were ‘not constrained by organisational barriers and systems’ and were
encouraged to develop innovative approaches to problems (briefing paper).
An evaluation of the service was carried out by the local Public Health director comparing a cohort of
service users with non-service users (control group), with the intended outcomes of reduction in hospital
admissions and social care packages. The results were a small reduction in the hospital admissions
between the 12 months before and 3 months after the intervention for the service users (no mention of
comparison with control group). The cost of social care packages, however, went up for both the service
user and control groups, although it was significantly less for service users (briefing paper). Using a
researchers’ lens, the conclusions would be that the effect of the intervention was weak, as there was
no reduction in hospital admissions between the intervention and control group and the costs of social
care packages increased. (NB: we did not have access to the original report.) Interestingly, these findings
were reported differently at the CCG governing board meeting.
The principal outcomes of the study indicated: a significant difference between the patient groups in
the number of hospital re-admissions and a significant reduction in social care costs.
Meeting minutes
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Based on the data we have, in being transmitted to the board the impact of the intervention became
substantially overstated. These minutes also mention that the occupational therapists had reported a
‘re-discovery of their skills’ and GP feedback was positive (meeting minutes). The project was
recommissioned at £250,000 annually on a recurring basis. Interview participants had widespread
enthusiasm for this project, citing how it had improved morale.
For another commissioning organisation, integration of health and social care commissioning occurred
strategically and operationally and permeated every aspect of their approach. It appeared to have
unanimous support, although dissent on this front might be difficult in an organisation so committed.
Health and social care had pooled their entire budgets several years ago, partly in a ‘defensive’ move to
stop the local PCT from being amalgamated with neighbouring PCTs in early reforms. They made
infrastructure changes, such as moving Public Health and children’s services to the local authority and
shifting adult social care services into health. The aim was to create an ‘integrated system as opposed to
an integrated single organisation’, although one participant noted that this was difficult when issues of
‘self-preservation’ arose (Alan, NHS commissioning manager). Decisions were taken with ‘a no detriment
advantage [in] that everything we do is about no detriment to the other party’ (George, Social Services
manager). This meant that in making commissioning decisions, the board, including the highly vocal locally
elected councillors, deliberated on the effect of actions both on key health outcomes such as hospital
admissions and on social care indicators such as residential care placements.
A CCG director described the social care voice as ‘very strong’ (Carol, NHS commissioning manager) and
interview and observation data suggested that those from the local authority were highly influential.
Moreover, lay members and patients played a major role. The CCG chairperson was a lay representative,
with a GP as vice-chairperson. Small, three-person teams, consisting of a clinical lead, a service manager and
a lay person, led each of their seven work streams (e.g. unscheduled care, disabilities, older people). The
CCG had set up a community forum whose members worked in various capacities across the CCG.
Furthermore, ideas for service changes were put to a ‘Dragon’s Den’ panel of service managers, clinicians
and lay people.
The impetus for such high levels of community involvement appeared partly as a result of ethical values,
but also because of a desire for informed community debate on the most difficult issues facing the
commissioning organisation. Community knowledge was important in challenging clinical knowledge and
priorities and engagement also sought to achieve acceptance of difficult decisions and public behaviour
change. However, such openness to public involvement also brought difficulties; for example, a CCG
board member had accidentally caused an outcry from remarks made in a radio programme and we
observed a member of the public heatedly challenge the CCG board in a public meeting. (NB: the CCG
members addressed this individual by his first name and invited him to talk with the deputy director
further, and so presumably he was well known.)
Commercial provider commissioning model
Outsourced contract
For the third model we have coined the term ‘commercial provider commissioning’, which applies only to
instances where the commissioning is done exclusively by the external provider. Although in this study
commercial providers mainly had a role in advising and supporting clients through the deployment of tools
and commissioning expertise, we found one example of ‘commercial provider commissioning’, where
commissioning had been completely outsourced to external providers. The commercial provider had taken
over all aspects of the commissioning process, including contracting and performance management.
(NB: the use of the term ‘commercial provider’ in this context does not refer in any way to commercial
providers of actual health-care services such as private hospitals).
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This started in 2009. The commercial provider team managed the contracts of a group of large, powerful
acute providers, which were ‘very expensive and quite difficult to control’ (Joel, commercial consultant).
The remaining NHS staff managed another set of contracts with acute providers in a different geographical
area. The commercial provider team consisted of a programme manager, nurses, administrators and ‘lots
of analysts’. Although the NHS and commercial provider teams were colocated on the same site, there was
a clear split in their remits and significant hostility from the NHS team, which may be a reason why only
one operational NHS team member was willing to participate in this study.
Definition of commissioning by commercial providers
While participants from advisory commercial providers defined commissioning in a variety of ways, often
comparable with NHS study participants, the definition offered from the company with the outsourcing
contract was consistently in terms of managing supply, demand and consumer engagement. Managing
supply was defined as getting the right providers, contracts and management processes, which one
participant thought was ‘simple’ (Larry, commercial consultant). Managing demand was ensuring that
providers deliver the right health care, which another said was critical to ensure that ‘people are only
passing deeper into the system at the appropriate point’ (Jemma, commercial consultant). Managing the
health-care consumer was about interacting with patients and the public to navigate their way through
the system.
The importance of data
Crucial to the commissioning ethos of this commercial provider was to ‘use data to drive decision making’
(Kristen and Thomas, commercial consultants). They largely saw the ‘problem’ as a NHS driven by politics
and people rather than by data. Several participants talked about the provision of data to ‘move you
beyond that purely political/anecdotal approach’ (Jemma, commercial consultant). Another said ‘we have
always said data are the lifeblood of any organisation’ (Dennis, commercial consultant). They wanted to
‘integrate the system’ by linking medical records, through better analysis of data to understand ‘what’s
driving your costs’ and by engaging patients to change their behaviour. Moreover, the aim of their
interventions was to develop or find a ‘single source of the truth’ (i.e. reliable, consistent data). This phrase
emerged repeatedly in interview and observation data.
Analysts for this outsourced service undertook ‘forensic investigation of the data’, mainly finding errors in
coding leading to overcharging (Joel, commercial analyst). However, when the commercial provider team
started the contract, there was ‘pretty much no data’ and so the hospital providers ‘kind of managed
themselves with little contract management’ (Harlow, commercial analyst). Only 2 of the 17 hospitals
supplied hospital (Secondary Uses Service) data, which:
. . . gives you granularity that finally you can start unpicking exactly what’s going on for the patient,
you can start looking at pathways and so on . . . [otherwise you are paying] for something that
you don’t even know what it is.
Dennis, commercial consultant
The approach the commercial provider took with hospital providers was to say:
‘If you don’t supply us with this data, we can’t validate our patient activity, therefore we are not going
to pay for it.’ So slight – at times, very antagonistic approach. And I remember we sent out these
letters and we were lambasted and lambasted by the PCTs, lambasted by the providers.
Dennis, commercial consultant
In an attempt to reduce the hostility between the commercial provider, acute providers and PCTs, a NHS
commissioner was seconded for 1 year to the commercial provider mid-contract. During fieldwork, several
participants noted that relationships had since significantly improved. This ‘firm but principled’ stance of
‘no data, no payment’ (Dennis, commercial consultant) suggests that the commercial provider was willing
to sacrifice comfortable relationships for the provision of good-quality, useable data. This is not to say that
all commercial companies would prioritise data and relationships similarly.
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Accountability and performance management
In addition to prioritising measurement and data capture, another characteristic of commercial provider
commissioning was the emphasis on accountability and performance management. For this contract, the
commercial provider placed nurses into hospitals to verify patient notes against invoices, as often
commissioners have limited ways of checking the accuracy of claims. Feedback from the hospitals was that
clinicians were essential in this role to make clinical judgements. A commercial provider thought that
embedding the nurses in the hospital teams was ‘invaluable’ in identifying anomalies because ‘every single
patient going into that trust is being reviewed by our nurse on site’ (Dennis commercial consultant). For
example, if there was any bed blocking, the nurses would ‘pick up the phone’ to contract leads and
investigate further. The nurses also regularly reported back performance management issues to the PCTs.
Another participant was less positive about the embedded nurses, seeing it as a lost opportunity, as,
apart from ‘one or two significant issues’ of quality and safety, the nurse did not capitalise on driving up
quality or challenging clinical behaviours. Measuring the impact of the nurses was also difficult, and this
initiative was stopped.
Knowledge needs
Within each of the models, different types of knowledge were privileged (Table 6). Local clinical
knowledge from GPs was prioritised in the clinical commissioning model, service user knowledge was key
in the integrated health and social care model and analysts’ knowledge of capturing and interpreting data
was crucial in the commercial provider model. This is explained further in the following sections.
TABLE 6 Comparison of models of commissioning and knowledge needs
Model Clinical commissioning
Integrated health and social
care Commercial provider
Knowledge
privileged
GP Service user Analyst
Knowledge
provided by
privileged source
l Diseases and conditions
l Local health-care economy
l Local service provision
l Patient preferences?
(indirectly)
l Patient pathways
l Patient experiences
l Patient preferences
l Local service provision
l Local health-care economy
l Data manipulation
l Ways data can inform
commissioning
l Performance management
and accountability
Knowledge
wanted but
unavailable
l Consistent, reliable data
from health and social care
l Dashboard with ‘real-time’
activity data and financial
flows
l Service evaluation
l Consistent, reliable data
from health and social care
l Service evaluation
l Consistent, reliable data
from health and social care
l Hospital data with
sufficient ‘granularity’
l Ways to link data across
sectors/organisations
Type of activities l Ideas for new services and
service redesign
l Challenge hospital
consultants and clinical
colleagues
l Integrated health and
social care teams, budgets
and/or projects/pathways
l Representatives on key
committees
l ‘Dragon’s Den’ panel for
new ideas
l Challenge clinicians
l Service users as joint
project leads
l ‘Forensic’ analysis of
hospital data to validate
invoices
l Nurses checking invoices
against patient notes
l Payment delayed until
satisfied with provider
data quality
Advantages/
disadvantages
‘Real’ decisions made closer to
patients
Lack of commissioning
knowledge
Make unpopular decisions
more palatable?
Commissioning decisions more
open to public criticism
Financial savings
Over-reliance without skills
transfer
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Knowledge needs for clinical commissioning
Within clinical commissioning, local GP knowledge of the health economy and service provision was
important. As key gatekeepers, they were assumed to provide an understanding of how best to deliver
care to patients. However, GP commissioners were cautious about relying on their local knowledge alone.
In our observations of commissioning meetings, clinical commissioners repeatedly called for evidence to
inform which services to commission anew and which services to recommission. This did not have to be
research based, but clinical commissioners were clearly uncomfortable making decisions in a vacuum.
Clinical commissioners were also wanted robust evaluation ‘to say “yes” and it is delivering what we
expected – or it isn’t’ (Clara, NHS commissioning manager). For example, one CCG chairperson mentioned
that they had about eight different initiatives to address problems around delayed transfer of care, but
no mechanism to find out if any were ‘contributing well or contributing badly to that final outcome’
(Simon, CCG chairperson).
In terms of information, NHS commissioning managers and commercial providers commented that clinical
commissioners needed information faster than PCTs, as GPs were used to ‘real-time’ data with general
practice information technology (IT) systems. In one commissioning study site, extensive work was
undertaken to update a pathway tool with locally informed pathways, which, the lead was pleased to report
in a board meeting, appeared increasingly used during consultations. In another commissioning organisation,
several participants talked about wanting the ‘holy grail of a very simple, understandable dashboard for
the general financial picture that is useable and understandable to GPs’ (Craig, GP commissioner). Ideally,
they wanted this tool to track real-time activity and financial flows to find out how money was spent.
We observed anxieties around discrepant data in several commissioning meetings and this concern also
surfaced regularly in interview data. For example, one CCG chairperson said that disagreements about data
were a ‘fundamental flaw of our system’ (Simon, CCG chairperson). Another GP commissioner was keen to
get consistent data because of the situation of ‘oh God, we went to this meeting with one set of figures,
now I see another set that tell a completely different story’ (Angus, GP commissioner). One GP clinical
lead commented:
I think GPs have a very limited tolerance for being given information in data, and as soon as you
present, you have two different sets of data, they typically devalue both of them and believe neither
of them.
Craig, GP commissioner
This issue was of high priority to clinical commissioners, as they were well aware that without consistent
data, behavioural change among their colleagues was unlikely. However, several participants also
mentioned that the lack of consistent data or repeated requests for further information was sometimes an
excuse for clinical commissioners to delay or avoid taking difficult decisions.
I sometimes get quite frustrated at people’s constant requests for more and more and more local data,
and more and more and more analysis, when really it’s quite clear what we need to do, and actually
more data is not going to change the actions that you need to take . . . actually, you know, it’s almost
like that’s just a mechanism for not taking [laughs] any action.
Sandra, Public Health consultant and GP
Knowledge needs for integrated health and social care commissioning
The knowledge privileged in health and social care commissioning in two of the three examples was
largely that of service users. In the integrated project, service users were the reference point in
understanding what worked (and what did not) and their perspectives were gathered in various ways
(pathways, consultations, shadowing). Similarly, mechanisms for incorporating service user views and their
expertise were instituted in the third commissioning organisation including service users as strategic leads,
elected councillors as board members, and a community forum. In comparison, the data for one CCG
suggested service user involvement were minimal.
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Do you see any patients around here today? No. So I think it is a bit about getting patients involved,
both in advising, helping with decision making and then communicating decisions to the public.
I think to have laypeople communicating messages would be very powerful alongside clinicians or
board members or politicians or whatever. And at the moment we have very little of that.
Anthony, GP commissioner
External expertise also contributed to integrated health and social care commissioning initiatives. For
example, a large international accountancy consultancy helped with the urgent care initiative and was
rated highly by the CCG chairperson. Elsewhere, a commercial consultancy was brought in to use their
systems methodology to map and understand ‘customer’ demand. (NB: in briefing papers, terminology
such as ‘failure demand’ appear regularly, suggesting that at least some commissioners had become highly
adept in its use.) Several participants were positive about the contribution of this consultancy. In another
example, Public Health led on the evaluation of an initiative. Finally, in one commissioning case site, a
commercial provider supplied expertise to set up a ‘Community Forum’ and small group structures, which
was also appreciated.
Knowledge needs for commercial provider commissioning
Given the emphasis on good-quality data, unsurprisingly analysts’ expertise was highly valued in
the commercial provider commissioning model. This was crucial to feed into and inform decision-making.
Pulling together data from disparate sources and increasing its quality had been a major task. Keeping on
top of the contract also required excellent analytical skills. A NHS client said that the key to this contract
was that the commercial provider did ‘the basics really well’, which resulted in savings estimated at over
£1M in the first year.
Initially within the contract, a clear knowledge translation strategy had been costed in by the commercial
provider so that a NHS team could pick up the skills of the commercial provider, but this was eliminated
early on by the NHS client to reduce contract costs. Therefore, scant ‘legacy planning’ was in place and the
costs of the contract were likely to increase again, once the commercial provider left. However, there was
little evidence that the commercial provider would leave, as the initial contract for 3 years was renewed for
2 more, and then after a further tending exercise the commercial provider was awarded another 3-year
contract with an extended 2-year option. By 2019, the commercial provider may have run this outsourced
commissioning service for 10 years with no mechanisms in place to transfer skills into the NHS/CSU.
This further deskilled local NHS/CSU analysts and commissioners and effectively made the NHS clients
completely reliant on commercial provider support.
Box 4 summarises the key points in this chapter.
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BOX 4 Key points of Chapter 4
l Three models of commissioning were identified from our data: clinical commissioning, integrated health
and social care commissioning and commercial provider commissioning. However, even within any
particular model, there was considerable variance in practices, procedures and underlying attitudes
and values.
l Every CCG had its own unique blend of these commissioning models.
l Different types of knowledge were privileged in the different models. Local clinical knowledge from GPs
was prioritised in the clinical commissioning model, service user knowledge was key in the integrated
health and social care model and analysts’ knowledge of capturing and interpreting data was crucial in the
commercial provider model.
l With their clinical knowledge of patient needs and local knowledge of the health economy, GP
commissioners had an important role in generating ideas for improved services and pathways. They also
were called on to challenge hospital consultants and their GP peers.
l The knowledge that clinical commissioners wanted was evidence of which services to commission and ways
to determine if their initiatives made a difference. Calls for reliable, trustworthy data were frequent, as
without these, there was limited impact in changing clinical behaviour.
l Examples of integrated health and social care commissioning included overarching programmes of work,
integrated health and social care teams and specific projects. One CCG merged its health and adult social
care budgets to create an ‘integrated system’, whereby the implications of decisions were considered on
both health and social care outcomes, the social care voice was ‘very strong’ at all levels of the organisation
and service users had major roles in decision-making and leading initiatives.
l A commercial provider won an outsourced contract to take over commissioning responsibilities for a NHS
team. In this model, high-quality data to ‘drive decision making’ was emphasised along with accountability
and tight performance management of providers (no data, no payment). In addition, nurses were
embedded in acute hospitals to audit patient notes. Good relationships between commercial providers,
commissioners and health-care providers were secondary to good-quality data. Without mechanisms
to transfer commercial provider skills into the NHS, the NHS clients have become completely reliant
on the commercial provider, as the contract is now expected to run for at least 10 years.
l Clinical commissioners wanted ‘real-time’ data on activity mapped against financial flows; NHS health-care
commissioners in general wanted service evaluations to find out if their initiatives had made a difference.
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Chapter 5 Knowledge acquisition
Introduction
This chapter addresses the research question:
How do health-care commissioners access research evidence and other sources of knowledge to aid their
commissioning decisions?
For clarity, ‘commissioner’ is defined as any individual employed by a CCG (or PCT, which pre-dated CCGs)
who makes decisions affecting health-care delivery or provision. Although we recognise that external
providers from CSUs and Public Health may be involved in work that impacts on health care and
experience the same or similar knowledge transformation processes, in this chapter ‘commissioner’ refers
to PCT/CCG commissioners, regardless of clinical or managerial background.
Chapter 4 provided data on knowledge needs and sources for the different models of commissioning.
This chapter describes knowledge acquisition and the following chapter presents findings on knowledge
transformation. However, the distinction between knowledge acquisition and transformation is blurred,
as transformation occurs from the moment knowledge is acquired. Nevertheless, for the purposes of
reporting, the findings have been artificially separated into two chapters.
To recap, the data informing the next three chapters comes from eight case studies. The four case studies
of CCGs were:
l Carnford CCG – struggling financially, highly collaborative with its providers and reliant on the use of
tools and the data produced from those tools to influence commissioning decisions.
l Deanshire CCG – relatively confident as a commissioning organisation, focused on governance,
carrying out some innovative projects in partnership with commercial providers.
l Norchester CCG – financially challenged, emphasis on (ideally academic research) evidence-based
policy-making, piloting new ways of commissioning contracts, with substantial aid from commercial
and not-for-profit providers.
l Penborough CCG – creating an integrated network of health and social care provision, with a heavy
emphasis on public involvement throughout, historically extensive use of commercial, not-for-profit and
freelance providers.
In addition, we draw on data from the four case studies of commercial and not-for-profit providers
working in contractual relationships with NHS clients. These were:
l Heron – a multinational commercial company with a suite of tools and mixed UK/non-UK staff, offering
analytics and project management.
l Jackdaw – small, international, not-for-profit offering one tool.
l Swallow – a national commercial company with a suite of tools staffed largely by ex-NHS personnel
offering analytical and commissioning expertise.
l Swallow Tool – an exemplar of Swallow and NHS clients (PCT, acute and community providers)
working together to audit best place of patient care using an electronic tool.
We start with sources and types of knowledge identified by participants, along with details of the ways in
which knowledge was acquired. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the relatively modest role of
research evidence in commissioning.
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Sources and types of knowledge
Classification of sources
In building a cohesive case for action, practising the art of commissioning and manoeuvring their proposals
through the system, commissioners sought knowledge and information from many sources to determine,
clarify, substantiate and defend their position. An overview of those sources commonly named by
commissioners and observed in commissioning meetings is detailed in Tables 7–10, categorised as ‘people’,
‘organisations’, ‘tools’ and ‘research based’. These tables have been constructed by a commissioner
working with our research team using the categories commonly understood by commissioners, and are not
exhaustive, as other sources and types of knowledge undoubtedly exist and these sources offer other types
of knowledge not named by participants. As this is not a quantitative survey, we make no claims to the
representativeness of this classification, nor do we attribute weightings to the particular factors. However,
Clarke and colleagues conducted a survey on sources of evidence used by commissioners,43 which offers
additional useful information.
TABLE 7 People-based sources of knowledge and information
Clinicians
Commissioning
managers Analysts
Patients and the
public Freelance consultants
Local relationships
and history
Local relationships
and history
Local relationships and
history
Local experience of
services and personnel
Local relationships and
history (if former staff)
How services operate ‘Whole-picture view’ Hospital and primary
care data
How services operate Project-based experience
Possible
improvements
Finance and budgets Software tool
operation
How they might be
better served
Specific skills
(e.g. analysis)
Primary care data Performance Data and their
interpretation
Products
Condition-specific
expertise
Legal responsibilities Local benchmarking
and modelling
Experience and
knowledge of the
conditions
Some knowledge of
academic research
Contracting and
procurement
Experiential
knowledge
(e.g. which services
are not managing
referrals well)
Experiential
knowledge
(e.g. how to steer
commissioning
decisions through
the system)
Experiential knowledge
(e.g. what data to trust
and not to trust)
Experiential knowledge
(e.g. how to put
pressure on the system)
Experiential knowledge
(e.g. ways to present
information for local
commissioners)
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Which sources are commissioners more likely to trust?
Among national sources, commissioners appeared to trust certain organisations more, namely the National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), The King’s Fund and NHS Improving Quality (formerly NHS
Institute for Innovation and Improvement). Participants viewed NICE as providing rigorous, but not always
easily applicable, information. NHS Improving Quality and The King’s Fund were useful sources of best
practice guidance and new ways of commissioning. In contrast, several participants, especially GP
commissioners, seemed sceptical about the rigor of the information from the Department of Health.
Local information often trumped generalised research-based knowledge or information from other localities.
For example, ‘telehealth’ was a national ‘must do’, but clinicians were wary about its local applicability.
In one CCG, a local Public Health consultant compiled a briefing about the academic research evidence
behind ‘telehealth’. This briefing appeared to reconfirm, and perhaps even strengthen, the CCG’s stance that
‘telehealth’ was not a useful intervention. One month later, a health-care provider implementing ‘telehealth’
presented data on the first eight patients presenting at their local service and noted the reduction in hospital
admissions. His conclusion was ‘the data is showing that it’s really starting to make a benefit’. Although the
committee considering ‘telehealth’ did not completely reverse their earlier position, they became more positive.
Cindy: We’re not entirely sure but it seems to have some evidence that something happening.
TABLE 9 Tool-based sources of knowledge and information
Electronic software tools
National
benchmarking
National and local
dashboards
Business
system/quality
improvement
techniques,
(e.g. LEAN)
Locally developed
models (e.g.
commissioning
intelligence)
Scenario generating tool Comparison with
other CCGs/CSUs/
health-care providers
Comparison with
other CCGs/CSUs/
health-care providers
Project
management
Pathway tool What’s not working What’s not working
Invoice management Activity and referral
data (local)
Risk prediction
Prescription alternatives
Bespoke dashboards
TABLE 10 Research-based sources of knowledge and information
Journals and bulletins
Search
engines Universities Cochrane
CLAHRC, AHSN
and PCRN
Electronic
newsletters
BMJ MEDLINE Local university Systematic
reviews
Future sources of
research
Local clinical
briefings
British Journal of General
Practice (BJGP)
Google
Scholar™
York (mentioned twice
in different CCGs)
Public Health
observatories
Drugs and Therapeutics The King’s Fund
MHRA Drug Alerts NHS Improving
Quality
Health Service Journal
(HSJ)
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency; PCRN, Primary Clinical Research Network.
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Anthony: Can you tell us the key areas where it’s starting to show benefit? COPD [chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease] isn’t.
‘Telehealth’ project lead: Heart failure.
Cindy: It’s soft measures such as empowerment.
Lily: Telemedicine helping people to feel they can take control but it’s hard to measure.
Teresa: Marvellous!
Cindy: So watch this space.
Meeting observation
Although many factors might have contributed to the group’s more welcoming response to ‘telehealth’,
the presentation of positive local data appeared persuasive enough to start to reverse previously held
opinions substantiated by research evidence.
Mechanisms for acquiring knowledge
Verbal
The mechanisms whereby commissioners acquired knowledge included conversations, stories
and documentation.
Verbal exchange was particularly well suited to the fast-paced, rapidly changing environment in which
commissioners worked. Conversations were an important way of getting information quickly through
chance encounters, formal meetings and informal gatherings. The contingent nature of these exchanges,
however, meant that if a different combination of individuals had happened to meet, different knowledge
would have been acquired and perhaps a different set of decisions would have been made.
. . . popping in to see various GPs on my way somewhere else because they had 5 minutes to spare
and wanted to chat. But we’ve come up with these ideas, and it’s just been because we’ve sat there
and had the time to chat.
Randall, freelance analyst
Knowledge was also acquired through stories. Sometimes stories were told to substantiate a viewpoint,
and sometimes stories about patients and services were recounted to appeal to ‘common sense’
and/or make an emotional impact.
Daniel: So the example that we used, and that really hit the team, was a chap who was having
problems with dexterity in his hands – has anybody related this story to you already?
Interviewer: No, no, not this one.
Daniel: . . . And the clothing side, he was struggling to do his buttons and to do the collars of his shirt.
They spent some time with him and, you know, the house was clean, he was a very proud person.
And the old approach would either be to put in a package of care around help to dress himself, or
making him wear some sort of T-shirt or something. Actually we were able to take his own formal
shirts, and behind the buttons put in some Velcro, so that he could wear his own shirts and have that
sense of self-esteem, and not have somebody coming in every day which, you know, the learning
from the team was people lose their independence the more they have people doing for them.
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So those types of simple things, but you can imagine, in a normal system, if you said, ‘Well I need to
put some Velcro in,’ you know, they’d be hunting for the Velcro budget, we don’t have one, put in a
‘package of care’ around clothing!
Daniel, commercial consultant
Stories could be powerful in influencing commissioning decision-making. For example, a commissioning manager
said that stories were important to persist with proposals through the lengthy, repeated decision-making cycles.
And I have often thought in the past you need the story of the change. Because ideally from the time
you’ve gone through health scrutiny committee, the CCG, other local groups, other stakeholder groups and
especially if you get to a procurement exercise where actually you might draw services to a close and you
know people may be TUPE’d [Transfer of Undertakings] or made redundant and there’s some heavy duty
consequences for people, you need a compelling story. And often that is much more powerful than data
that you want to throw at people, and so having the clinical stories is really important and the patient’s
story is really, really key.
Harry, NHS commissioning manager
But not everyone was in favour of stories. A Public Health consultant noted that GP commissioners tended
to be ‘overly swayed by these hugely dramatic stories that clinicians would come in with based on
individual patient anecdotes’ (Mary, Public Health consultant).
Documentation
Although substantial knowledge acquisition occurred through informal conversation, more formal verbal
exchanges such as meetings were recorded, to leave a paper trail documenting discussions for
accountability purposes. Commissioners had substantial access to other documentation, much of which
was unsolicited. Documentation was often sent electronically. Documentation included performance,
activity, financial and referral data from a range of health-care providers, directives and guidelines from the
Department of Health and regional bodies, meeting papers, business cases, reports, patient satisfaction
surveys, guidelines and pathways. Often key points were summarised on a side of A4 or an executive
summary, possibly because the volume of reading was unmanageable. For example, governing board
members had usually at least a dozen documents of several pages each to read before monthly meetings.
Presumably to make this task easier, many documents had standardised cover sheet with information such
as title, purpose of the paper and action required. In some cases, executive summaries of one page or
shorter directly followed these cover sheets.
Despite this ‘overabundance’ of information, which meant that CCGs were ‘absolutely swimming in data’,
a CCG chairperson said they had ‘a staggering lack of . . . intelligent data’ (Simon, CCG chairperson).
One way of finding missing but desired information was through the internet. GP commissioners and
commissioning managers recounted how they used Google™ or Google Scholar to find the relevant
information to contribute to discussions with colleagues, inform thinking about service provision and
substantiate the decisions already made.
I go onto Google Scholar or Google, and it’s not very difficult to type in key words like ‘CCG’ or ‘PBC’
or ‘PCT budget allocation evidence’, and Google is phenomenal, and Google Scholar will obviously just
give you the articles, and you can usually get there on a single page, obviously go a little bit further,
read some of the subreferences, etc., extract the key data and some of the graphs, put it onto a
PowerPoint, and either present it at a board meeting or in one-to-one discussion with colleagues.
Patrick, GP commissioner
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The process mentioned above of reading the subreferences, extracting the key data, entering findings onto
a PowerPoint presentation and presenting the data to colleagues clearly illustrates the simultaneous
processes of knowledge acquisition and transformation, as sifting, selecting, rejecting, synthesising and
incorporating takes place to reshape the original knowledge (see Chapter 6, Ways knowledge is treated).
Useful but overlooked sources
Although where and how commissioners acquired information was important, the obvious sources that
were overlooked were also interesting. For example, several participants from one commercial provider
pointed out the vast number of good-quality data that commissioners did not use, including Public Health
data sets. Another former commissioning manager recounted how she had been unaware of the wealth of
information available to her from internal sources when she had worked within the NHS, and so had not
known what to ask for.
Kirsten: . . . when they [commercial providers] came in and said, ‘Who is driving your costs?’ at which
point I was like, ‘What do you mean? I don’t understand that question’. I’ve got this demographic. I’ve
got this population, deprived population here and here. I’ve got this overall growth in population, and
this wodge of money at that hospital, and that wodge of money at this hospital. That was my data
points. And they came in and said, ‘Well who is driving your costs?’ and came back with a pile of
paper this high saying, ‘All these people have been in hospital more than three times in the last
12 months, they’re driving your costs’. I didn’t know I had that data, I didn’t know to ask for it, and
now I know.
Interviewer: And where did they get that data from?
Kirsten: From my own IMT [information management technology] department!
Kirsten, commercial consultant
Research evidence
This section discusses the limited impact that research made on commissioning, usually appearing digested
in other forms such as NICE guidance, locally developed briefings and embedded within software tools.
However, we did identify a couple of examples of explicit use of research in one site in the form of
evidence reviews drafted by local Public Health consultants. Elsewhere, another CCG was attempting to
become a more robust ‘evidence based commissioner’.
Implicit use of research evidence
For commissioners, the word ‘evidence’ often meant any source of information other than personal
experience and anecdotes. When asked about the use of evidence in commissioning decisions,
participants often mentioned best practice guidance, hospital and primary care data and Department of
Health documentation.
Academic research made a fleeting appearance and was usually embedded within other forms. Most
participants did not talk about research evidence unprompted and research evidence was only formally
presented at two of observed board meetings (of the same CCG). Instead, participants at another
commissioning organisation talked about how research was implicit ‘in the system’ (Alan, NHS commissioning
manager), although there was no formal mechanism or any obvious attempt to check if it was being
appropriately and systematically adduced. Instead, clinicians and commissioners were ‘expected to keep on top’
of their area (Alan, NHS commissioning manager) sometimes by having their ‘ear to the ground’ with national
and local networks (Vidur, GP commissioner). The expectation was that clinical commissioners would bring a
research perspective with up-to-date, research-based assessments. In an observation of one CCG meeting, this
higher level of understanding of research was visible when a GP commissioner explained ‘funnel plots’ to his
colleagues, although we do not know if GP commissioners as a profession were this knowledgeable.
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Difficulties with using academic research
When asked about academic research, participants mainly talked about the difficulties in accessing and
using research. These included ‘academically very robust’ interventions not working in clinical practice
(Jane, NHS commissioning manager), the difficulties in finding applicable, relevant research or tools,
the challenge in drawing conclusions from literature reviews when there were substantial variations in the
intervention, lack of commissioner time and skills to do comprehensive reviews, difficulties in interpreting
the ‘spin’ within abstracts (Mary, Public Health consultant) and the length of time for locally commissioned
research to produce meaningful outputs.
One Public Health consultant discussed the difficulties in making research digestible for consumption
by commissioners.
So there is an issue around the evidence, and often it’s very sort of generalised, the conclusions can be
quite vague, so it’s quite difficult to turn that into kind of an operational plan. Then you need to pull the
evidence together, and there’s always the risk that you’ve missed out a really critical recent study which
contradicts everything else. Then you’ve got to find a receptive audience, and often it will come across
as being quite kind of ivory tower, and is this really of direct relevance to what we’re trying to do?
Rick, Public Health consultant
Explicit use of research (or research-like) evidence
However, research-based information was sometimes evident. Two commissioners (from different CCGs)
mentioned conducting literature reviews for specific projects, or contracting commercial providers to review
the literature for them. Many participants mentioned NICE guidelines. Although NICE guidance was
described as ‘hard edged’ with stronger links to academic research (Karen, Public Health consultant), it was
not mandatory to apply, and locally implementation was sometimes problematic if local services did not
exist to support the guidelines. Another GP commissioner made the point that NICE guidance was
‘absolutely crucial’ to decision-making but ‘we know we would go bust if we implemented all of them’.
So, they picked the ‘best ones’, defined as the most ‘do-able’ (Patrick, GP commissioner).
Local service evaluations were mentioned by participants from three CCGs, when they were asked about
research. These included a controlled cohort study of the reablement project, a cohort study mapping
the service usage of 50 patients at a local hospital and a controlled cohort study on the impact of case
management on hospital usage. The controlled cohort study was led by a local academic GP and was
mentioned by several participants, as the findings of this study had a clear impact on commissioning
decisions because the CCG decided not to expand the case management service; the evaluation had
found that little difference between the case and control groups. However, the nature of the contract was
such that the CCG could not recoup the costs of the service, although they did decide not to increase
their investment.
Public Health was cited in response to queries about accessing research evidence, for example the Public
Health consultant who drafted a briefing on ‘telehealth’ for one subcommittee, but carrying out a
robust evidence review was time-consuming. Nonetheless, the subcommittee appeared enthusiastic
about this these evidence appraisals.
Teresa comments that this presentation is very, very helpful. People are interested in more reviews of
research evidence around unscheduled care, to help with things like education and self-management . . .
Anthony: Value of this is that if we think of new initiatives we want you to be critical . . .
Percy: . . . Can we give things to you (Public Health consultant) to check out?
Anthony: That is the sort of input we want, and have not had in past.
Meeting notes
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Yet despite this enthusiasm, the subcommittee members appeared at a loss in applying the information,
especially as much of the research evidence was about ineffective interventions. For example, in observing
a meeting where an evidence review on interventions to prevent unplanned hospital admissions was
presented, the committee scanned through the interventions, a short discussion ensued on the benefits
and disadvantages of one intervention with inconclusive evidence (‘telemedicine’) and the document was
then put to one side. We do not know if the document fed into their future thinking, but its use seemed
cursory. This group did not appear to consider the disinvestment opportunities highlighted by these
reviews. The Public Health consultant who prepared these reviews was aware that the group struggled to
apply the information usefully.
Another issue I think, so for instance Sarah Purdy’s work [on unscheduled care], an awful lot of it
was like, ‘Well there is no evidence that this works and there’s no evidence that that works.’ And
that, it’s really interesting, but then you think, well if we are trying to get people who have these really
kind of strict targets, real pressure to reduce costs, and to just come in every month saying ‘We’ve
looked at this and it doesn’t work,’ then that’s quite a difficult position to be in.
Rick, Public Health consultant
Evidence-based commissioning
Although in three CCGs research evidence was not particularly drawn on, the ethos of one CCG was
explicitly grounded in evidence-based policy-making. This was visible throughout the organisation. In
meetings, participants, including lay representatives, often asked ‘where’s the evidence?’ and in interviews
participants from this CCG regularly talked about how the application or lack of research evidence affected
decision-making.
I’ve had conversations [with colleagues] about, ‘Well, you know, we shouldn’t be putting that down to
say it will make savings because there’s no evidence that it will,’ versus me saying, ‘But actually we’ve
still got a statutory responsibility to deliver a balanced plan, and if I take those savings out they need
to come from somewhere else.’
Carla, NHS commissioning manager
One GP commissioner from the same CCG noted that the repeated refrain for evidence for which they are
‘always duty bound’ can stop decision-making by commissioners.
. . . [they become] frozen because you can’t make pragmatic decisions. Because it’s like America is out
there but they will not set sail until they know it’s there . . . So with interventions like ‘telehealth’,
‘they’ll say ‘well we are not doing that.’
Patrick, GP commissioner
Briefings
A formal mechanism for improving the evidence-based practice of GPs was clinical briefings drafted and
sent out by a GP commissioner from one study CCG. Initially, these clinical briefings just went to one
practice, but then the CCG disseminated the briefings across the patch. The briefings evolved from
focusing on clinical evidence to including updates from local services, such as feedback from local hospitals
on problematic referrals. Again, in the act of acquiring information for the briefings, the GP commissioner
was already transforming knowledge as some information was discarded and other information was
selected, reshaped and synthesised to reflect local circumstances.
Within the commercial providers, regular briefings were drafted and disseminated. The information from
these briefings was sometimes passed on to the NHS clients via e-mail. One commercial consultant had
a self-appointed task of pulling together regular briefings with research from ‘think tanks’, NHS Improving
Quality, Public Health observatories and ‘leaders of thinking’. He also included information from Deloitte
on health-care innovation (North American), McKinsey, the Mayo Clinic and Dartmouth Atlas to ‘bring in
stuff that might be a bit different from what you normally see on the Department of Health websites’
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(John, commercial provider). Once John left the company, however, no one appeared to take up this
role – another example of the way in which knowledge acquisition was dependent on the happenstance
of who was present. Conversely, in the other commercial company, this role was formalised, as a
designated consultant sent out weekly bulletins. If this staff member was unavailable, another was
appointed to this task. The consensus from commercial provider staff at both companies was that these
briefings had helped them become more evidence based.
Commercial providers and academic research
Many software tools marketed by commercial providers were predicated on academic research. For example,
one tool arose from decades of academic research initiated by clinical teams. Development of the tool was
ongoing and one external provider encouraged researchers around the world to carry out independent
studies using the tool. Results were published on its website ‘to impart knowledge of how it’s been applied
in different areas’ and establish ‘rigour’ (Stan, commercial analyst). Consultants from the company regularly
attended academic conferences where they gave presentations on the tool and made ‘opportune’ contacts
(Katie, commercial consultant). Engaging academics was important to the success of rolling out the tool.
Interviewer: And how important do you think universities are in terms of expansion?
Respondent: Extremely. Absolutely, that’s the key, and that’s what differentiates us from [competitors]
that we are research oriented, and that’s what the [tool] is based on.
Katie, commercial consultant
In summary, commissioners defined evidence in many ways, but not usually in terms of academic
research. Academic research was occasionally explicitly sought, but usually it had been digested,
transformed and embedded into forms such as NICE guidance, software tools, the clinical knowledge
of GP commissioners and local briefings, presentations and conversations. Importantly, commissioners
did not usually check or confirm the standing of rigorous evidence in such sources, but took it on trust.
When commissioners had more direct access to research evidence, they had reservations about and
difficulties in applying it to local circumstances. Ironically, a negative consequence of evidence-based
commissioning was that without robust evidence commissioners became stalled in their decision-making.
The general interest in using research evidence was encouraging, but difficulties in finding applicable,
user-friendly research and its inconsistency in providing useful, accessible conclusions meant that the
impact of academic research evidence on commissioning decisions was limited.
Box 5 summarises the key points of the chapter.
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BOX 5 Key points of Chapter 5
l Sources of information for commissioners included people such as clinicians, commissioning managers,
analysts, patients and the public, commercial and not-for-profit providers and freelance consultants;
organisations included local public health departments, CSUs, health-care providers, Department of Health,
NICE and think tanks such as The King’s Fund and the Nuffield Trust. Tool-based information came from
software tools from commercial providers, national benchmarking and local dashboards.
l Local data often trumped national or research-based information.
l In acquiring information, conversations and stories were important, as oral methods were fast and flexible
which suited the changing world of commissioning. Unsolicited documentation was ubiquitous and often
sent electronically. Commissioners used internet search engines such as Google and Google Scholar to find
required information.
l Once acquired, indeed in the very act of its acquisition, information went through many cycles to be
rejected, filtered, embellished and/or modified before further dissemination.
l Commissioners often did not use information sources available such as Public Health data sets and
CSU data.
l Academic research was occasionally sought, but usually was already digested, transformed and embedded
into NICE guidance, software tools, GP clinical knowledge, presentations, conversations and local briefings.
Its provenance and appropriateness was taken on trust and not checked. Disinvestment opportunities
highlighted by research reviews did not trigger debates or influence commissioners’ thinking.
l The general interest in using research evidence was encouraging, but difficulties in finding applicable,
user-friendly research and its inconsistency in providing useful, accessible conclusions meant that the impact
of academic research evidence on commissioning decisions was limited.
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Chapter 6 Knowledge transformation
Introduction
This chapter addresses the research question:
What are the processes by which health-care commissioners transform information provided by other
agencies into useable knowledge that is embedded in commissioning decisions?
Having discussed knowledge acquisition, this chapter discusses knowledge transformation, although as
stated previously the phenomena of knowledge acquisition and transformation are inextricably linked.
Because this is a study of knowledge transformation between commissioners and external providers, we
will provide examples involving commercial, not-for-profit and freelance providers, public health
departments and CSUs.
Knowledge transformation necessarily involves the acquisition and modification of information. In
analysing our data, we identified five conduits through which knowledge was acquired and transformed.
We use the term ‘conduit’ deliberately to emphasise the sense that knowledge flowed through these
channels between two or more parties whose exchanges involved both receiving and transmitting
information, sometimes simultaneously, and to evoke the transformational flow of that we observed. The
conduits were, of course, inevitably intertwined and interlinked, but are treated separately here for the
sake of clarity.
1. Interpersonal relationships, whereby commissioners sought information held by others with whom they
had ongoing relationships.
2. People placement, whereby commissioners accessed information embodied by external provider
consultants with particular skills, experiences, backgrounds and expertise, who were placed
among them.
3. Governance, whereby commissioners were expected in their role as publicly accountable, statutory
organisations to act on information from elsewhere (e.g. Department of Health, NHS England teams) or
set up internal structures and processes.
4. Copy, adapt and paste, whereby commissioners accessed information from elsewhere which might be
locally applicable.
5. Product deployment, whereby commissioners accessed information held in electronic or non-electronic
tools and methods produced by the external contractors and deployed by or for the clients.
These five conduits were not the only ones commissioners and external providers employed, but they were
most commonly found across case sites to a larger or lesser extent. To increase the potential usefulness
and application of the knowledge passing through these conduits, commissioners continually carried out
two processes: contextualisation and engagement. Contextualisation involved taking knowledge and
filtering and focusing it through a local lens. Engagement entailed promulgating and refining the
knowledge further by involving, informing, enthusing and/or motivating the right people.
These conduits were employed at various times during the decision-making trajectory, from the moment
that a commissioner asked, ‘What do I need to know and from what/whom will I get the information I
need?’. Through these conduits, commissioners collaborated with many colleagues internal and external
to identify gaps in their current knowledge, attempt to fill those gaps, assess the usefulness of the
information received, apply what was useful and modify/discard what was not, identify new information
gaps, attempt to fill those gaps, assess usefulness and so on. These iterative, repeated cycles were
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continually layered and multifaceted, making the tracking of any particular information/knowledge (such as
research evidence) and its trajectory difficult to trace.
This chapter describes the five knowledge transformation conduits, the processes that commissioners used
to maximise the use of knowledge and the ways knowledge was treated.
Interpersonal relationships
Interpersonal relationships came into play when commissioners sought information held by others with
whom they had ongoing relationships. For example, one commissioning organisation contacted
consultants from a local not-for-profit organisation to ask for possible external organisations with
specialised skills to inform a contracting initiative. Because professionals from the two organisations had
worked together before, the commissioners knew that the not-for-profit agency was well placed to advise
them. Of all the conduits, interpersonal relationships appeared the most influential and were implicitly
nested into people placement and product deployment.
Interpersonal relationships were visible at different times and played out in key relationships. Some key
relationships were positive and some less so, which led to varying levels of impact. For example, one
commercial provider allocated consultants with experience in commissioning to help staff from
commissioning organisations to interpret data from software tools. A few commissioning consultants were
‘very, very good individuals within [commercial provider] who added a huge amount of value in terms of
helping people with their commissioning problems’ (Alfred, NHS client). Others appeared less useful to
commissioners and made less progress.
In one commissioning organisation, interpersonal relationships were closely linked to colocation and the
face-to-face, informal contacts that colocation permits. In interview, a GP commissioner noted the number
of desks he sat away from the Director of Finance (two) and the Director of Public Health (eight) in their
open-plan office, and credited this proximity with the high level of collaboration. A freelance analyst
working with this CCG was also aware of the importance of informal, face-to-face encounters with
local GPs.
If you’ve got trust and if you’ve got experts in both domains really closely engaged, literally, and by
that I mean literally sat at the same computer fiddling around with stuff on the screen, bouncing ideas
off each other, that for me was where all these light bulb moments came.
Randall, freelance analyst
One Public Health consultant talked about how through building relationships, Public Health had
transformed commissioners’ understanding of the commissioning cycle, highlighting the importance of
needs assessment. This was particularly important given how thinly stretched the Public Health team was
across five CCGs.
I suppose what we’ve done a lot over the last two years has been around really relationship building.
Because one of the problems with having five CCGs and a sort of relatively lean Public Health team is
actually, you know, physically being able to be a presence which, I mean I know that just being
somewhere is not the same as imparting but if you’re never there and they can’t see you, that is a
problem . . . I think we’ve been very successful there with the CCGs actually supporting them to
understand the commissioning cycle, and that it starts with a needs assessment.
Sandra, Public Health consultant
With commercial providers, interpersonal relationships sometimes appeared to depend on a perception of
shared ‘public sector values’ such as partnership, knowledge freely exchanged and the primacy of patient
benefit (Alfred, NHS client). We observed several instances where commercial consultants attempted to
capitalise on their NHS credentials and knowledge to build relationships.
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFORMATION
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
54
. . . to get credibility if they’ve not seen your CV [curriculum vitae] beforehand, is that I’ve worked in
the NHS, so I’m clinically intelligent in that sense, and I’ve been in their shoes most of the time, so I’ve
often been in the wards with people that I’m working alongside and I try to understand what their
issues are. But I can also work with them as a person, so who they are and what issues they are
facing. And I mean I know that’s very effective, because I get an awful lot of disclosure very early on in
terms of what the real issues are for people.
Jessie, commercial consultant
In summary, interpersonal relationships manifested themselves in different ways, but often appeared
dependent on informal, face-to-face encounters and demonstrating shared values through claims
of belonging to the ‘NHS family’.
People placement
Another conduit, closely linked to the above, was people placement, whereby the necessary skills,
expertise, background and experiences were embodied in the professionals themselves. Ideally, these
individuals were embedded within a client organisation. An example of people placement was when a
commercial company located two nurses at acute hospitals to check invoices against patient notes.
Commonly, the intention behind people placement was to inject knowledge into the health-care system
and to foster interpersonal relationships.
Several types of external providers employed the conduit of people placement. For example, a CSU
provided regular senior manager input at senior management team meetings and an analyst embedded
within the CCG.
Well, we have a very good contact at the CSU, Mike. He comes to our senior management team
meetings now once a fortnight. And what we’ve managed to do with his help and support really is get
his team to see themselves as welcome within our building . . . And so we need to build up some of the
personal relationships which always make these things easier. And we need some of the ease of
communication which comes from somebody being on the next desk rather than at the end of the
telephone or e-mail.
Tom, CCG chairperson
Although it was relatively rare, some commercial companies managed to embed consultants into NHS
organisations, but only if commissioning organisations were receptive.
Helen: It was very much a place of work as well, so we stayed up there during the week, so it wasn’t
a transient thing either we absolutely became part of their organisation. And we were invited to
everything that was to do with that organisation, weren’t we? Whatever happened we were – one of
us was involved in something that was going on in there. And so because we were there, and we
were very visible, and we were in the same building as the four commissioning group leads, directors,
we were very available, weren’t we? (Yeah) And we had lots of drop in questions, so they regularly
came to us with questions that weren’t necessarily related to the piece of work that we were doing
with them at the time. So they would come for advice and help, wouldn’t they?
Patricia: And I think because we had built that relationship, we were then seen as an organisation
coming in that they didn’t feel threatened by.
Patricia and Helen, commercial consultants
Former public sector organisations such as CSUs employed the people placement conduit with perfunctory
matching of skill sets to client needs. With commercial providers, the process of people placement
appeared more sophisticated, as the matching of consultant and NHS client was fundamental to success.
Good matching considered discipline (e.g. analyst to analyst), previous experience in the care sector (e.g.
mental health) and skills and expertise (e.g. knowledge of contracting). One commercial provider, either
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accidentally or intentionally, also allocated consultants whose personality type filled gaps on the
management team (e.g. ‘completer/finishers’ vs. ideas initiators). Some clients wanted international experts
rather than ‘recycled NHS managers’ (Kristen, senior commercial consultant), but other clients preferred
working with those with NHS background. Softer skills were also necessary.
The front man, Tim, was very good, he knew his stuff, he could hold his own with the GPs, he worked
well with the colleagues, didn’t wind anybody up and we had a very productive year out of that
working relationship.
Kurt, NHS analyst
Commercial consultants were allocated to projects on the basis of client needs, which were often unclear
and highly changeable. Commercial consultants could suddenly be reallocated, leaving NHS clients
somewhat bereft.
There’s a piece of work that the PCT want to do which is more about looking at different kinds of
contracting options for the future. And we’ve got an expert in that, and it seems absolutely daft me
spending ages reading up and scratching my head and only being able to give them part of the
solution, when actually John can do it all. And he’s really wanted to get his teeth into something like
that. So I’ve explained to them [the clients], ‘This is our expert. I will be moving back. John is going to be
doing this piece of work’. But, they’re not happy – I think they’re not happy about me stepping back,
but they know that they’ll get what they need and at the end of the day, that’s what they’re paying for.
Jessie, commercial consultant
Although the conduit of people placement relied on the knowledge embodied within individuals, those
individuals often chose to relocate. For example, about 20% of study participants at one commercial
provider left before fieldwork stopped 6 months later. Many went on to work for rival commercial
companies, taking their expertise with them. We also encountered NHS participants who straddled the
NHS/commercial provider divide by working concurrently for both. During the data collection phase,
no one voiced concern about this intermingling and exchange between the NHS and commercial companies.
Subsequently, however, a programme broadcast on BBC Radio 4 questioned the impact of secondments of
NHS staff into large commercial providers and vice versa.44
Governance
Another conduit through which knowledge was obtained and transformed was governance, which we use
here in the very broad sense of the structures and processes which shape ‘the way we do business’.
Governance is a similar conduit to the others in that knowledge is exchanged and transformed between
two or more parties, sometimes from national/regional bodies such as the Care Quality Commission or
NHS England and sometimes between different local committees. Knowledge to inform governance came
from sources such as national ‘must dos’ and guidance, local financial data and patient-level data.
Unlike the other conduits whereby the commissioner actively sought information, with this conduit the
commissioner was often the (unwilling) recipient. The governance conduit was visible in processes and
structures adopted by CCGs and the way decisions were made. For example, with clinical commissioning
medical input was now much more likely to inform decision-making.
In the old days decisions made by the PCT would be made according to what the Department of Health
required, the Strategic Health Authority required, the managers thought was appropriate and then we’d
also consult with the clinicians . . . and that’s how it would go through. Now it starts with a clinician,
the whole innovation, the whole idea. The clinicians drive it through and they bring it to the governing
body and say, ‘This is what we want to happen – is it feasible to make it happen?’ The governing body
then, as the name suggests, looks at the governance of it, and that’s the right way. That’s a big shift in
where the responsibility, where the accountability, where the innovation and the service provision
comes from.
Malcolm, CCG chairperson
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Because probity and accountability were so important to CCGs, proposals went through several
decision-making cycles before ultimate approval. This often frustrated commercial providers and freelance
consultants, who complained of slow NHS decision-making, such as Brian:
Kevin: Think about the decision route. From the project board to the Operations Group – the papers
are already out for the March Operations Group meeting.
Brian: Why does the Operations Group need to make the decision?
Len: It needs to be the whole community, can get it into the March agenda. [Len is Operations
Group chairperson.] [Kevin asks about terms of reference and whether they have delegated
decision-making powers.]
Brian: Can’t possibly expect every decision to go to them? This isn’t a major decision.
Kevin: This is our top priority.
Brian: The more you push it up the governance ladder the harder it is to make a decision.
Kevin: The expectation was that we were coming back with a recommendation.
Brian: So we will inform them and explain why. Not the same as asking ‘do you agree’?
Kevin: We are asking for an endorsing decision from them.
Meeting notes
Interestingly, Brian, the freelance consultant above, was a former PCT chief executive, so he was presumably
well accustomed to the exigencies of public sector accountability. But a recent study suggests that these
structures have become even more prolific with the advent of the Health and Social Care Act 20124
and CCGs.45 Because proposals were repeatedly discussed in decision-making cycles across several
decision-making groups, it was often hard to determine what and when decisions were taken, who was
involved or what information had contributed. Nonetheless, as public money was involved, proposals were
necessarily subjected to substantial scrutiny.
Besides decision-making processes and structures, the governance conduit was evident in other aspects,
including setting strategy, finance, risk and information management. The conduit of governance was most
visible in our observations of CCG board and subcommittee meetings. For example, we observed a freelance
consultant presenting her report on the Francis Inquiry to a CCG governing body, which considered the
implications of the report operationally and strategically. This report necessitated a response from every CCG
as a national mandate. The consultant, who was an ex-NHS colleague, took the 290 recommendations of
the Francis report, synthesised them into a few categories and benchmarked local performance against these
categories. CCG board members found this report ‘really helpful’, especially as the consultant’s assessment
was that the commissioning organisation was ‘not starting from zero’ (Hannah, commissioning manager).
This then influenced their subsequent decisions on developing a strategy for quality assurance.
The governance conduit was visible in policies around data sharing, which often had a major impact on
limiting or preventing knowledge transformation. The desire to use patient-level data to link across data
sets was increasing, as commissioners from several of the study CCGs developed patient pathways to
inform their commissioning decisions. But this coincided with greater stringency around data protection.
For example, one commissioning organisation wanted to link up their dashboard with hospital data to the
risk prediction tool at patient level to learn more about where in their pathways patients stopped using
NHS services. Information governance stipulations were that linkage of patient-level data could occur only
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if there was direct patient benefit to the patients involved. But in the case of the dashboard, direct patient
benefit could not be demonstrated, so this linkage was not permitted. Distinguishing between data
linkage for ‘direct patient benefit’ versus ‘commissioning’ was not straightforward.
Anthony: Think that would be great and if the hospital could tell us what happened to them. Can we
share that data between hospital and community (i.e. trace a patient journey through)?
[Yvonne says no but Sally says yes.]
Yvonne: Because patient’s been discharged we couldn’t argue that it’s for the benefit of that patient.
But you could anonymise. But you couldn’t then link without an identifier to community provider data.
Rowena: Couldn’t someone call the patient and ask if they could use their data?
Percy: If we want to use data for performance we can take to (something).
Yvonne: As long as anonymised that’s fine.
Meeting notes
Moreover, although a participant said that GPs were less enthusiastic about using patient data for
‘planning’ purposes rather than direct patient outcomes (Sanjay, GP commissioner), when GP
commissioners realised the restrictions around use of patient-level data for commissioning, there was
considerable outrage.
Tom: You can’t beat actually following case notes.
Anthony: That was shot down due to information governance.
Tom: Rubbish!! [He is really indignant].
Amelia: If it is a clinician to clinician discussion you’ll be fine.
Tom: In that case I’ve breached information governance lots of times.
Anthony: There is a distinction if you are looking at the data for a cost saving versus a care issue.
General group response is that ‘it is all patient care’.
Meeting notes
In another commissioning organisation, data sharing with commercial providers was an important concern.
To populate software tools, commercial providers needed access to patient data sets from different
health-care sectors. For the risk prediction tool, all the data for the local general practices and hospitals
were held in a data warehouse by a third-party commercial company. This same company also held
national NHS data, and so NHS data governance requirements were all met. Nonetheless, several GPs
voiced concerns about releasing their data without patient permission, as they were alarmed about
data handling.
Patrick: I know a lot about it, because I’m extremely sceptical because I did not like the idea of
[commercial provider] having all of our data. People completely do not understand the data flows
and the IT implications of what they were suggesting. So it takes primary care data, merges it with
secondary care data, then what people didn’t really realise is that there is a third data set which
had no information governance surrounding it whatsoever, apart from [commercial provider] could
use it for whatever they wanted and sell it to the highest bidder.
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Interviewer: Really?
Patrick: Well I’m exaggerating slightly.
Patrick, GP commissioner
One practice manager said that he and his colleagues had similar concerns about the association of the
risk prediction tool with a commercial company, as practice managers were beginning to see themselves
as ‘guardians of the patients’ data’ (Adrian, practice manager). Once the contract with the commercial
provider ended, however, the CCG was ‘desperate’ to share patient-level data and roll out the tool, but it
was tied up in information governance (Patrick, GP commissioner).
Not all CCGs were concerned about data sharing with commercial providers. An analyst at the same CCG
as above noted that data sharing was hampered because influential GPs were ‘at the cautious end of the
spectrum in terms of data sharing’ (Charles, NHS analyst). He commented that GPs in a neighbouring
county had 100% uptake of the risk stratification tool, because there was not the same level of concern
and the other county also had ‘people at very senior level who were driving the value of the risk prediction
tool’ both clinicians and managers. Another reason Charles thought practices were reluctant to sign up
was that the sign-up documentation was lengthy and technical.
In summary, the governance conduit was mainly visible through decision-making and information
governance. With decision-making, because proposals were considered by many different committees, the
knowledge was constantly reshaped. Information governance could halt knowledge transformation by
forbidding linkage of patient data sets and because of alarm around commercial providers having access to
patient data.
Copy, adapt and paste
Another conduit was ‘copy, adapt and paste’, whereby innovations, ideas, tools, pathways, guidance,
service redesign and so forth were taken from one context and adapted to a different programme, project,
organisation, health-care economy or sector. One commercial consultant, who was a former public sector
employee, commented that there was an ‘almost pathological desire’ to ‘copy and paste’ in the NHS
(Felicity, commercial consultant). One GP commissioner noted that commissioners were good at ‘foraging
around to find something roughly right’, but then had difficulties in testing the robustness of the
borrowed concept (Ciara, GP commissioner). To make the imported knowledge work, commissioners and
clinicians had to contextualise and adapt the concept locally.
We found many examples of copy, adapt and paste across the case site CCGs. For example, one CCG
adopted ‘copy, adapt and paste’ with a commercial pathway tool. Based on NICE guidelines and tailored
to reflect local pathways, this electronic pathway tool was intended to sit on GPs’ desktops to provide
evidence-based pathways accessible during consultations. This had been adapted in a neighbouring
county, to great acclaim. A CCG borrowed and paid for their neighbour’s modified pathway tool and
adapted it further to meet their requirements by adding information about local services.
‘Copy, adapt and paste’ was encouraged by copious documentation on best practice, disseminated from
the Department of Health, The King’s Fund, NHS Improving Quality and other organisations. One
commissioning organisation was constantly ‘horizon scanning’ to look out for pioneering initiatives to
appropriate ‘because there are loads out there’ (Carol, NHS commissioning manager). Sometimes, they
contracted external commercial providers to ‘bring in research from other areas that says over here they are
doing this and how that might be adapted or adopted here’ (Hilda, lay representative). But often they
conducted those searches themselves.
Research in this modern world is very quick, you know, it’s really very, very easy to find out who’s
doing what. So if you look at A&E and put in GPs in there, you know, I know there’s been national
research done, I know there’s The King’s Fund stuff, but in 10 minutes I could go online and find out
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which other hospitals are publishing information about trying it. So it’s relatively easy to pick a subject
matter and say what’s going on out there.
Alan, NHS commissioning manager
In summary, ‘copy, adapt and paste’ was so ubiquitous in the case sites that it was sometimes hard to
trace back to the original source of the innovation. Few ideas or ‘innovations’ seemed genuinely original.
Moreover, each time an innovation was appropriated into a new context, its content was further modified.
Product deployment
Another related conduit of knowledge was product deployment. Product deployment consisted of the
production and dissemination of information via tools, often combined with training in their use that was
produced by the external contractors. In one commissioning organisation, the tool was a system-wide
business method. Developed from managerial research into organisational behaviour from the 1980s, the
aim was to move organisations from a ‘command and control’ ethos to focusing on customer needs.
The commercial provider contributed the method and the client brought local knowledge. Although the
idea of seeing the organisation from the service user perspective is not new, the combination of the
knowledge of the consultants (who were often ex-clients of the method) with an overarching method that
prioritised ‘principles’ over ‘rules’ (e.g. downgrading box ticking to meet governance requirements) seemed
to change the way that service redesign was viewed.
And I think what I’ve learned, which actually, in some ways, when I say it out loud seems so simplistic,
is that actually, if we do the right thing for our patients, then it actually is cheaper, quicker, more
efficient, more effective.
Jane, NHS commissioning manager
But a non-electronic tool was unusual. In this study, product deployment usually involved software tools
developed by commercial providers for invoice validation, scenario modelling and risk prediction. Risk
prediction tools were most common. These tools aggregated hospital and primary care data to work out
the current and predicted costs of patients based on their conditions. This information was usually used
to identify patients at high risk of hospital admissions for interventions such as case management by
community matrons, although one CCG was piloting use of the tool for resource allocation to
general practices.
Training NHS staff in operating the tools was part of product deployment. One tool provider set up virtual
online webinars, whereby NHS clients were taught advanced operational skills by international experts in
the risk prediction tool (see Chapter 8, External provider 1). Another risk prediction provider organised
face-to-face multidisciplinary sessions, either in GP practice premises or at the headquarters of the commercial
company. Participants at these training sessions tended to be practice managers, community nurses,
pharmacy leads, commissioning managers and GP clinical leads. The format of the training sessions was
interactive PowerPoint presentations followed by a demonstration of the tool populated with local data.
A critical moment in the sessions was the identification of local high-risk service users, as this was a test of
the tool’s accuracy and usability. If ‘the usual suspects’ (i.e. known patients) (Ginny, external consultant)
were identified and no new information was provided, NHS clients might conclude that the tool offered
no added value. But if too many patients unknown to the clinical team were identified, the conclusion
could be that the tool was inaccurate. In comparing data output from the tool with their clinical and
practice-based knowledge, clinicians formed judgments about the usefulness of the tool.
Two commercial providers used a strategy of training NHS/CSU trainers who in turn trained other NHS/CSU
staff. The NHS/CSU trainers came from different backgrounds, including primary care commissioning and
information. They taught general practice staff and community matrons and others how to use the tools
through group presentations and ‘sitting by Nelly’ methods. However, several NHS trainers noted that
those trained to use the tools quickly forgot those skills, as neither the CCG nor other general practice
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staff requested any output. The skills were not drawn on frequently enough to embed the knowledge
(see Chapter 8, External provider 1).
NHS/CSU analysts were key to the implementation of these software tools, as analysts tended to have
day-to-day operational responsibility. But the capacity of analysts available within the NHS was low,
especially during fieldwork when PCTs were losing staff in the turmoil following the 2012 Health and
Social Care Act.4 Instead, commercial providers trained anyone who showed up from the commissioning
organisation to training sessions, which might include those who were uncomfortable with anything more
complicated than spreadsheets.
But in one commissioning agency, the NHS analysts were an equal match for the sophisticated
expertise of commercial providers. In working closely with the commercial providers to run and test a
scenario-generating tool, the NHS analysts identified several ways that the tool could be improved and
made these adaptations themselves within the software. These suggestions were then incorporated into
the next version of the tool by the commercial provider and rolled out to other clients. Some commercial
provider consultants, mainly those with lead responsibility for a particular tool, actively sought these
opportunities to enhance tool performance. This was an example of genuine knowledge exchange
whereby both commercial provider and NHS client benefited.
Knowledge transformation processes
In adapting and applying knowledge accessed through these conduits, two processes were regularly
employed: contextualisation and engagement.
Contextualisation
Contextualisation involved taking information from elsewhere and applying a local lens or filter.
Commissioners had an essential role in contextualising the knowledge to local circumstances, but
sometimes external providers had to undertake contextualisation as well so that the knowledge was fit for
commissioners. When appropriating information from elsewhere, one commissioning manager commented
that someone ‘always says our system is not like that’ (Clara, NHS commissioning manager), and so the
knowledge needed to be contextualised to overcome this hurdle. One commissioning manager said that
contextualisation was the ‘crux’ of commissioning.
I think that’s the crux of our job. It’s really interesting, because you read what you read, and you find
out what you can, but then it has to be applied locally. And all localities are different, you know. If
you look at [our CCG], for instance, we’ve only X population in our entire area. Geographically it’s
relatively small and urban compared to say our neighbours in [county name]. So that alone says
something about how you start to think about things. And a lot of activity, research, JSNAs, a lot of
Public Health driven sort of surveys about where your deprivation is – all that information is available.
And so you have to then balance best practice against what’s reality locally, what you’re doing already
good and bad locally.
Alan, commissioning manager
The inherent transferability between the original context where the information was generated and the
local situation was important and participants varied in views on how close that matching had to be.
Karen: If evidence or trials show that it works elsewhere then we have to believe that it can work
here too.
Carol: Agree but we can’t assume that it will all work here because the data elsewhere may say 200
but it won’t be 200 here. Need to look at all of the pieces not just one part.
Meeting notes
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Contextualisation repeatedly appeared in product deployment. The type of knowledge and information
built into software tools was often based on academic research evidence or expert consensus that was not
UK based. Often, tools needed ‘Anglicisation’. This contextualisation was crucial, as without high NHS
applicability clients tended to dismiss the tool. Some contextualisation was undertaken by external provider
staff, but, to make some tools useful, NHS analysts provided further contextualisation for the local
health-care economy.
Moreover, NHS clients had to know what to do with the data and needed help applying data outputs to
commissioning decisions. Ideally, commissioners had access to an ‘interpreter’ who was known and trusted
to assist with this type of contextualisation. For example, in one CCG, a CSU analyst attended meetings
where she had a regular slot to present a dashboard and work through the implications of the data with
committee members. In another CCG, a GP commissioner talked about his concern that, without a trusted
interpreter, commercial providers might take advantage of GP commissioners.
But, you know, what do you do with that data? We know that it must be saying something to us,
the fact that a little old lady has had three falls, the ambulances have been round a few times, that
probably is telling us something about her, that she’s not very stable. But it doesn’t tell us that she’s
somebody that necessarily needs to be assessed by the team. And when our team resources are really
very, very stretched, we’re in a bit of a dilemma. We’ve now got a waiting list for people to be
assessed, and half of them, I suspect, will be assessed and it will be decided that they hadn’t really got
a big problem at all. So somebody coming in and saying, ‘Oh yeah, we recognise all of that, we can
do something with that,’ sounds superficially very appealing. Now some of it may be complete bullshit
and they may just be angling to get into the markets and that’s what worries me.
Roger, GP commissioner
Contextualisation was integral to the ‘copy, adapt and paste’ conduit and manifested in interpersonal
relationships and people placement, where through relationships and by combining knowledge and
expertise, knowledge could be transformed into a more useable, applicable form. Training on the tools
alone did not appear to be sufficient in helping commissioners to maximise their use of the tools. The
outputs had to be interpreted and contextualised by those who understood the tools, so that local
commissioners could digest and apply the information. Otherwise, NHS clients did not know what to do
with the data. Contextualisation was less evident in governance processes, although translating national
and regional mandates required some contextualisation.
Engagement
Another knowledge transformation process was engagement. Engagement was about taking transformed
knowledge and exposing and refining it further by involving the ‘right people’. The right people might
have important information or perspectives, be positioned to instigate behavioural change (or show reason
why that could or should not happen) and/or could tap into local or national networks to make the
initiative a success. Again, commissioners were crucially placed to undertake local engagement, but
external providers also actively used engagement strategies.
Local commissioner-led engagement was evident with service redesign initiatives, whereby commissioners
drew on the experience of those ‘round the table’ (Abbie, NHS commissioning manager). Moreover,
engagement of clinicians into commissioning initiatives was discussed across all case sites. For example,
in one CCG meeting the group talked about progress on engaging ophthalmologists in developing a
community service. Engaging GP practices was also a common topic.
And one other positive thing I think is that in previous times it’s been incredibly difficult to actually
engage general practice in some of the quality improvement work because, understandably, you
know, independent contractors, getting GPs to come to meetings and do things if you can’t fund
them and things is quite difficult, and now obviously that is a role [for GP commissioners].
Sandra, Public Health consultant
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With appropriate governance, engagement was visible to ensure that the right people were involved in
decision-making. This signalled that the relevant organisations had been consulted and took responsibility.
Being perceived as engaging appropriately was a high priority with one CCG, where very large meetings
with many different organisational representatives were held, although input from some was minimal
(i.e. Public Health, Social Services). In another, the process of engagement led to a different (and smaller)
mix of elected councillors and a lay representative as chairperson.
In one contract, engagement by the external provider was clearly implicated in the vicissitudes of the
contract’s success. The commercial provider first deployed a team of analysts with little commissioning
expertise or NHS knowledge and minimal focus on relationship building and engaging local commissioners.
The NHS client complained. The commercial provider then allocated a cohort of new management
consultants, many with a background in the NHS, with a remit of ‘commissioner engagement’ to help to
interpret and use the data. Some successfully developed interpersonal relationships. The NHS clients were
happier. However about a year later, changes within the commercial provider meant that the emphasis
shifted and engagement moved more to the background. Moreover, the commercial provider blocked NHS
clients from having any direct contact with subcontractors of the tools because of concerns that the NHS
clients would drop the main contractor in favour of the subcontractors. This stifled knowledge exchange.
The contract was renegotiated; the termination date was brought forward by several months and the NHS
clients directly contracted further training from a subcontracted company. Changing levels of commissioner
engagement had an impact on the success of this contract.
In summary, engagement helped to spread, and further transformed, knowledge. Engagement was
particularly necessary with product deployment, as ample data from this study suggested that without
engaging the right people such as influential GPs and practice managers, as well as commissioners, the
roll-out and use of software tools was frustrated. Interpersonal relationships enhanced product deployment
and appeared to facilitate greater understanding (and possibly use) of the tool outputs generated.
Engagement was highly visible within governance.
Model of knowledge conduits and transformation processes
Figure 5 represents the findings of this chapter visually, setting out the relationships between the different
knowledge conduits and commissioners’ knowledge transformation processes. In Chapter 8, details from
vignettes will be added to the template below to provide examples.
Ways knowledge is treated
As stated previously, we found that knowledge acquisition and transformation were interwoven, with little
to differentiate knowledge acquisition from knowledge transformation, as every transfer from one source to
another entailed someone’s knowledge acquisition, during which it was at least to some extent altered.
In contextualising and engaging, commissioners employed many ways of treating that knowledge. These
actions are set out in Figure 6 and are not presented in any quantifiable way. They emerged from taking
multiple accounts in the data in turn and analysing how the information had been treated. Through this
continual, repeated sifting and milling, useful information was retained and passed on, while less helpful
knowledge was discarded. The ways that commissioners treated knowledge were similar to the ways that
multisectoral policy-making groups and clinical communities of practice treat knowledge in developing their
‘mindlines’.20,21,46,47
Box 6 summarises the key points of the chapter.
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Repeating
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FIGURE 6 Ways of treating knowledge.
BOX 6 Key points of Chapter 6
l The conduits through which knowledge was transferred were:
¢ interpersonal relationships, whereby commissioners sought information held by others with whom they
had ongoing relationships
¢ people placement, whereby external staff were embodied with particular skills, experiences,
backgrounds and expertise and were ideally embedded within the clients’ organisation
¢ governance, whereby commissioners received and applied knowledge as publicly accountable officials
¢ copy, adapt and paste, whereby commissioners accessed information from initiatives elsewhere and
applied locally
¢ product deployment, whereby commissioners accessed information held in electronic or non-electronic
tools and methods.
l Within these conduits, knowledge was not merely transferred but transformed.
l Many of the activities of knowledge transfer, exchange and transformation were motivated by the ‘juggling’
art of commissioning discussed in Chapter 3, which entailed the need to manoeuvre information through
the system in an optimal manner that, by ‘satisficing’ competing pressures, altered the knowledge itself.
l Commissioners employed contextualisation and engagement to localise the knowledge and spread it to the
right people. In undertaking these processes, knowledge was treated in many ways, such as reshaping,
discarding and telling.
l Face-to-face encounters were important in facilitating interpersonal relationships. People placement and
product deployment implicitly relied on activating the interpersonal relationship conduit, which led to
greater success in contractual relationships. Without this comingling of conduits, commissioners struggled
to interpret data outputs without an interpreter on hand.
l Information, innovations and ideas were so modified that sometimes the original provenance was difficult
to ascertain.
l Information governance hampered the flow of knowledge by limiting access to patient-level data for
pathway mapping and linkage of data sets. Some general practice staff had concerns about data sharing
with commercial providers.
l Of all the conduits, interpersonal relationships appeared most crucial in influencing commissioning decisions.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03190 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 19
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Wye et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
65

Chapter 7 The role and nature of external
providers
Introduction
This chapter answers the research question:
What is the nature and role of agencies that provide commissioning expertise from the public (e.g. Public
Health), private (e.g. commercial providers) and other sectors (e.g. not-for-profit)?
Having discussed knowledge acquisition and transformation in commissioning, we now focus on external
providers. As mentioned previously, we use the term ‘external provider’ for several different types of
organisations. These include former public-sector bodies such as Public Health and the information
function of PCTs that have now predominantly moved into CSUs. This term also includes commercial and
not-for-profit companies, freelance consultants and voluntary agencies, although no data were collected
from the voluntary sector.
The chapter starts with a classification and description of the types of external providers encountered
during fieldwork. An exploration of CSUs and Public Health follows. We then present information on why
commissioners use for-profit and not-for-profit consultants and what these consultants offer. The final
section covers the views of participants on for-profit and not-for-profit providers.
Who are the external providers?
Classification
During the two-and-a-half years of fieldwork from 2011 to mid-2013, our four case study CCG commissioners
worked with many different external providers. We have listed these below, categorised as public, commercial,
not-for-profit and voluntary sector, along with the work these organisations (or individuals) were engaged
in, where known. Some functions were carried out by multiple organisations; for example, evidence reviews
were conducted by commercial companies and public health departments. This list is not exhaustive, as
occasionally participants mentioned that external providers had been contracted, but the provider was not
named and no further details were available.
The breadth of external providers and their level of involvement suggest that there was substantial external
provider presence in NHS commissioning during the fieldwork period, some of which pre-dated the 2012
Act.4 Table 11 gives an overview of the range and type of external providers working across the four CCGs.
Commissioning support units
Having provided an overview of the different types of external providers, we will discuss each one in turn,
except for the voluntary sector, for which we have few data.
Commissioning support units officially came into existence in April 2013, a month before the bulk of the
fieldwork stopped. At the time of writing this report (spring 2014), the future of CSUs seems uncertain,
as there is substantial debate about reorganising CSUs, merging them and/or creating partnerships
between CSUs and commercial organisations. Uncertainty was a feature also during fieldwork, but this
was mainly focused around the role of CSUs and ways that CSUs and CCGs could work together.
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TABLE 11 External providers encountered during fieldwork
Provider Contribution
Public sector foundation
Public Health JSNA and identification of local priorities, well-being and prevention, rapid evidence
reviews, health impact assessments, service evaluation, evidence interpretation, horizon
scanning
CSUs Transactional (e.g. payment of invoices, contract monitoring, budgeting), performance
management, data analysis, bespoke analytical tools, service evaluation, HR, media
support, organisational development
Primary Care Research
Network
No current role but suggestion of contribution to setting up and delivering local research
projects
Leadership Academy Learning and development for CCGs
Commercial
Bazian Literature review
BDO Consulting Service review, horizon scanning, capacity filling, data analysis
Beacon Mental health specialists, developing pathway approach to severe mental health
Boston Consulting No information about contribution
Capita Software tool deployment
Cobic Programme management, specialise in developing outcomes-based commissioning
CSL No information about contribution
Ernst & Young No information about contribution
KPMG No information about contribution
PricewaterhouseCoopers Organisational development
Swan Partners Modelling and future spend
United Healthcare Software tool development, commissioning support
Vanguard Development of pathways
Freelance consultants (pseudonyms)
Brian Project manager for condition specific project. Ex-public sector
Harold Analyst developing tool. Ex-NHS
Percy Project manager for portfolio of work. Ex-NHS
Randall Analyst developing tool. Ex-NHS
Tina Responding to Francis report and undertaking project on improving quality. Ex-NHS
Not-for-profit
ACG International Software tool development
The King’s Fund Organisational development
Solutions for Public Health Programme management, event management
HR, Human Resources.
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Sometimes this relationship was challenging, partly because CCG clients often were not clear about the
problem, the intended outcome, ways to monitor progress or the unintended consequences of their
interventions. The CSU–CCG relationship could also be hampered by CCGs making a ‘deluge of requests’
for data, many of which were quite similar. This led to ‘muck spreading’ rather than a strategic approach.
A variety of different staff in CCGs ask a very large number of questions of our informatics function,
some of which are different questions, or slightly different questions, so that they’re not asking in a
joined-up way, if you see what I mean. But equally our staff, sort of under that deluge of requests, run
the risk of just sort of getting stuck in front of their screen trying to find answers to those requests . . .
it’s rather at the moment as if between us we’re driving a muck spreader, and we’re spreading masses
of information all over the place. Whereas actually what we’ve got to do is target the fertiliser where
the plant is.
Mike, CSU analyst
Commissioning support units and study Clinical Commissioning Groups
The four case CCGs contracted three different CSUs. The CCGs had quite distinct relationships from
their CSU.
One CCG had a large internal team to avoid dependence on the CSU, which they felt was too removed.
A participant intimated that the ‘best’ former PCT staff had been cherry picked by the CCG and those
without posts then went to the CSU. This CCG bought financial services and ‘transactional’ activities such
as payment of invoices, but the CCG still carried out internal finance reporting such as budget reports and
contract monitoring. Another participant was clear that he would prefer CSUs not undertake service
design, as local knowledge was needed. The general sense from this CCG was that the CSU was an
external organisation.
Commissioning Support Unit staff embedded within this CCG included a pharmacy advisor, human resources
support and a small team for extra contractual activity. A participant said that embedding CSU staff within the
CCG was key, as GPs liked to work with those they knew. Without embedding CSU staff, the likelihood was
that the CCG would create internal support services duplicating those offered by the CSU.
GPs tend to work on a one-to-one relationship, and better the devil they know sort of example. So to
work with an anonymous organisation, they will find a challenge. And I can see Clinical Commissioning
Groups up and down the country wanting to recreate lots of commissioning support services within
their own environment, because they’ll be wanting to build relationships with people they know.
Sarah, NHS commissioning manager
In another CCG, the CSU and CCG worked more closely together. This particular CCG was keen on using data
and tools to inform commissioning. The CSU carried out routine data analyses, but they also built bespoke
tools and supported software tools from commercial and not-for-profit providers. The CSU ‘offer’ included
media support, responses to Freedom of Information requests, public and practice engagement, human
resources and organisational development, recruitment, workforce planning support, risk management,
information governance, IT support to the CCG and general practices, horizon scanning and financial activities
such as managing staff payments. The CSU also offered a scheme to fill ad hoc capacity gaps in the CCG.
The CCG had a close relationship with a senior CSU manager and a CSU analyst; the latter ‘had been
around for donkey’s years’ and took the role of ‘principal analyst’ (Connie, CSU analyst). She was highly
regarded and well embedded within the commissioning organisation with her own desk. Because of
this long-standing relationship, this analyst believed that she was not seen as a threat when requesting
commissioning plans or making suggestions. Her role was to liaise with the CCG and the team back
at the CSU offices that did ‘a lot of the actual [number] crunching’ (Connie, CSU analyst). CCG staff could
also use her as an access point to find relevant expertise within the CSU. Another important role was
interpretation, as this analyst helped CCG commissioners to understand outputs from the CSU.
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Some of the reports can be quite monstrous. And, you know, they were bravely wading through it all,
which was frustrating for them, and it wasn’t fair on them, because there should have been someone
there to assist them.
Connie, CSU analyst
In observations, the reliance of the CCG on this principal analyst was notable. During one meeting of a
subcommittee, she was not able to attend and the members had no access to the dashboard tracking
unscheduled admissions. This caused significant consternation and some negativity.
[Morris asked if it was possible to have an update on the gaps in the dashboard.]
Anthony: We have no dashboard.
Teresa: The difficulty is that the information service hasn’t been able to complete the work we wanted
them to do because they were doing the QIPP [Quality, Improvement, Productivity and Prevention]
information plan and HRGs, so staff were pulled off our stuff. We are not happy about this and are
trying to get it resolved.
Anthony: We felt we were getting real traction in November.
Teresa: Difficult times at the moment, changes in the system are having an impact but we are where
we are . . .
Anthony: Very frustrating.
Teresa: Don’t give up hope. Connie will be back on it.
Anthony: Presumably we are paying. If she is not available then they have to get someone else.
Meeting notes
Commissioning support units and commercial providers
Having looked at the relationship between CSUs and the study CCGs, we now discuss general findings
about the interactions between CSUs and commercial providers.
Commissioning Support Units had complicated relationships with commercial providers, working
sometimes in collaboration and sometimes in competition. For example, one CSU manager commented
that in her experience CSUs and commercial providers best worked together in partnership whereby CSU
staff offered local knowledge to sense check and interpret the data.
[Commercial provider] have come in and developed the data warehouse to take the SUS [Secondary
Uses Service] data. But the data warehouse has only become useful because our data managers have
got involved in looking at that and interpreting the data for them to say, ‘Right well you’ve got
um – um you’ve matched this particular data item wrong,’ or, ‘You’ve got to filter for this,’ or, ‘You
need to be aware of that,’ and then quality checking the information, so that they’ve actually set up
the data warehouse to process the information correctly.
Joan, CSU manager
Another CSU manager planned to offer a mediation service, whereby CCGs could go to CSUs to identify
commercial and not-for-profit providers for other work. But there were signs in some CCG–CSU
relationships that CCGs might turn to commercial providers out of dissatisfaction with CSU performance.
I think that’s bizarre. At the end of the day, if we’re having this sort of contract arrangement, then if
we’re saying to an organisation, ‘We’re paying you X number of pounds to provide us with the data,’
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they can’t come back and say, ‘Well we can’t do it because we’re too busy doing something else,’
having agreed to undertake that body of work. They’re essentially in breach of contract . . . I think
what’s probably going to happen is I think they’re going to shoot themselves in the foot potentially.
Because I think people will go outside of the CSU when they’re allowed to.
Anthony, GP commissioner
Competition between CSUs and commercial providers became increasingly common over the study as they
bid for the same business. One commissioning manager recounted an experience when a CSU did not bid
for a contract because among the competition was a commercial company with whom the CSU had
previously worked. His interpretation was that the CSU knew that they would struggle to win the contract,
because the analytical service of the commercial provider was superior.
In April 2014, we conducted our final interview. This was 1 year after CSUs had been launched and
18–24 months after our initial data collection. Although the viewpoint of this particular commissioning
manager might be uncommon, he mentioned that in tendering exercises the quality of bids from the CSUs
had been disappointing.
And I suppose there is a sort of basic commercial lesson to be learnt out of this in that if the CSUs are
moving as they are towards a place where they need to go out and win business, they need to raise
their game substantially both in terms of their customer orientation, just the whole sort of attitude,
but also in terms of the amount of careful, competent work that they need to put into preparing
bidding documentation, because some of it was just woefully inadequate really.
Jacob, NHS commissioning manager
In summary, the relationships between CCG and CSUs varied from distant to quite close, with some CSUs
offering a broad spectrum of services. In general, CCGs trusted that the CSUs had the interests of CCGs at
heart, but in practice there were concerns that the CSUs struggled to manage the demands of multiple
commissioning clients and produce useful output. Embedding CSU staff within CSUs was common. The
relationship between CSUs and commercial providers could be collaborative or competitive and there were
some concerns that CSUs were not competitive enough and/or not adept at bidding for contracts.
Public Health
Like CSUs, Public Health was a former PCT in-house function separated from commissioning with the 2012
Health and Social Care Act.4 Public Health maintained its public sector status, so commissioning colleagues
tended to trust the motivations of their Public Health colleagues. But Public Health had moved into local
authorities. One consultant, who was a former NHS analyst, was concerned that this would marginalise
Public Health still further, as historically the links between local government and NHS organisations had
been tenuous.
All CCGs in this study accessed Public Health for information on JSNA to determine the priorities for their
population. But, beyond that, clinical commissioners had differing perceptions on the usefulness of
Public Health.
In one CCG, Public Health had a clear role in accessing, synthesising and interpreting research evidence, as
a Public Health consultant had carried out evidence reviews for a subcommittee. His motivation was to find
ways that Public Health could engage with and influence CCGs. In addition to evidence reviews, this local
public health department had undertaken ‘deep dive’ needs assessments, pathway redesign, individual
funding request evidence reviews, strategy development, input into Quality, Improvement, Productivity and
Prevention (QIPP) plans and had helped to ‘interpret things like the Vitamin D guideline from the CMO
[Chief Medical Officer] letter’ (Sandra, Public Health consultant). They also contributed to a service
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specification on cardiac rehabilitation. Moreover, they brokered relationships between a local charity
promoting an exercise referral scheme with the relevant GP commissioning lead.
Within this CCG, one GP commissioner was enthusiastic about Public Health involvement in commissioning
with their ‘massive amount of expertise’ and valuable local memory (Ralph, GP commissioner). Another
GP commissioner was less clear about the contribution that Public Health could make, noting that Public
Health kept asking the CCG what was needed, but as a new organisation the CCG neither could clarify their
needs nor understood what Public Health could offer. However, although the relationship between this CCG
and Public Health was still under construction, substantial goodwill clearly existed between the two.
In another CCG, the relationship appeared less promising. Two GP commissioners commented that they
did not have a clear vision of how Public Health fit, although the post of Director of Public Health was
a joint appointment between the CCG and the local authority to help collaboration. They thought
that the Director of Public Health overemphasised well-being, inequality, deprivation and prevention.
In observations, the Director of Public Health presented data in a way that appeared to confuse GP
commissioners. Nonetheless, the Director of Public Health was a widely visible, vocal member of the CCG
governing body. In this particular CCG, the ability of Public Health to influence the CCG appeared to rest
quite heavily with one individual.
In summary, during fieldwork the role of Public Health was still under discussion. Commissioners tended to
trust the intentions of their Public Health colleagues, but views on the usefulness of output varied. Several
participants commented that Public Health overemphasised the well-being and deprivation agenda at the
expense of producing service evaluations and evidence reviews that would be of more use to commissioners.
Commercial and not-for-profit providers
Reasons for working for commercial and not-for-profit providers
The rest of the chapter covers commercial and not-for-profit providers. First, we will present reasons that
NHS professionals moved to commercial and not-for-profit providers and then discuss cultural differences
between the NHS and commercial sectors, reasons for contracting commercial external providers and
attitudes towards the use of commercial and not-for-profit providers.
In interviews, we found that many consultants from for-profit and not-for-profit providers had ex-public
sector or NHS backgrounds. Ex-public sector professionals said that they joined for-profit and not-for-profit
companies for several reasons. Two former information managers believed in the product of a not-for-profit
and wanted to promote it more widely. Another ex-information manager moved to commercial consultancy
because he became ‘fed up with the NHS’. He thought he would have more influence outside than in
(Rhett, commercial analyst). After over 15 years in the NHS, Jessie also felt that she could make more of a
difference from the outside. Inside the NHS, she often felt ‘constrained’, whereas now ‘there’s more
opportunity and I’ve found that I’ve been able to be more effective in driving change and changing people’s
behaviours and attitudes than I was when I was an [NHS] employee’ (Jessie, commercial consultant).
For analysts, the differences between employment in the NHS and commercial sector were particularly stark.
The main reasons for departure from the NHS were career progression and job satisfaction. An analyst said
that in the PCT he felt like ‘a small piece in a larger clockwork’, whereas with the commercial provider he had
‘free rein’ to make decisions which made him feel ‘more important’ (Ranulph, commercial analyst). After
12 years in the NHS, Doug left because of lack of progress in IT project management. He was interested in
independent contracting or interim management but needed more private sector experience. Only one
participant raised the issue of pay, claiming that salaries in the NHS and commercial sector were
commensurate, although this is difficult to believe given the tendency for NHS analysts to be graded at
bands 5 or 6 (currently £21,478–34,530 annually).
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Joel appreciated that commercial analysts were allocated work on the basis of their skills and the ‘whole
emphasis is a lot less about hierarchy’ (Joel, ex-NHS commercial analyst). In the NHS, the quantity and
quality of analysts was substandard, as ‘one of the frustrations with the NHS is that they don’t reward
excellence and knowledge’ (Joel, commercial analyst). Because analytical staff had limited prospects, good
analysts tended to leave or went into management, which meant that they were not benefiting the ‘coal
face’. This is a familiar management problem.
A NHS commissioning manager who had worked with both NHS and commercial analysts thought that the
NHS analysts were ‘a fairly dejected bunch who are not very loved or cared for’. This was reflected in
the quality of their work.
I think the NHS, they don’t have the same motivation to trawl through the detail that [commercial
provider] have. My experience of information staff in the NHS is they’re kind of a fairly dejected bunch
who are not very loved or cared for. And I think that sort of is reflected in the quality of the work they
produce. They sort of churn out the monthly monitoring reports or a standard monthly interpretation
of ‘We’re over-performing in cardiac, we’re under-performing in urology,’ and that’s about it. And the
[commercial provider] analysts seem much more interested in understanding what the data is telling
them, so moving on from just analysing data to the sort of information intelligence insight end of
the spectrum.
Paula, NHS commissioning manager
Several former NHS analysts now working for commercial companies agreed that NHS work was dull and
the focus was not on interpretation, whereas commercial analysts were more knowledgeable about
data application.
I was in a meeting this morning with um – I won’t name the PCT, but it was a PCT. I spoke to two
analysts and the programme manager, and the programme manager knew what they were doing,
the analysts were contractors who were just brought in and knew the nuts and bolts of it, but didn’t
have any knowledge, and were just there to churn out the information. And I think the difference is
that our analysts actually know a bit more than just churning out the data, because they can apply
more knowledge around the business and the NHS.
Howard, commercial analyst
Cultural differences between the NHS and commercial providers
Working harder and faster
Several people used the word ‘liberating’ to describe their experience of working for commercial providers,
as their ideas were given substantial internal support, which was less common in the NHS. A difference
that Jen noted was that commercial provider staff worked harder and faster and ‘no’ was not an option.
‘If a customer asks for it then work it out’ (Jen, commercial consultant). Tim said that moving to the
commercial provider was a ‘massive shock’ because the NHS was ‘very relaxed; there weren’t many
demands put upon you,’ whereas in a private company there were. Patricia and Janine also thought that
commercial companies worked faster, whereas in the NHS there was substantial discussion before any
action, arguably to meet the governance rules for a publicly accountable agency.
Moreover, commercial consultants said that many NHS projects were not followed through. But work
streams contracted with commercial providers also failed to materialise. For example, one PCT asked a
commercial provider to facilitate workshops with GPs on their information needs, as part of the transition
to CCGs. The commercial provider then developed a survey of GPs with the aim of assessing GP
knowledge about commissioning. This survey was never administered. In another example, a major
consultancy worked with one PCT to develop a Public Health forecasting model, but the analyst kept
finding ‘glitches’ and informed the management consultancy. Eventually the project was dropped, as both
the management consultancy and the health-care clients lost interest.
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Working to the brief
Jen noted that results were more important than process for commercial providers. Jemma and Howard
made similar comments, while Vicky said that commercial providers thought about commissioning in terms
of ‘what are the key problems we’ve got to solve? . . . What are we actually looking to achieve?’ (Vicky,
commercial analyst). Perhaps because of the iterative nature of commissioning, NHS clients often struggled
to conceptualise work in these terms, so the brief was unclear and the value for money difficult to assess.
So I – I think that there is a – it’s ambiguous about the value for money that people of [commercial
provider] give, to be quite honest with you . . . I mean to be fair to them; they’re not given a
clear brief.
Percy, freelance consultant
Unclear briefs not only resulted from lack of precision around problems and outcomes, but also raised
potentially unrealistic expectations of what commercial providers could offer.
I think my view, and especially going through that process of that change, was the NHS [client] did
not know what they wanted. And I think sometimes they think, if they have the private industry come
in, we’ll give them all the answers. But you can’t give them the answers without knowing
the question.
Patricia, commercial consultant
The lack of clarity about problems and outcomes that affected the quality of briefs repeatedly arose in one
contract. Within the commercial company itself, the consultants could not agree the level of detail needed
in a brief before it was signed off by both parties. Some consultants wanted very clear remits and
milestones while others were prepared to be more flexible. When the senior management team at this
company changed, the previously more easygoing, adaptable approach of some consultants was replaced
by a strict edict to only ‘work to the brief’. Any activity not detailed in full would require extra payment.
One client said that it was ‘much more obvious that they’ve allocated 3.25 hours to do a task and then
they are out of there’.
Previously, as clients we’d say, ‘We’d like this room painted red’. And [commercial provider] would
respond, ‘Fine, red, what colour red? Okay we’ve got it’. And now under new management they say,
‘We’ll buy 3 litres of red gloss paint and we’ll paint this wall X and it will take Y amount of time’.
Susie, NHS client
Eventually the commercial provider’s insistence on only working to the brief was a contributory factor to
the premature cessation of the contract.
Finding ‘ethical’, non-profit-driven commercial companies
Possibly to assuage misgivings about moving from the public to private sector, many ex-NHS consultants
unsurprisingly stressed the ‘ethical’ nature of their commercial provider, stating that the principal intention
of these companies was to improve the NHS, not generate profits for shareholders.
Doug said that he chose to work for his external provider because it was ‘not totally corporate’ and ‘there
was a real sense that we are here to improve the NHS not to make money out of it’ (Doug, commercial
analyst). Jemma had worked in a pharmaceutical company, the NHS and a commercial provider. She felt
uncomfortable ‘ethically’ in the pharmaceutical company and happier in the NHS, and thought the
commercial provider was a ‘really nice balance between that ethical and commercial approach’. She
explained that although the commercial company was ‘fuelled by commercial drivers at the end of the
day which influences the way we work and the decisions we make’, there was a ‘genuine interest in
producing outcomes for the benefit of people other than our own organisation’ (Jemma, commercial
consultant). She was ‘shocked’ when she moved into the NHS because of the way in which ‘people
detached themselves as individuals from the NHS as a system’ and the need to ‘feed the beast’, which
was ‘demotivating’ (Jemma, commercial consultant).
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Tim had worked in the NHS as an analyst and subsequently with a commercial provider for 6 years. Working
for the NHS was ‘rewarding because I was doing something for the NHS and therefore kind of for people in
general’. In moving to the commercial provider, he felt he retained that sense of doing ‘something which I felt
was actually going to have benefit’ (Tim, commercial analyst). Tim finished his interview by saying that his
company was not out to ‘take over the NHS’ but to help patients, albeit in a different way.
At the end of the day, it’s about helping patients. I think the good thing about [commercial provider]
is that I think pretty much everybody in this place has that same mentality. And a lot of people
come out of the NHS, a lot of people are ex-nurses and such like, and still have that same kind of
mentality, that they do just want to help patients, but just in a different way.
Tim, commercial analyst
In summary, often consultants with for-profit or not-for-profit companies had ex-NHS or public sector
backgrounds. Reasons for leaving the NHS included lack of promotion prospects, frustration with the NHS
system and belief in greater influence from outside. Although consultants worked harder in the commercial
sector than the NHS, employment by commercial companies was ‘liberating’ and appeared to give greater
job satisfaction, perhaps because of fewer regulations. A major difference between the NHS and commercial
sector was ‘working to the brief’, which meant that consultants had to be adaptable enough to meet clients’
changing needs without taking on too much extra, unpaid work. The general sense of many accounts was
that working for the NHS was a bit of a backwater and talented ex-NHS staff convinced themselves that they
could still contribute to the NHS, and possibly make an even bigger impact, through working for commercial
companies, although our data on benefits do not support this to any great degree (see Chapter 9).
Why were external providers contracted?
To justify their expense, commercial consultants had to provide evidence that their contribution added
value over and above what was already accessible. NHS clients contracted commercial and not-for-profit
providers for many reasons. A commercial consultant identified the following:
l to help develop commissioners and commissioning skills
l as a stopgap when short of staff
l to help meet specific ‘deliverables’
l to turn around less mature, struggling commissioning organisations
l to have someone from outside identify what is not realistically going to work
l to add value to what is already planned.
A NHS commissioning manager said the advantages of external providers were their independence and
credibility. For example, an external consultancy was brought in to carry out a service review in a
controversial area, independent of the acute providers and commissioners.
Elsewhere, a NHS commissioner mentioned that a commercial provider brought ‘a fresh pair of eyes’
(Lynn, NHS commissioning manager). Sometimes this ‘fresh’ perspective was solicited to help
commissioning organisations find previously unidentified savings, although this did not always materialise,
often ‘because it was just telling us what we already knew’ (Paula, NHS commissioning manager).
Sometimes, the ‘fresh’ perspective was also wildly inaccurate; for example, a commercial provider
overestimated potential savings from decommissioning ‘procedures of limited clinical value’ by comparing
the PCT with the rest of the country without taking into account local circumstances. In another example,
analysts and commissioners attempted to replicate the work of the commercial provider to identify savings,
but the calculations of the local analyses did not correspond to those of the external provider.
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Once the teams looked into the data further – well there’s two things, (a) it was quite difficult to look
into the data further because we didn’t have the level of detail that supported the high level figures;
[(b)] when we did our own analysis looking into it further, we couldn’t find the same opportunities.
Joan, CSU analyst
One commercial consultant talked about how external providers gave the ‘bigger picture’. For some CCGs,
this bigger picture was international and commercial and the providers were contracted specifically for
access to this expertise. This was especially important for CCGs that wanted to move ‘further and faster’
(Sarah, NHS commissioning manager). Others opted for UK-based companies because they wanted those
who ‘spoke fluent NHS’ rather than ‘fluent expert’ (Susie, senior NHS analyst). For example, we observed
how a UK-based consultant regularly drew on her knowledge of how commissioning organisations
elsewhere in the UK faced similar problems, but we were unable to collect any NHS client views to assess
the helpfulness of these narratives.
One commercial consultant thought that commercial providers had access to other sources of information
‘that allow them to join the dots in a different way’ by convening a ‘bigger, richer group of people
together who have got more brain power and experience than they would be able to deploy in a PCT’
(Rhett, commercial analyst). Another analyst shared that view, having just moved from the NHS. He
said that the commercial company created ‘more of a product than an information team on its own’,
through collaborations of commercial, NHS and academic partners. They had ‘academics coming and
scrutinising the work’ which increased rigour and led to ‘sell[ing] a product that bears up’ (Ranulph,
commercial analyst). Nonetheless, when this particular contract came to an end, the NHS clients opted to
retain and pay for half of the products on offer.
Sometimes commercial providers were contracted for their project management expertise. In one contract,
a company developed complicated benefits realisation maps to identify and track benefits. These detailed:
l ‘enablers’ (such as software tools)
l actions to change (e.g. ‘implement engagement strategy for GPs and providers’)
l outcomes (e.g. ‘full GP engagement is achieved’)
l benefits (e.g. reduced referrals)
l objectives (e.g. ‘By the end of 2011 we will have implemented a system of strategies and processes
which will result in a reduction in spend of XXX by 2012’).
In this contract, the enablers were within the control of the commercial company, but the actions leading
to outcomes, benefits and achievement of objectives were not. Nonetheless, this commercial company
did not receive payment until both parties agreed that the benefits had been ‘realised’. The actions for
change on which the success of the contract hinged were actually enormous projects in their own right,
dependent on commissioning clients to initiate and carry out. Moreover, these documents implied a linear
model of change, where one action neatly led on to and triggered the next, whereas the literature is clear
that NHS change management is much messier, multidirectional and complicated.48–50 Unsurprisingly, a NHS
client said that it was difficult to see what value these benefit realisation maps had added. Moreover, in
summing up the overall impact of this contract, one consultant concluded that little progress had been
made in the first 18 months.
I think that we’ve provided the enablers in many instances, whether that enabler is a piece of
analytical work or a tool or even people, whatever it is, but there are no actions being taken, and
therefore no outcomes being achieved, and very little benefits.
Paddy, commercial consultant
Gap filling (i.e. replacing missing staff) was another reason for contracting external providers, although
both NHS clients and commercial consultants had concerns about using commercial staff in this way
because assessing added value from gap filling was difficult. Gap filling was especially common in 2012
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when many PCT staff left; for example, one commissioning organisation lost one-third of its staff. But
rather than just making up numbers, sometimes external providers were contracted to fill skills gaps for
specific projects. For some CCGs, attracting staff with the right skills was a perennial problem because
their organisations were small. In one particular CCG, which was geographically isolated in a deprived part
of the country, a partial solution was a cadre of trusted, known, ex-NHS freelance consultants.
In summary, external providers were brought in for their knowledge, skills and extra manpower. The
knowledge of the ‘bigger picture’ could be national or international, based on different ways of
manipulating data or being an outsider. But sometimes commercial and not-for-profit consultants were
just filling temporarily vacated posts. Assessing the added value that commercial providers contributed over
and above what was already available was important in assessing their usefulness. This task, already a
difficult one for the clients, was even harder when consultants were principally gap fillers.
What do external providers do?
Consultants carried out a variety of different tasks, projects and roles in case study CCGs. For example, one
commercial company collected data for a national review on hospital mortality rates and carried out a
horizon-scanning exercise to identify interventions in primary and secondary care that reduced hospital
demand. They also supported the CCG’s work on planning for future demand. Furthermore, this CCG
worked with a freelance ex-NHS colleague on their quality agenda. They also sought help from not-for-profit
companies with specialist expertise. In this CCG, drawing on the expertise and support of external providers
was fairly common.
In another CCG, two freelance consultants were highly visible. One was a former PCT chief executive
who was semiretired and carried out some consultancy work around integration across care sectors. The
other was a retired former NHS analyst who was supporting the CCG with software tool development.
In addition, two major management consultancies had helped draft commissioning strategies as part of
the authorisation process. A third commercial company had significant input into a project aimed to
consolidate urgent care services in one location. This commercial consultancy carried out numerous tasks
such as identifying reasons for urgent care use and modelling workflows.
We’re trying to redesign the emergency department and integrate the walk-in centre which was closing
and we’re trying to integrate some of that function, along with the GP out of hours, and put all of that
into one place with the emergency department, so that you’ve got one place to go to for all emergency
care. And then the patients are streamed either to a GP or primary care nurse or to the emergency
department, depending on who is the most appropriate person to be dealing with their condition.
Now what Bullfinch Partnership were able to do for us was, firstly they said, ‘Well these are the fifty
commonest reasons that people come to the emergency department. And can you say which direction
those people should go, i.e. primary care or emergency department? And if it’s a mixture, then roughly
what percentages?’ And then they went away and got the data for the emergency department, from
the walk-in centre and the out of hours, and they were able to model for us what the likely need would
be for clinicians at various times of the day. So quite technical, needs a bit of number crunching, needs
a bit of input from us as well, but they went away and did that work and we were able to see that
actually in the daytime we would only need one GP staffing that particular part. Out of hours would be
different. But, you know, it answered that question for us.
Tom, CCG chairperson
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In another PCT, a commercial company assisted with data analysis and helped build a bespoke tool.
We were looking at dashboards, we looked at things like [commercial provider A] and I think it was
[commercial provider B] or whatever it is . . . And this is information to tell us what’s going on in the
system, you know, what’s happening to emergency admissions, are they going up or down? And PBC
practices have a budget, so are practices on budget or below budget or overspending or underspending
etc.? And so [commercial company C] helped us look at the other people’s (). We also looked at some
of the other stuff and we came to a general conclusion, which [commercial company C] are happy to
back, that none of them actually did the business, including their own. So we actually then said,
‘Right, we’re going to build our own.’ So we built our own dashboard. [Commercial company] gave us
advice but mainly it was – it wasn’t trying to lead us anywhere. That dashboard we have now sold into
other areas, so that’s being used in [county X] and it was shortlisted in the Y Awards.
Kurt, NHS analyst
In another CCG, multiple companies were engaged specifically for work around a contracting initiative.
A local not-for-profit agency provided co-ordination, programme management and some event
management, especially in the first phase of the initiative. They also supplied clinical leads. A NHS
commissioning client said that working with this not-for-profit was like ‘working with another PCT’
(Clara, NHS commissioning manager). This not-for-profit organisation also sourced three other companies to
work on the contracting initiative. We know little about the first. The second was a condition-specific
consultancy contracted to challenge local acute clinicians and provide data to compare the local CCG
against international benchmarks. This was a relatively new, clinically led organisation that ‘based a lot of
evidence of practical experience and outcomes from the US’ (Clara, NHS commissioning manager). Another
organisation was commissioned for their expertise in modelling current and future spend for the new
contracts. In addition to these three, a fourth commercial company was involved in developing new ways of
contracting. Their role was principally one of programme management, helping the CCG to identify its goals
and processes of achieving them, deploying commercial consultants to support the process and providing
links and introductions to other useful companies. The multiplicity of tasks and functions and finding the
right external providers to deliver them shows the complexity involved in contracting commercial providers.
In summary, external providers undertook a wide variety of tasks including project management, gap
analysis, forecast modelling, event management, pathway development, software tool development,
analytics and stakeholder engagement. The matching of the external provider to the task relied less on the
organisational form (i.e. commercial, not-for-profit, freelance) and more on the skills, experience and
expertise on offer.
Views on external providers
Without hard measures of impact, opinions on the usefulness of external providers varied. The experience
of one CCG chairperson was that overall commercial providers were not ‘leagues above the PCT . . .
[because the] private sector is very variable and I’m not absolutely convinced that they’re necessarily better
than the PCT’ (Martin, CCG chairperson).
Another participant said that the primary benefit of one contract was that PCTs were more likely to
collaborate with each other. For example, use of the software tools meant that issues around GP practices’
reluctance to share patient data with commissioning organisations had been tackled.
I don’t think in terms of the actual expertise or capabilities that [commercial provider] brought
fundamentally a lot of anything new or different. But maybe it was the effort that we all put into
getting it up and running and collaborating and working together on things like information
governance protocol that helped to accelerate some of the development.
Andrew, CSU analyst
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Another client with a different provider thought the real strength of the commercial provider was its
analytical team and approach to data. He thought they did ‘a bloody good job’.
And the great strength I think of the service that [commercial provider] provided is that they had a
strong analytical component in the team and were very data-savvy essentially and drove a lot of their
forecasting on the basis of a good, forensic analysis of what the data was telling them, which is also
the way that they’d managed to squeeze savings out of providers by challenging inconsistencies in the
provision of reporting from the providers that indicated that there were flaws in the data that was
being reported, so the misattribution of activity in the contract. So they did a bloody good job in
my opinion.
Jacob, NHS commissioning manager
However, this might be a minority view, as only one other NHS client working on this contract with
this commercial provider agreed to be interviewed. Although not as effusive, she also thought that the
commercial provider had made a useful contribution.
Trust and usability (i.e. ease and acceptability of use) were important factors in contributing to opinions on
the usefulness of the contributions of freelance, not-for-profit and commercial providers. Commercial
providers were often viewed with substantial suspicion, but they themselves believed that if the quality of
their work was high this negativity could be overcome. In some cases, we found this to be true, as a
couple of commercial providers produced output of considerable value, such as savings on acute hospital
contracts and improved national ranking of the commissioning organisation. But often client feedback was
mixed or lukewarm, with observations that the output was not quite right. In contrast, generally the
output of freelance consultants was highly valued, usually because these now independent consultants
often had the advantage of previous employment by the client. For example, we observed a former nurse
colleague now working as a freelance consultant praised repeatedly at a CCG board meeting for her
concise presentation style and the quality of her reports, which members found easy to digest. In another
CCG, several participants were positive about the abilities of a freelance analyst, whom one described as
‘brilliant’, who once had worked in a local GP practice (Adrian, practice manager). In both cases, the
freelance consultants were able to contextualise their work with remarkable accuracy, because of extensive
familiarity through their previous employment with the client.
With regard to trust, client views on commercial providers were influenced by beliefs about the level of
threat such companies posed for destabilising the NHS and the perception of what external providers
could offer.
There’s a risk to the fundamental structure of the NHS and it’s a slippery slope to privatisation. If you
look at the CSU, then it has the contract management of the Acute Trusts, and the primary care sector
[NB: Informant incorrect as NHS England contracts primary care sector]. That’s a lot of clout. Now if
hypothetically that purchasing power for NHS services was outsourced to a private sector provider then
you are basically making some fundamental changes to the structure of the NHS. Now that’s my kind
of knee-jerk reaction response. However if you look at the NHS as a brand it’s a very complicated brand
and there’s lots of public private sector enterprise that make the NHS function, you know. And there
are examples of private sector organisations that have been far more efficient than our historic NHS
counterparts. And so it’s very possible for private sector companies to provide services for the NHS in
accordance with NHS values. So I am less concerned about the involvement of the private sector, as a
concept than some others might be.
Harry, NHS commissioning manager
A GP clinical lead had no objection in principle to using commercial providers, although he was deeply
committed to the NHS.
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But in all honesty, if they [the commissioning organisation] are not cutting the mustard, well why
not go to KPMG or something and get them to do a body of work for us? And spend the public
money getting a private organisation to do a body of work for a public organisation? I personally
would not have a fundamental ideological aversion to that, although I am firmly, deeply ideologically
committed to the NHS and do not want to do things which destabilise it, but recognise actually we
need to look at it very differently and spend our monies differently.
Anthony, GP commissioner
One GP localities lead was similarly pragmatic. He had ‘no problem’ with paying for commercial tools ‘as
long as the cost of it is commensurate with the potential benefit that we can get’ (Craig, GP commissioner).
Another GP commissioner seemed resigned to the influx of commercial provider support within
commissioning, because GPs did not have the skills themselves. Other GP commissioners were more
negative. One said that he did not trust any of the big ‘consultancies that come in and fiddle about . . . give
you some data and then disappear’. He went on to explain that the information had to arrive on his desk
consistently from a trusted information provider with whom he had a long-term relationship (Angus, GP
commissioner). He also said that he did not believe that the information provided by commercial providers
was any better.
Now I don’t think that for pure knowledge or information they’re any better at what they do. They’re
glossier and they talk the talk, but I don’t think there’s any intrinsic reason why they should be cleverer
than an internal service.
Angus, GP commissioner
Another GP commissioner was ‘wary’ of the commercial provider ‘agenda to make money without having
some of the other aims that non-private providers might have’ such as ‘providing health care to the local
community in the best way possible’. She was more comfortable about not-for-profit agencies and
thought that ‘having a little bit of alternative provision can be helpful for commissioners so that they can
actually get the main deliverer to deliver what they want’ (Ciara, GP commissioner).
A senior CSU manager, who eventually went to work for a not-for-profit, thought that the organisational
form was not as important as ensuring similarity in values.
[We] have met with [commercial provider] on a kind of fortnightly basis and we’ve developed, I think,
a very healthy relationship with them. And my view as to why that is, is that [commercial provider]’s
value set lies much more with our value set. And they’re a small company, I think they’ve only got less
than 30 employees; all of them are ex-NHS staff.
Alfred, CSU analyst
In contrast, some participants were concerned with the ‘predatory’ behaviour of commercial companies.
For example, one GP commissioner, who was leading on the implementation of a software tool by one
company, was contacted by a rival company claiming that their tool was superior. Given that software
tools were not his area of expertise, this GP commissioner was perplexed about how to proceed.
This ‘predatory’ behaviour also concerned a CSU manager.
And what [commercial provider] has been doing, it seems, is sort of trying to pick off each CCG. And
potentially there is a real commercial risk to the NHS there, because you’ve now got eight people
who could be told, ‘Well I’m sorry, that’s just what you’ve got to pay’. They’ve not got any
commercial skills.
Mike, CSU manager
Although we have limited data, concerns about the use of private providers were raised by two members of
the public as part of the public questions in a CCG board meeting. The CCG response was that private
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providers have been part of the system for years and GP practices could be considered independent contractors
(meeting minutes). The point about GP practices was also made by a lay representative on another CCG board.
GPs sometimes are put as, ‘Well you know, they have this great big heart, and they’re just going to do
everything for everyone’ . . . sometimes perpetuated by GPs themselves, you know, ‘We’re only here
to save lives’. And the large salary and contract that comes with it of course but, so, but they are
primarily businesses. They want to function by delivering good-quality health care to their patient
group and they win contracts for doing that and they get paid well for doing that, as is rightly the
case. So like any business, that’s how they operate.
Malcolm, lay representative
In summary, commercial consultants knew some clients might view them as threats but believed that this
could be overcome through good performance. This was less problematic for freelance consultants, who
were often former colleagues of their clients, as the perception of threat or a conflict of values was less.
Not-for-profit agencies and commercial companies that convincingly demonstrated NHS ‘values’ were more
likely to be trusted. Nonetheless, clinical commissioners’ views on commercial providers were ambivalent.
Some GP commissioners were happy to contract commercial providers if the benefits were worthwhile;
others recognised that the lack of GP commissioning skills warranted greater use of commercial providers
and others were inherently distrustful and believed that the offer of commercial providers was no better
than that of NHS (or ex-NHS) staff. For this last group, not-for-profit organisations were more acceptable.
Box 7 summarises the key points of the chapter.
BOX 7 Key points of Chapter 7
l Trust plus usability influenced views on the usefulness of external output. Freelance consultants generally
had a NHS background and were viewed as less threatening than commercial providers. Their output was
well contextualised to their client, as often freelance providers were former employees and so had useful
local knowledge. In contrast, although commercial consultants often had ex-NHS or public sector
backgrounds, they were sometimes viewed as threats, the usefulness of their output was variable and they
lacked local knowledge. Not-for-profit providers encountered less hostility than commercial companies.
l The breadth of external providers and their level of involvement suggest that there was substantial external
provider presence in NHS commissioning during the fieldwork period, which included 18 months prior to
the passing of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act.4
l The relationships between CCG and CSUs varied from distant to quite close, and views about CSU
contributions ranged from inadequate to highly valuable. CSUs and commercial companies’ relationships
could be collaborative and/or competitive.
l The move to local authorities increased the marginalisation of Public Health in commissioning. Some participants
thought that Public Health overstressed the inequalities agenda at the expense of input such as service
evaluations and evidence reviews. However, although the evidence reviews produced by one Public Health
consultant were appreciated, they did not seem to inform the thinking of commissioners in one case site.
l NHS analysts were particularly drawn to working for commercial companies, as NHS work was often
mundane with scant opportunity to interpret, as opposed to merely produce, data. NHS analysts felt
isolated and unable to effect much change on commissioning.
l CCGs contracted external providers for their knowledge, skills and expertise in many areas including project
management, forecast modelling, event management, pathway development, software tool development,
analytics and stakeholder engagement. Commercial providers sometimes brought a specialist ‘big picture’
view and sometimes were just filling gaps in the staffing.
l The matching of the external provider to the task relied less on the organisational form (e.g. commercial,
freelance, not-for-profit) and more on the skills, experience and expertise on offer.
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Chapter 8 Accounts of NHS and external provider
contracts
Introduction
This aim of this chapter is to provide in-depth accounts to illustrate the points made in previous chapters.
These vignettes offer a wealth of material that is difficult to present out of context, given the multilayered,
multifaceted nature of knowledge exchange. Each vignette was built around a contractual relationship
between NHS clients and commercial or not-for-profit providers. Some of the vignettes describe an entire
contract, while others illustrate just one component. To maximise anonymity, the providers will be known
as ‘external provider 1’, ‘external provider 2′ and ‘external provider 3’; no distinction is made between
for-profit and not-for-profit providers and quotes are not attributed. A summary of key points follows
each vignette.
External provider 1
Background
External provider 1 was a small international company that marketed a software tool developed and
refined from decades of academic research. Academics carried out studies with the tool in different
countries, tested its viability, amended the algorithms and presented findings at conferences, which helped
to contextualise the tool, provided credibility and reached new markets.
It’s often that the academicians (sic) through publications, through presentations and conferences
and so on that proves the [tool’s] viability within a particular country or setting and demonstrate its
value. And then the government gets – you know – it gets their attention. But it has already the
acknowledgement and the credits that come from having been already vetted out in an
academic setting.
External provider 1’s business model was based on keeping their company small and relying on other
larger locally based companies with licences to provide software, training and the ‘wrap arounds’ (or ‘front
end’) which were software/user interfaces. The advantage of working through suppliers was that these
larger companies could ‘exploit the system’ by ‘react[ing] much more strongly to a market or emerging
market’ and were big enough for initiatives such as FESC and the Lead Provider Framework. As an
international company, external provider 1 also valued the local knowledge these larger suppliers had and
received ‘added value’ such as the ‘report generator, additional analytical tools or consulting that they
[the suppliers] offer the user’.
A disadvantage of working through local suppliers was that the licensed suppliers were selective about the
level and type of knowledge that filtered through to end users, as the aspects of the product that local
suppliers highlighted varied. For example, external provider 1 noticed that one supplier was ‘much more
interested in the delivery of information, how it looks and feels and so on’ because they were an
informatics company, while another prioritised the ‘managerial aspects’ because it was a ‘classic
management consultancy’. This meant that the management consultancy ‘struggled with not being able to
understand the subtleties in the technology and how sometimes a particular report in terms of the way it
looks is actually important to whether it gets adopted or utilised in any way’.
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Knowledge exchanged
This vignette begins with a NHS team acting on behalf of a consortia of commissioning organisations
contracting a licensed supplier of external provider 1’s tool. The terms of that particular contract were that
no direct contact was allowed between external provider 1 and NHS staff; all contact had to be filtered
through the licensed supplier. (The latter was concerned that, with unmediated contact, the clients might
decide to contract external provider 1 directly and sidestep the local supplier.) Consequently, NHS end
users were unable to develop more advanced skills, as they were working with a supplier with less
understanding of the tool than the clients would have liked. However, the contract with the licensed
supplier was eventually renegotiated by the NHS contracting team, lifting the clause of no contact. External
provider 1 was then contracted directly.
To facilitate knowledge exchange, external provider 1 arranged for experts in designing the software tool to
teach selected NHS end users more advanced skills. Known as ‘superusers’, the NHS participants worked
across several different PCTs, were chosen by their local PCT and had a variety of backgrounds including
analysts, commissioning managers and project managers. The contract between external provider 1 and the
NHS was for several modules of advanced training in the tool. The experts were located in North and South
America and were chosen because they had developed particular aspects of the tool. At a pre-arranged
time, the superusers would log on to a webinar. The expert could not be seen but his/her voice would talk
users through a series of slides. Simultaneously, superusers could write notes to each other or the expert or
ask questions by raising their virtual hand. Sometimes there was a long enough time lag until the expert
noticed the question that the webinar could already be on a completely different topic. At the end of the
set of modules, the superusers sat an exam and received a qualification.
The training was technical and oriented to the US health-care system, although a consultant from external
provider 1 told us that each module was revised prior to the webinars to contextualise for the particular
country. To help contextualise and embed the knowledge further, they used several mechanisms,
for example:
1. Two knowledge brokers were present at every session: a consultant from external provider 1 and an
information manager who worked for the NHS team that set up the contract and who knew the
superusers well.
2. Superusers were given homework. Homework questions for module 2 included ‘describe the risk
factors that are included’ as well as an opportunity to identify ‘take home messages’ and further
questions. To improve their understanding, superusers were allocated time to compare their homework
when they met at other forums.
3. The superusers were sent the slides a few days before along with some background reading to prepare
for online sessions.
4. One participant organised a full-day revision session, when the course was nearly completed.
5. External provider 1 supplied manuals to users about the system with every variable described, but other
manuals could also be downloaded.
Knowledge transformation
The tool necessitated GP practice-level data and generated output on patients that were at higher risk
of using health services. One superuser’s role was to embed the software tools into GP practices and
encourage GP practice staff to use them. In transforming her learning about the software tool to GP
practices, she selected aspects of the webinar learning that were germane to practice managers and
administration staff and dejargonised the language.
There are a number of reports within the tool, so I focus on two reports that they need. The first one is
the case management report, which has their entire practice population within it. And then you apply a
series of filters to only have those patients that you want to look at. And that’s taking a very broad
approach. And then there’s also an approach where you can concentrate on specific disease conditions.
So I concentrate on those two reports mainly. And then I go into the report and I go through column by
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column so they understand what each column means. And I put it into terminology that they can
understand. And then, while I’m there, we actually run a report, we put it into Excel, I go through the
filters so I’m showing them how to do it, and actually often I get them to do it. So I get them to do
the picking rather than me, so that when I leave they’ve actually got a list of patients. And I think,
at the point I leave, they do understand. I think the problem comes because they don’t access it often
enough, so by the time they need to go back into it they’ve forgotten. So what I’ve done is produce a
PowerPoint presentation with step by step instructions so they can refer to that.
We obtained a copy of this PowerPoint presentation and each slide is a screen shot of a menu on the
tool with a red circle around the option to generate case management reports for the Quality and
Outcomes Framework. Although this superuser said that general practices did not want to learn how to
operate the tool as they had little time, tool operation was the focus of her teaching. Instead, general
practices wanted the superuser to analyse the data and send practices the results, and then practices
could ‘get on with it’. But information governance stipulations meant that neither the PCT nor this
superuser had permission to access to the relevant practice data.
Another superuser who was trained in advanced skills had an analytics background. A major initial
challenge was that he had no access to the tool, so it was like ‘trying to be a car salesman and sell a car
by describing it to people. We were on a hiding to nothing’. A further complication was that a tool with
the same function from a different provider had been operational for over 5 years locally and this was ‘
not always flavour of the month’ with GPs sceptical about case management. To remove the association
with case management and market the tool more successfully, this superuser showed differences in
standardised mortality rates and type of disease by practice to identify novel ways of allocating resources
to general practices. This strategy was apparently successful, as after one presentation one locality
increased its take up from three to all 10 practices. In training general practice staff, he tended to ‘dive
straight into using the tool’ with a case report and explain terms and concepts as he went along.
As a primary care commissioner, another superuser said that the tool was used in several ways. The first was
to identify a case list for the community matrons, which longer term could feed into an ‘overhaul’ of the
community matron contract and a change in referral criteria. Second, she said that ‘a lot of’ commissioners
ask her to run the tool to see if there is ‘anything interesting’ about a particular cohort of patients. For
example, to reach elderly individuals who needed some care but were not housebound or known to
health-care providers, the CCG had set up drop-in clinics in church halls and sheltered accommodation
staffed by community matrons, pharmacists and voluntary sector staff (e.g. Age Concern). To ‘populate
those clinics’, the superuser devised an algorithm and ran it in the tool, for example over age 60 years,
several comorbidities, ‘a couple of hospital counts’. This list of patients identified was further refined when
passed on to the GP practices who then decided if the tool had identified the right people. This ‘did actually
throw up people they [general practices] might not have thought about’. The feedback the superuser and
her team got from the practices about using the tool in this way was ‘quite, quite promising’.
Challenges
One challenge was that some general practices were not motivated to use the tool. A superuser reported
that, once general practice staff were taught, those skills were forgotten, as the tool was infrequently
used. Another superuser noted that, because practices were not asked to identify patients as a part of any
programme or initiative, the tool was not used routinely. That particular version of the tool also did not
allow for stripping out of certain patients (e.g. pregnant women, those with transplants), which meant lists
of patients were produced that the practices could not manage. Moreover, trend data did not exist to
track patients over time, thereby determining whether or not the tool and consequent interventions made
a difference. For these reasons, practices sometimes did not ‘see the point’ in investing their time in
the tool.
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Another challenge was around data accuracy. For example, one superuser recounted how raw data were
extracted from primary care, linked with secondary care data, cleaned and ‘put through the grouper’
(the algorithm). But the result wasn’t ‘right’. The superuser and her team identified that the problem was
not with the tool, but with the ‘wrap arounds’ from the other suppliers. Consequently, the CCG had
considerable concerns about using the tool and had not launched the ‘charm offensive’ with the general
practices. Moreover, the superuser and her colleagues had to learn about technical aspects of the tool
which they ‘shouldn’t need to know but we’re feeling we do need to know because we can’t ask the right
questions’. However, overall, this superuser was positive about the benefits of this tool; she just thought
that the package with multiple suppliers was too complicated. As these data were collected in 2012 and
several versions of the tool will have been rolled out since then, these problems may now be corrected.
Views on the training
Satisfaction with the training depended on expectations. One superuser with a commissioning background
identified her objectives from the training as:
Technical expertise about how the data is extracted, how it’s cleaned, the algorithm that’s supplied
and the outputs that the [tool] gives and in addition to that they [external provider 1] will be in the
best position to understand how best to use it.
She said the training left her ‘better informed’ but ‘more confused’, because of its technical detail. When
probed about ‘how best to use it’, this superuser said that there were lots of ways to ‘cut the data’ and at
the moment a ‘generic approach’ was employed, but she wanted someone from external provider 1 to
work with her and a commissioner for long-term conditions ‘to actually think about the best way to get
maximum results’, perhaps by developing a strategy focusing in-depth on one condition such as chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease or diabetes. She wanted the tool contextualised to her immediate concerns,
which was difficult without a tool expert on hand. She also wanted an opportunity to blend her local
knowledge with expert knowledge to identify where the tool could make a difference. The absence of a
strategy for using the tool with general practices meant that the superuser did not have much clarity about
the direction she should be taking with practices and, in turn, practices were less receptive to ‘getting on
board’. Her learning from the training did not address this.
Another superuser found external provider 1’s training interesting, not least because she learnt what the
tool could do without the ‘front end’ (i.e. ‘wrap arounds’) provided by other suppliers. This superuser
thought that the original training by the local supplier did a ‘good job in trying to get across the things we
needed to know at the time’ and it was ‘a very useful introduction to what actually is quite complicated’.
Through actual use of the tool over time, this superuser found that the implications of some of the training
were not appreciated until she was working with live data. She thought that ‘the training is obviously very
necessary, but also there’s a period of time of actually using data and reflecting back on things that’s also
very important’.
Benefits and disadvantages
At the time of fieldwork in 2012, the benefits of the software tool appeared to be more theoretical than
actual, perhaps because superusers had just been trained. A member of the NHS team that procured the
tool said he ‘absolutely’ believed that the tool could be useful for commissioners, but thus far making a
difference was ‘more the exception than the rule’. Other mechanisms were needed to capitalise on the
tool, such as good-quality community matrons, ‘integrated’ working relationships between community
matrons and GPs and regular patient review to ensure that the information generated was useful. This
participant identified many difficulties, including the inherent challenges in changing the status quo, the
complicated environment, the range of stakeholders across multiple organisations who did not necessarily
buy into the change objectives, and the short-term focus on ‘today’s problem today’ leading to managing
the ‘minutiae’, which militated against longer term strategic thinking, induced a lack of relevant skills
among managers in interpreting information, and limited leadership at senior management level to
champion the tool.
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Another superuser thought that a potentially powerful way of using the tool for practices would be in
‘case-mix adjustment’. Currently, practices were judged against an overall average (i.e. average number of
hospital admissions by practice). Using data from 10 practices in one locality, he identified the practice that
had the greatest opportunity to lower admissions, which would not have been selected through usual
methods. This example was also brought up by a local GP clinical lead, who felt that this application was
potentially very powerful. He was also relatively positive about the tool because it had addressed some
long-standing problems about resource allocation to GP practices that the clinical lead had been aware of
since fundholding days.
As both of these examples suggest, in general, participants identified how the tool might influence
commissioning, rather than examples of actual impact.
Box 8 summarises the key points from the first vignette.
Figure 7 explicates visually a few of the transformative processes in this vignette. Chronologically, this starts
at the bottom with product deployment.
Table 12 illustrates how the differing agendas and pressures of the key parties affected their knowledge
exchange activities.
Figure 8 illustrates how the tool, the knowledge embedded in it and the information derived were
transformed by the key players in the knowledge exchange conduits. The ways that these key actors
‘framed’ that knowledge are indicated by the changing shape of the knowledge that each set of actors
had about the tool, for example the shift from the tool being framed at its inception as evidence-based
knowledge with deep and wide academic credentials to a deliberately simplified and, therefore, useful
piece of saleable software.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03190 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 19
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Wye et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
87
BOX 8 Key points from vignette 1
This vignette illustrates how knowledge transforms through multiple processes. In one example, a superuser
applied her recently acquired knowledge from the webinar training to devise an algorithm to identify elderly
patients for a multidisciplinary intervention (product deployment). But before contacting these people, this list
was again transformed by general practice staff who weeded out those who were not suitable (interpersonal).
The processes of engagement (with general practices) and contextualisation (of the algorithm and the original
list) were also evident.
In another example, a superuser copied the steps to generating a case management report into a PowerPoint
presentation with screen shots and red highlights (copy, adapt and paste) and then trained general practice staff
through ‘sitting with Nelly’ sessions where she passed on her knowledge (people placement). General practice staff
did not want to learn how to manipulate the data themselves, but data protection rules meant that only they could
have access to practice data to transform it into useful knowledge (governance). The superuser contextualised the
webinar knowledge to focus on areas of key interest to general practices and through face-to-face visits engaged
practice staff to use very limited aspects of the tool (interpersonal knowledge transformation).
Other key points from this vignette include:
l External provider 1 worked through academic channels. They encouraged independent assessment of the
tool, posted published papers on their website and attended academic conferences to make contacts.
Academics not only were knowledge producers but they also (unwittingly) marketed knowledge to extend
external provider 1’s reach.
l The tool was bought by a NHS team on behalf of several commissioning organisations and then allocated
to NHS staff who had no input into the selection of the tool nor any clear information need that the tool
was meeting. Consequently, NHS users were left to puzzle out not only how to use the tool but what
problems it could address. One superuser found that this lack of clarity impacted on her ability to engage
GP practices.
l Although the NHS clients recognised the high calibre of expert knowledge, there was agreement that the
training included excessive technical detail. Some said it was too focused on the American health-care
model and not on how the tool could best be used in English commissioning contexts.
l Because it was so small, external provider 1 worked through much local commercial companies to market
its tool, which led to complicated arrangements which impacted on data quality and created concerns
about competition hampering knowledge exchange.
l During fieldwork (May to August 2012), difficulties cited with the tool included its overly American lexicon and
conceptualisation of health-care systems, its lack of filtering mechanisms and its discrepancies between raw and
processed data. These may have by now been resolved with successive versions of the tool, but were sufficient
to lead to the postponement of rolling out the tool to GP practices in one commissioning organisation.
l Transformation of knowledge to GP practices was through the NHS ‘superusers’ acting as intermediaries.
They offered training but, because there was no impetus on GP practices to subsequently use the tool to
produce information, the skills and knowledge transferred could be lost.
l Apart from identifying patients from case management, which arguably was for clinical rather than
commissioning purposes, actual use of the tool to inform commissioning was relatively limited during
fieldwork (2012). Exceptions were that the tool had been used innovatively to identify prospective users of
an outreach clinic for the elderly and the ‘case mix adjustment’ aspect of the tool to identify GP practices
with the most potential to reduce hospital admissions.
l Nonetheless, an analyst superuser and a GP clinical lead were enthusiastic about the tool, and another
superuser with a commissioning background thought it was ‘quite promising’. A third superuser was
less convinced.
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TABLE 12 Examples of the key parties’ aims and activities in vignette 1
External provider 1
(tool developer)
Local supplier
(tool supplier) Superusers Commissioners GP practices
Aims
l Meet academic
standards
l Attract senior
international
academics
l Persuade clinical
opinion leaders
l Spread EBM
l Gain international
kudos
l Sell product
l Stay small
l Provide training
if possible
l Gain NHS credibility
and influence
l Exploit knowledge
of local contexts
l React quickly to
local market
l Give added value to
tool developer
l Add consultancy
and report writing
skills
l Ensure
indispensability
l Demonstrate
success
l Sell product/gain
market share
l Increase efficiency
l Change NHS ways
of working
l Persuade and
train users
l Develop skills
l Show value of new
knowledge to GPs
and commissioners
l Try to embed tool
to generate GP
data
l Anglicise (US)
tool’s outputs
l Engage general
practices
l Engage community
matrons
l Feed useful
information to
commissioners
l Meet targets
(health/budget)
l Comply with
governance
l Improve patient
pathways and care
l Improve NHS
efficiency
l Maintain own
professional
standards
l Demonstrate
improved care
l Increase efficiency
of commissioning
l Increase respect
among clinicians
l Establish good
working relations
l Gain influence
over care
l Avoid complaints/
adverse publicity
l Establish good
ways of working
l Attract staff (CCG
and local NHS)
l Focus on patients
l Meet targets (QOF/
others/budget)
l Comply with
governance
l Improve patient
pathways and
care
l Improve practice
efficiency standards
l Demonstrate
improved care
l Maintain own
professional
standards
Activities to meet aims (or not)
l Develop robust,
evidence-based
tool
l Validate tool
l Achieve credibility
for tool
l Engage local
supplier
l Train local supplier
and superusers
l Anglicise the tool
(a bit)
l Provide (mainly
technical) training
l Obtain user
feedback to
further develop
tool
l Select, filter,
simplify
l Write attractive
reports
l Develop ‘wrap
around’
l Make do with less
understanding
of tool
l Prioritise managerial
aspects
l Block direct
NHS–external
provider 1
knowledge transfer
l Help Anglicise tool
l Show how well it
has worked for
others
l Gain proficiency
via webinars,
‘homework’ and
using tool
l Overcome initial
technical confusion
l Teach GP staff and
work with them
l Encourage GPs to
apply data outputs
l No access to
patient data, so
unable to analyse
GPs’ data for them
l Show how well it
has worked for
others
l Question what
problems tool
solves
l See potential but
little actual benefit
l Downplay the
usefulness of the
data
l Lament lack of
data interpreting
skills
l Stress practical
difficulties of
implementing the
data’s implications
l Give low priority to
developing any
strategy for using
the tool
l Resist having tool
imposed
l Try to learn from
superuser
l Try not to have to
use the tool myself
l Try it out
l Accept some
promising data
l Weed out ‘false’
data
l Focus on what
helps my practice
l Find that some
data is unhelpful
l Challenge the
data accuracy
l Forget how to use
the tool
EBM, evidence-based medicine; QOF, Quality and Outcomes Framework.
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External provider 2
The software tool
External provider 2 was a large UK-based company that supported several software tools, some developed
in-house and some developed elsewhere. Consequently, they had a large team of analysts. The tool in this
vignette was developed by another commercial company. It used ‘evidence based protocols’ to assess
whether or not a patient or cohort of patients were in the best place of care for their particular needs; for
example, those in hospital might be better placed in community settings. According to the product guide,
the ‘evidenced based protocols’ that informed the tool were ‘developed and maintained by a Global
Clinical Panel of over 800 independent experts including UK based clinicians’. These guidelines were
‘compared with the clinical evidence within Map of Medicine and NICE guidelines and found to be 97%
compliant’ (product guide). No further information was available about where or how these guidelines
were generated. However, there were references to academic research within the tool.
Although local commissioners had not specifically requested or sought this tool, it was available for
regional use. The local hospital had higher than average emergency hospital admissions and the decision
was made to conduct audits using this software tool to determine if patients were misplaced in acute
settings. Essentially, the audit consisted of clinically qualified staff (i.e. ‘reviewer’) entering patient data by
working through a number of screens checking boxes. The reviewer would enter supplementary notes to
explain reasons for his or her decisions. The tool then reported whether or not the patient ‘qualified’ by
meeting the criteria for care in that particular setting. As the audits took place in ‘real time’, care providers
would be available to answer any queries of the reviewers arising from patient notes.
The first audit
A first audit of the local hospital using the software tool was carried out solely by staff from external
provider 2 in the autumn of 2010. One NHS client said that ‘the first audit was a disaster really’. He
identified several problems, the first being the lack of detail. For example, the tool gave the proportion of
those who could have been given care elsewhere without any details about why or where.
It gave us no details. So when we got that we felt that that was unhelpful because a percentage
figure didn’t give us any idea of what was required, who those patients were, were there any themes
in that? And what facilities were required? So if it was say falls, you know, what’s required? What
would we have to put in? Because they assumed that there was a physician who would go and visit
the patients at home, and constant nursing support at home, which wasn’t available.
Once the notes were reviewed, they found that ‘whoever applied it, applied it without any common sense
at all’, giving them ‘ridiculous’ results. This was thought to be a problem not with the tool, but with its
application. Hospital clinicians retested the patients who had been ‘non-qualifying’ and found that nearly all
qualified. Examples of those initially classified as ‘non-qualifying’ included a pregnant woman who was
‘essentially killing her baby’, which led to a statutory legal admission, and a man with repeated chest pains
who needed a coronary angiogram which could not be administered at home; the tool said that he was
suitable for home care. These anomalies were not because the tool was North American (although several
participants commented about the challenges in applying a North American tool) but because ‘it was just a
complete misunderstanding or very, very poor assessment’. We do not know who within external provider 2
carried out the assessments.
The hospital wanted the PCT board to consider the revised results, but the PCT commissioners
were reluctant.
They had just fed back and signed off the protocol . . . One of the PCTs said that they didn’t really care
whether it was accurate or not, it gave them the message they wanted . . . they actually refused to
look at it.
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Eventually, the PCT and external provider 2 were persuaded to examine the revised data and they agreed
that the quality of the audit was poor.
And they said ‘Look if you really want us to see your data, if it would help for us to go through your
data, we’ll set up a meeting’. And I said, ‘Look, it’s not my data, it’s your data. It’s not going to help me
in any way at all. I’ve read it, I understand it. It’s just that you’re planning all around this, and you
haven’t looked at the data yourself, and consistently won’t look at it’. So they at that point said, ‘All
right we will look at it. And we’ll bring it there with external provider 2’. And I brought the notes and
we went through it. And at that point the PCT were completely shocked. So external provider 2 said
they just didn’t understand why it had been so poor. And the PCT, I could see they were quite shocked,
because I think they at that point felt that I just didn’t like the result of it and was arguing on the edges
or the extremes, but in truth it was really, really very poorly done.
The second audit
The experiences of the first audit obviously had a major impact on the planning of the second.
Commissioners leading on the second audit did lots of ‘one to one talking, listening to their concerns’ to
get the right people back on board. The argument used was that the second audit was using internal
people with local knowledge of organisations that external provider 2 did not have. Moreover, the second
audit would have joint PCT–care provider ownership with adequate clinical leadership. In addition, the
settings expanded to include acute, community and social service premises, including the medical
admissions unit, community hospital wards and social service wards. The population under study was all
those aged over 70 years currently located in those settings during the 7 days of the audit. The knowledge
wanted from the review was:
Are patients being admitted appropriately?
For the patients who are in beds who could go home today?
For the patients who are in beds who could receive a different level of care from another provider?
Meeting minutes
There were some concerns about whether or not the software tool would provide all the necessary
information needed, especially around capacity. A bespoke questionnaire was to be administered in
tandem with the tool when auditing. Additional information collected by the questionnaire would include:
Is there an existing care package?
Did the patient have a ‘telecare’ service available?
Does the patient live alone?
Meeting minutes
Staff from the hospital meant to develop this further, but a participant subsequently said this questionnaire
was never devised. It was not entirely clear if an explicit decision was taken or if the questionnaire dropped
off the agenda. Regardless, these data were not collected.
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For the health-care staff to undertake the audit themselves, training was necessary. The tool developer
(not external provider 2) carried out the training. The training was intended for 5 days, but local reviewers
could not be released for that amount of time, so the training was cut down to 2 days. Reviewers included
two managers with nursing backgrounds, a consultant community nurse, an acute hospital nurse, a
discharge liaison officer without a clinical background and a social worker. Only two reviewers were in
current clinical practice. Seven reviewers were trained but five carried out the audit. As part of the training,
the reviewers developed a glossary to translate American nomenclature into terms suitable for this
particular health-care economy. While entering the data into the tool, consultants from external provider 2
were on hand within the setting to answer any questions. At the end of every day, the reviewers met a
senior hospital consultant to discuss any cases found to be ‘disqualifying’ and analytics staff (not clear if
PCT or commercial based) then generated data reports.
Knowledge transformation
Two key streams of knowledge were exchanged in this vignette. The first was about the tool and was
between external provider 2 (including their tool developers) and local stakeholders and reviewers. The
medium was formal meetings with PowerPoint presentations and didactic, face-to-face training of local
reviewers both delivered by commercial consultants. But one reviewer said that the real learning came
from using the tool because of misconceptions of how the tool operated.
Because we didn’t have an understanding of how the tool actually worked, when we set up that
workshop. We were very much posing the questions of: what should be included in the audit, what
shouldn’t be, what types of questions should we be asking in the audit? Thinking that an audit would
be questioner-based, that you would present – you know, if you’ve got these clinical notes in front of
you, you’d also have a list of questions at the side of you and you would answer those questions, if
that makes sense. Where the audit tool itself isn’t like that at all. So I think we had a misconception of
what the tool looked like.
This comment is slightly confusing, however, as several workshop participants had been involved in the
first audit and so, presumably, were familiar with the tool. Nonetheless, the second audit generated ideas
among commissioners, community and hospital providers about how to use the tool next time around.
One was to follow patients through their journey from day one of admission to test suitability daily to
inform length of stay and another was as a 24-hour ‘snapshot’ of A&E.
The conceptual model of the tool was especially useful to hospital staff. They replicated the approach
(without the tool) in ‘several audits of little areas’.
I think the whole question of looking at admissions and what was required, and what services could
be put around it, is one that is so obvious that actually we weren’t thinking about it. So although the
audit didn’t achieve that, or the first one didn’t do it, and the methodology seemed so obvious,
the questions seemed so obvious, we weren’t doing it, so I think it was quite useful for the initial
concept, because it is a simple concept . . . and I think they’ve [commercial provider] brought that.
This conceptual shift had generated substantial enthusiasm, but neither the hospital nor commissioners
said that they would use the tool itself again. Moreover, the hospital would not work with external
provider 2 again.
A second stream of knowledge centred on outputs from the tool and how those outputs informed
commissioners’ decision-making, as a NHS participant said that a key problem was acting on the findings.
Despite numerous requests, we never obtained the final report from either the first or the second audit.
However, we did collect a PowerPoint presentation for an audit using the software tool at a neighbouring
hospital a year earlier. This provided an account of the tool outputs.
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This report presented separate findings into acute admissions and long stay with ‘headline’ information for
each. This information was then broken down further for each category, into ward, ward type, specialty,
patient age and admission day. Additional information on patient characteristics (e.g. lives alone) and
admission source (e.g. GP) was given for long stay. Alternative levels of care were identified for all three
categories (e.g. acute admissions, long stay). Results from qualitative interviews with clinical and managerial
staff were then presented in terms of ‘opportunities identified’. The report gave separate recommendations
for commissioners and providers, for example ‘Review sub-acute provider admission criteria and admission
protocols in consultation with acute provider. Implement monitoring arrangements to ensure that these are
adhered to and remain based on level of care need’. The report finished with ‘next steps’ (report).
Although we did not obtain a copy of the final report for the audits under study, a participant said that
28% of patients could have been cared for elsewhere in the first audit, while the second audit found
that 24% of patients were in a suboptimal care setting. Although the difference between the two audits
was minimal, the results of the second audit were widely accepted, whereas the first audit was highly
contested and led to the disengagement of the hospital. Consequently, the first audit did not generate
much knowledge transfer. A participant in both audits said that the second was more successful than the
first because of local involvement across providers and the commissioning organisations. This created ‘a
much better understanding of what was actually happening in hospitals’ across the health economy, which
was ‘invaluable’. Local engagement led to local ownership.
In the findings presented to the PCT board, recommendations included conducting an audit with the
50- to 60-year-old age group, given that fewer over-70s were in hospital and community settings than
anticipated. This also meant that commissioners needed to look elsewhere in the system to reduce hospital
demand. However, it is unclear whether or not these recommendations were taken on board, as a
subsequent e-mail in late 2011 said that ‘the results have not been used in any commissioning decisions’.
The timing of the publication of the report coincided with the height of the turbulence from the 2012 Act
and the departure of the PCT champion to a new job, so possibly other factors contributed to its limited
impact on commissioning.
Benefits and disadvantages
A participant said that the local stakeholders could have conducted the audit without the software tool,
but it would have been ‘very qualitative’ and the same quality of data would not have been produced.
Generally, local stakeholders found the second audit ‘very useful’, but not because the tool gave much
insight into unplanned hospital admissions, nor did it provide information to feed into planning for future
care. This was partly because the questionnaire to collect these data was not developed but also because
of ‘gaps’ in the information provided by the reviewers, including the lack of recording of NHS number.
Without current clinical backgrounds and possibly because of the abbreviated training, some reviewers
‘struggled’ and the quality of data was poorer than anticipated.
Nonetheless, the audits had an entirely unexpected outcome, in that relationships between the hospital,
community providers and commissioners improved, particularly through the fieldwork phase of the second
audit when local reviewers, commercial consultants and hospital staff met daily to consider the doubtful
cases. Several participants stressed how important this improvement in relationships was, as previously the
hospital had not worked well with the commissioners or the community providers, ostensibly for over
20 years. A participant said that ‘it made us start talking about data rather than prejudiced opinions’,
which meant that formerly fractious conversations were now based around ‘evidence’.
I’d say [I had a] very negative experience from working with this tool and the way it was applied. But
ultimately it might have been the trigger to really make some very big changes in the health economy, in
terms of making us realise we have to work better together. And that probably was more valuable than
the tool ever could be. So paradoxically [the commercial company] helped. And I think they helped
because it was the beginning of saying, ‘We’re going to talk about evidence rather than about opinions’.
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In sum, the application of the tool mended historically fragmented relationships, built trust within the local
health economy and helped the hospital to consider other ways of grappling with a longstanding problem.
But the commercial provider played a minor role, mainly in offering a forum for the stakeholders to work
together and providing knowledge about the tool.
Box 9 summarises the key points from the second vignette.
Figure 9 below illustrates a few of the transformative processes in this vignette. Chronologically, this starts
with number (1). Table 13 details the motives behind these transformations further. Figure 10 summarises
a few of the crucial transformations that the key actors in this vignette undertook to reshape the tool, its
embedded knowledge and the information derived from it. It also illustrates the way they framed the
status of that knowledge as a result of their contextual demands and constraints, and their worldviews.
BOX 9 Key points from vignette 2
In this vignette, engagement was a central issue. For example, before running the second audit the right
people had to be re-engaged, following the ‘disastrous’ impact of the first. Governance also played a major
role with the first audit, as the PCT commissioners were unwilling to consider revised results because their
decisions and plans had already been made.
The knowledge transformation processes of interpersonal relationships, product deployment and people
placement were particularly visible during the auditing process. Reviewers came from many different
backgrounds (acute, community, social services and commissioning). They pooled and shared their clinical,
service and organisational-based knowledge through daily, face-to-face debriefings (interpersonal relationships)
and with the help of the software tool (product deployment) created new understandings. People placement
was also evident, whereby the reviewers took knowledge out of the audit settings back to inform their
organisational bases. This was particularly useful with the acute hospital, as little previously was known. In this
way, difficult relationships between different sectors of the local health-care economy were improved. After the
audit, the most noticeable knowledge transformation process was ‘copy, adapt and paste’, whereby the
hospital staff took the underlying concept of the tool and applied this approach in audits in other areas of
the hospital.
Other key points from this vignette include:
l The tool tended to be ‘one size fits all’, which was not fit for purpose. Contextualisation was necessary first
for the UK (e.g. lexicon and sectors) but also for the particular health economy (i.e. to match which services
are locally available). The tool was too crude to change practice, but it was a starting point.
l To use a tool successfully, it was necessary to understand it. Moreover, a software tool such as this required
actual use to comprehend its full potential. Having expert advice on tool use was also necessary. Ideally,
tool analysis needed to be complemented with the collection of other data.
l Assessing what was appropriate for individual patient care was subtle, and the danger of any rigid
framework was that it lost that subtlety and threw up apparent negative findings that were debatable.
l The particular value of the tool and intervention by the external provider was as a trigger for reflection on
health-care processes and policy at a far deeper level than previously. A disturbing possibility is that it was the
poor quality of the initial audit, and the subsequent wrangles, that proved to be the key catalytic feature.
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TABLE 13 Examples of the key parties’ aims and activities in vignette 2
External provider 2
(tool supplier) Reviewers
Acute hospital trust
clinical managers PCT commissioners
Aims
l Maintain credibility of
evidence base
l Maintain credibility
with clients
(commissioners,
managers and
clinicians)
l Anglicise product to
penetrate NHS
market
l Improve product
l Ensure acceptability
(and saleability) of
product in NHS
l Ensure ability to use tool
l Interpret checklists
correctly
l Try to understand clinical
contexts
l Try to Anglicise tool
l Be credible to clinicians
l Be accurate
l Work efficiently
l Ensure results fair and
accurate
l Use accurate audit
findings to improve
poor care
l Avoid unfair criticism
l Be seen to manage
improvements
l Carry clinical colleagues
l Persuade PCT the results
are wrong
l Help PCT and provider 2
to ensure good second
audit
l Improve acute services
l Push and lead the use
of audit
l Engage stakeholders
l Be helpful in redesigning
new audit protocol
l Ensure that reviewers
have time off to be
trained
l Move quickly to
planning changes in
services
l Be seen to be decisive
l Be seen to be fair
l Maintain good relations
with trust
Activities to meet aims (or not)
l Contextualise the
tool (poorly)
l Help redesign audit
protocol
l Train reviewers
l Enable local audit to
be more quantitative
and detailed
l Inadvertently provide
the ‘boundary object’
that mends trust
and PCT relations
and stimulates
constructive dialogue
For provider 2 reviewers
(first audit):
l Get misleading results
l Lose credibility
l Have results (eventually)
overturned and ignored
For local reviewers
(second audit):
l Make time for training
l Work alongside clinicians
l Develop glossary of terms
l Apply clinical and local
knowledge
l Learn about other
organisations in local
health-care economy
l Learn on the job
l Gain credibility
l Produce detailed and
accepted results
l Feed results and insights
back to own organisations
l Test findings against
own review of notes
l Question validity
l Engage reluctant PCT
l Work with PCT to agree
on second audit
l Design second audit
l Accept second audit
results as accurate and
fair
l Act on results of second
audit
l Decide to replicate
second audit method
elsewhere in trust
l Adopt this audit method
without using this tool
l Deny (and then accept)
first audit results
l Re-engage hospital
l Engage community
provider and social
services
l Help revise methods for
second audit and
develop new audit
protocol
l Set up joint running of
second audit
l Accept results of second
audit
l Fail to use results in
commissioning decisions
l Engage in constructive
dialogue with hospital
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External provider 3
Background
External provider 3 was a UK subsidiary of a North American health-care corporation with an international
portfolio. Although in the UK external provider 3 employed over 100 staff, they had access to several
thousand North American employees, who acted as international experts, developed software tools and
sometimes filled UK staff shortages.
In 2008, external provider 3 won a 2-year contract to carry out several specific pieces of work for a PCT.
During the first year of the contract these were renegotiated and four main work streams emerged:
(i) support for WCC; (ii) complex case management, including the introduction of a software tool;
(iii) development of a ‘savings cabinet’; and (iv) consultancy/coaching work with newly appointed directors
within the local commissioning structures. This vignette focuses on work streams (i) and (ii). Various
extensions meant that the contract eventually lasted 3 years.
External provider 3 had five to six whole-time equivalent staff working on the contract, but this involved
eight main individuals. As well as a programme manager and a clinical lead, there were two North
Americans who spent a substantial amount of time on site, an associate programme manager, one or two
people for ‘actuarial-type work’ and an analyst. Some of these staff were ‘coming and going’, but a
feature of the work seemed to be the continual presence on site over a long period of time of the clinical
lead and the associate programme manager.
Knowledge wanted
The commissioners in this vignette worked within a strong local culture of collaboration, innovation, public
engagement/accountability and transparency. They were very open to working with external agencies to
support their commissioning activities, and did so regularly because sometimes they were unable to attract
candidates with the necessary experience. Being able to recognise where external support would be
helpful was an area where the NHS clients felt skilled. During fieldwork, several NHS staff spoke about
the importance of building up a network of external organisations and individuals who had the right
knowledge and skills. The expense, however, was mentioned as an important constraint on accessing
external support.
At the time of tendering for this contract, which pre-dated the 2012 Act by several years, the commissioners
were ‘trying to go from good to great as a commissioner’. To achieve this, they wanted to look outside the
NHS as ‘we wanted to set our aspirations greater than just what was available nationally and look at some
of the good practice internationally.’ Contracting a company with a North American base was, therefore,
particularly appealing. Consultants from external provider 3 described the commissioners at this particular
NHS site according to Belbin’s team roles.51
So they were the plants and shapers, but they weren’t the completer finishers. I would say that that
was evident when we were working with them, that they had a huge amount of ideas. Lots of
shaping, lots of meetings, huge meeting culture, and then the actual discipline of completing it and
measuring was not there.
The external provider 3 consultants assigned to the contract saw themselves as ‘completer finisher’
personalities which complemented the missing skills within the PCT. Both external provider and NHS staff
spoke about the degree of focus on performance management as one of the key differences between
their organisations. Another commissioner summarised the knowledge and skills which he thought
external provider 3 had brought to the NHS client organisation as good, real-time analysis, programme
management, engagement and coaching.
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World Class Commissioning work stream
External provider 3 described a ‘gap analysis’ based on the success criteria for WCC as ‘hard going’ for
both sides, but also ‘the key’. Through the gap analysis, the external providers sought to help the
commissioners understand the assurance process. The consultants went through each commissioning
competency and challenged the commissioners to ‘demonstrate that you actually do that. Give me
the tangible evidence’. The gap analysis also facilitated communication within the NHS client organisation,
leading to the discovery of duplicated work.
A ‘massive programme of work’ was then undertaken to prepare for the next WCC assurance day. An
early task was to work with commissioners to identify who should be part of the WCC process ‘not just
having the same people that put their hands up, but actually who does need to be involved’. This included
identifying the stakeholders external to the commissioning organisation: ‘if you don’t start engaging
with them as of day one, when they do get contacted they are going to give a very different message to
what you think they will’. The external providers said that the commissioners recognised that project
management was not one of their strengths, and so training was provided: ‘a lot of the stuff that we did
was around developing staff to take on projects’. They also provided information about tools which could
be used for particular tasks, and further training around these.
The commercial consultants mainly drew on best practice examples nationally and internationally, identified
from existing and new contacts to inform this work. Some of this knowledge came from colleagues
working at other NHS sites who had already gone through the WCC process. The external consultants on
site brought in experts from external provider 3 to the NHS client site, including North American staff who
provided some training. But they also made contacts based on publicly available information and facilitated
exchange of knowledge between NHS organisations.
Case-management work stream
A NHS commissioning manager described the second work stream as ‘a project directly to support adult
social care and community nursing to think about what we needed to make that work here’. First, a
software tool was used to identified the ‘riskiest population’ in each of the localities, and then the external
providers ‘sat down with the community matrons’ to compare the lists of patients produced by the tool
with current patient lists (presumably based on clinical judgement). They found little overlap. External
provider staff said that this had ‘really started [NHS clients] to ask questions’. Agreeing how to proceed
had been a long process, necessitating going ‘back quite a few steps’ to discuss the basic principles of case
management and the definition of a ‘complex’ patient. External provider staff felt that NHS staff
sometimes did not have thinking space or ‘someone next to you challenging’ your assumptions. The
software tool, and the external provider staff supporting it, had provided this challenge. This led to
changes in the implementation of case management.
As part of this work stream, the clinical lead from external provider 3 was involved in project meetings
with the leaders of the NHS clinical teams and she also ran sessions directly with nurses and social care
workers. This consultant said that within the existing case-management programme ‘there was nothing to
say whether what they were doing was actually adding value anywhere in the system’. So, as evidence
to evaluate the impact of the existing case-management programme was not being generated, this was
something else offered by external provider 3.
In addition, the personal qualities of the external provider lead were appreciated. A NHS client said
that the external provider clinical lead was ‘a skilled programme manager’ and had clinical knowledge
and experience as a nurse, a combination missing from their own organisation at that time. Actually
having carried out case management elsewhere, and speaking from that experience of changes, the
various benefits and pitfalls, was key to the external provider’s value. The NHS commissioning lead was
also a clinician and this similarity in backgrounds meant that the external provider clinical lead had ‘very
ably’ supported him to get other clinicians on board.
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Challenges
The main challenges, which were raised by both sides, were those of defining what work was needed and
ensuring the work remained relevant and useful in a constantly changing commissioning environment.
A NHS commissioning manager felt that several factors had affected the relevance and usefulness of work
done by various external providers for her organisation. She felt that either partner could be ‘at fault’, with
the brief sometimes not having been that good, but also ‘what is brought is not quite as relevant as it
could have been’. The political climate had changed after work was commissioned, meaning that it was no
longer as acceptable. The contract was sufficiently flexible for changes to be made when needed, although
this did take a good deal of time and energy. The long timescale of the contract facilitated this, as did the
mutual goodwill to engage.
Views on the work
The NHS commissioners expressed positive views about the quality of the work conducted by external
provider 3. The clinical lead assigned to the project was rated particularly highly, and was seen to have
good credibility based on her ‘sound knowledge’. A commissioning manager said that the external
provider had ‘much better horizon scanning, because they were looking internationally’, while another
manager emphasised how the external provider had been skilled at interrogating data, identifying areas
which needed work, and coming up with ‘good tools which we could use’. Another commissioner
described external provider 3 as having ‘both the tools and the understanding of those tools’.
The manager who had been closely involved in the case management work was very satisfied.
What we’re buying is a polished product for something that we want to do anyway. But of course you
then come into the aspect of how they support us to get going, and that’s a standard supplier/
provider thing, and we’re very happy with that, I think they do a very good job. If I didn’t, they
wouldn’t get any more business.
A GP commissioner was less sure about whether or not the contract had been a good use of resources:
They did some work here but for what we paid them I’m not sure. It was somewhat difficult to
understand exactly what they achieved in the end. So I think if you’re going to do that you’ve got
to be very clear about getting value for money because it can be very expensive . . . you know, well it’s
the cynical idea, isn’t it? You get management consultants in to tell you what you know already. They
just go round, you know, finding, you know, and producing, probably hopefully producing solutions
that you may not have seen, but probably you have seen, but not been really able to put into effect.
The quality of the work was not the only factor affecting how useful it ended up being, and this senior
manager’s view that some streams were very useful and others less so was a fair reflection of our
data overall.
There were some really good pieces of work where we were looking at things such as risk
stratification and programmes of work going forward, and those worked quite well . . . I think both of
us [external provider and clients] probably felt, at the end of the day, that we’d got some really good
things out of it but perhaps not as much as we had hoped.
Benefits and disadvantages
The external provider staff assigned to the contract felt that it had gone particularly well, saying that
their organisation was really proud of this project. They described knowledge transfer as having been a
pillar which stood alongside all of the work streams, and that this was important to their professional
integrity. The benefits perceived by the NHS clients included those linked to specific projects but also
more general skills and approaches which they felt they had acquired through the work.
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And they have supported us in making us better at doing the evidence. Because external provider 3
will never do anything without having some data analysis, they’d have almost a hypothesis to do
something and then they’d test that out . . . So I think they have made us more organised in that way.
A commissioning manager referred to a ‘commissioning toolkit’ of ‘those types of technical things that
we would need to support us going forward, which we’ve used’. She felt that the external providers had
led by example but had also set up the systems and processes that ‘then enabled us to see and learn how
to do that type of process’.
The WCC work stream had been very effective in moving the NHS client up the national rankings, but it
was not clear what the impact was on their actual commissioning at the time. A minority of NHS clients
were uncertain about the ongoing value of the work a few years down the line and in a very different
commissioning landscape.
The case-management work stream had challenged how community services were being targeted, and
had engaged clinical, social care and management staff in negotiating agreed definitions of targets
and objectives for case management. A system for measuring outcomes was also introduced. However the
ultimate outcome of the work was beyond the control of both external provider 3 and the commissioners,
as it required the service providers to deliver the benefits. Restructuring of community services owing to
national level initiatives was seen by a commissioning manager as having limited the impact. This was
‘absolutely nothing to do with the expertise we brought in’.
Yeah I suppose, hmm, [long pause] I mean to some extent, you know, to some extent we’ve gone as
far as we can at the moment on that particular case-management initiative. And I would point to it
and say that was a result of their involvement.
Nevertheless, this work was described by another commissioner as having been ‘the biggest gain’ on the
contract. He commented that the external providers were ‘very good’ at working with professional groups
and felt that an opportunity was missed in not bringing the external providers together with clinicians
earlier. Another commissioning manager also felt that the clinician engagement had worked well,
and that it was where some of the legacy lay, as it was ‘real for people, and it’s not just feeling as if it’s
a theoretical exercise, so people can see that there has been a change that are using the systems’.
The WCC work stream is depicted in Figure 11. Although the numbers indicate possible chronological
order, this was not entirely clear from the data. Moreover, because the WCC aspect of this vignette is
derived mainly from the experiential knowledge of external consultants, using data to develop tables and
models tracking the transformation processes of that knowledge was difficult. So, no table or figure
equivalent to those in External provider 1 and External provider 2 accompany this vignette.
Box 10 summarises the key points of the third vignette and Box 11 summarises the key points in
the chapter.
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BOX 10 Key points from vignette 3
Several knowledge conduits were employed in this vignette. As this was an organisation comfortable with the
idea of ‘buying in’ knowledge and skills as and when required, knowledge was acquired from the people
brought in (people placement). The commissioners had a strong interest in exploring international best practice
(copy, adapt and paste), but they did this via the presence of those external provider 3 staff within their
organisation. External provider 3 staff drew on knowledge from their colleagues working elsewhere in the UK
as well as from North America to find good examples of best practice (interpersonal relationships). They also
searched the internet and made contact with other NHS organisations to find initiatives which had worked well
elsewhere which could be adapted for this NHS client (copy, adapt and paste). The application of the tool
triggered a renegotiation of the client’s approach to case management, and the use of gap analysis had been
crucial in identifying the tasks for the WCC work (product deployment).
The local culture within the NHS client resulted in governance processes which prioritised collaboration,
innovation, transparency and engagement, and this may have been behind the strong relationship which
developed with the external provider. External provider 3 staff commented on how this relationship had gone
beyond what was usually developed with most NHS clients, where external providers were sometimes perceived
as a threat. The embedding of external providers and the duration of the contract had also facilitated this
relationship. This relationship and level of access allowed added more value, and trumped some negative
associations of their private-provider identity encountered elsewhere.
Contextualisation was also very visible within this vignette. The external providers’ engagement with
professional groups was seen as central to the progress which had been made with case management. Both
the software tool and the case management methodology which external provider 3 had brought to their NHS
client had originated in North America and had been contextualised, first, for the UK context, and then another
level of contextualisation was added at the level of the local client site.
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BOX 11 Key points of Chapter 8
l Knowledge transformation processes were multilayered, multifaceted and nested within each vignette in
various ways.
l These vignettes demonstrate that external providers may offer ‘solutions looking for problems’ rather than
developing solutions in response to real problems experienced on the ground.
l Examples of knowledge obtained via interpersonal relationships included professionals from commissioning,
hospital, community and social services pooling their knowledge in daily face-to-face encounters when
auditing and external providers contacting colleagues for best practice advice.
l Product deployment included the training and use of software tools and gap analysis to inform competency
development work.
l Governance was less evident, and sometimes stopped knowledge transformation from occurring, for
example when a PCT did not consider revised results from an audit after board decisions were made or
when national imperatives superseded local decisions.
l Examples of copy, adapt and paste included modifying software training tool materials for general
practices, adopting the conceptual approach of a software tool (without using the tool itself) and applying
(modified) successful WCC initiatives from elsewhere.
l Examples of people placement included embedding external provider staff in a commissioning organisation
and assigning a project manager to teach general practice staff use of a software tool in another.
l Contextualisation in these vignettes largely occurred around adapting North American software tools to
local English health economies through glossaries and the interpretation efforts of external providers.
l Engagement was visible throughout the vignettes; for example, when commissioners worked to re-engage
health-care providers after an unsuccessful first audit, general practice staff were introduced to software
tools and professional groups were enthused to achieve ‘World Class Commissioning’.
l The result of the knowledge exchanges and transformative processes, shaped by the key actors’ contextual
drivers, constraints and worldviews, was to produce not only actual changes in the knowledge base but
also a range of different ways of framing the external providers’ tools that were being used and the
information the tools generated.
l Highly skilled external consultants working in welcoming organisations that added value beyond what was
available locally and deliberately drew on multiple knowledge transformation conduits appeared
more successful.
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Chapter 9 Benefits and disadvantages
Introduction
Having discussed knowledge acquisition and transformation and the role of external providers, we now
address the research question:
What are the benefits and disadvantages?
When originally conceiving this question, we were particularly interested in how knowledge exchange
between commercial providers and NHS clients influenced commissioning decisions. However, our analyses
suggested that answering this question was much more complicated than just looking at impact on
commissioning. In assessing benefits and disadvantages, the implicit questions to be considered are:
benefits of what and for whom?
In thinking through ‘of what’, our main focus of interest was external provider–NHS contractual
relationships, particularly commercial and not-for-profit providers. The ‘what’ also included their products
such as software tools, new information (often from the tools) and use of knowledge conduits such as
people placement. In terms of ‘for whom’, the principal client audiences identified were commissioners
and analysts. But each of these audiences was heterogeneous, with a multitude of clients with different
expectations. For example, senior commissioners might be interested in strategic gains and improvements
in their organisation’s prestige, while the focus of junior commissioners might be more operational, such
as support in developing patient pathways. Similarly, those involved in the production and marketing of
information included CSU senior managers interested in better leverage in the health-care market, middle
managers who wanted to enhance day-to-day relationships with their clients and those at the coalface
who churned out the data looking to do so more quickly and easily. In addition, a secondary group of NHS
clients was the health-care providers who were affected by data collection and interpretation.
A further potential beneficiary audience was the commercial and not-for-profit providers, who wanted to
exploit the potential of their software tools and attract other clients with their growing knowledge base.
Because these external providers were also made up of professionals with heterogeneous disciplines,
occasionally one professional group (say analysts) would conclude that a particular contract had been
successful, citing post-contractual NHS-commercial analyst collaborations, while staff with other
perspectives involved in the same contract stated that the contract was not particularly successful, because
senior management relationships had soured between clients and the external provider.
Thus assessing benefit depended on what was under consideration and who was making the judgement
as well as what had been produced. Furthermore, clients weighed up useful output against expense.
Don’t ask me about value for money on those things because, you know, from the private sector, and
in the public sector, external consortia of that type is very, very, very expensive. And there tends not to
be a formal measure of how much you got for that.
David, CCG chairperson
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In Chapter 8, we presented accounts of the perspective of NHS clients along with details on the nature
and benefits of the collaboration. Data to inform this chapter come from the three vignettes in
Chapter 8 along with several other contracts between NHS clients and external providers. All were with
commercial and not-for-profit agencies except the final two. These included:
(a) training NHS commissioners and analysts to become ‘superusers’ of a software tool (see Chapter 8,
External provider 1)
(b) the training and use of an electronic auditing tool to determine best place of care (see Chapter 8,
External provider 2)
(c) developing the commissioning competencies and performance of a commissioning organisation
(see Chapter 8, External provider 3)
(d) supporting the reintegration of those with long-term conditions into the community
(e) training and deployment of a suite of software tools
(f) an outsourced commissioning unit
(g) supporting a new contracting initiative
(h) developing and using a dashboard for unplanned hospital admissions (CSU)
(i) project to improve condition-specific outcomes for an acute condition (freelance consultant).
For several contractual relationships (a, b, c, d, e and h), we have sufficient data from the external provider
and NHS clients to draw conclusions. For (f) we were unable to recruit sufficient NHS clients, and for (g)
and (i) we were prevented from collecting sufficient accounts from external providers. Nonetheless, we
have ample data to inform this chapter.
We begin with a discussion about the unhelpful factors that hindered knowledge exchange in the NHS
generally, before focusing specifically on knowledge exchange with external providers. We then set out the
challenges in assessing the impact of contracts between the NHS and commercial/not-for-profit sector,
followed by a set of useful criteria to judge that impact. The chapter ends with findings on what did and
did not work well.
Gap between analysts and commissioners
Several participants mentioned that the schism between health-care analysts and commissioners was
particularly unhelpful in fostering knowledge exchange. Initially, commissioners and analysts were colocated
within PCTs and were then generally separated out into two organisations with the 2012 Health and Social
Care Act4 (CCGs and CSUs). But even before the Act, these two communities did not work well together, as
other studies have shown.52 A former NHS analyst thought that separating analytics from commissioning
was ‘absolutely’ wrong for the fast-paced, highly changeable environment of commissioning.
So this sort of siloed approach where one set of people come up with the requirements and they give
the requirements to this other set of people who go away, beaver away and then deliver it, I just don’t
think that works. I think that’s absolutely set up to fail.
Randall, freelance analyst
This gap affected not only analysts and managers in commissioning organisations, but also those working
within acute hospital trusts. A former head of IT for a hospital recounted how he bridged the manager/
analyst gap by instituting a policy of asking analysts to follow up managers’ requests by initiating personal
contact to find out more about what information was wanted and how it would be used, because
historically analysts had not furnished the right information. Similarly, the former head of information for a
commissioning organisation set up an exchange between PCT and acute hospital analysts so that they
could learn more about each other’s environments and use of information. These are both examples of
people placement.
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Within commercial provider organisations, we found that the gap between analysts and commissioners
(or project leads) was much less evident, even though many commercial participants had ex-NHS
backgrounds. Possibly this was because commercial companies deliberately cross-fertilised individuals with
different backgrounds. For example, a commercial company said that their ‘standard team’ consisted of a
project manager, a clinical lead and an analyst. As a result, analysts were highly knowledgeable about
commissioning and how best to produce useful data and managers and clinical leads knew how to use
data to inform change. This level of interdisciplinary working was noticeably absent from the NHS sites.
Another long-standing contribution to the schism between analysts and managers was that the trigger for
data production was the ‘wrong way round’. Data tended to be generated and then a use for this data
was sought, instead of managers first defining a problem and then analysts generating the information for
a solution.
It always starts with the data, stick it in a big warehouse, then they think, ‘Well what should we do
with this?’ and then we start pushing out, coming out with reports and saying, ‘Do you like these
reports?’ Rather than starting from the other side, which is the commissioner has this burning urge to
answer this particular question that is relevant to making an actual decision. So OK, so we need to
answer this question: how are we going to go about answering it?
Randall, freelance analyst
Difficulties in measuring the impact of contracts
Commissioner/analyst silos
The gap between analysts and commissioners also created difficulties in measuring the impact of contracts
between the NHS and external providers. A major product of commercial/not-for-profit providers in this
study was the generation of good-quality data using sophisticated tools. But within the NHS generally,
data were not used to generate change. Therefore, this affected the assessment of the impact of these
contracts. Moreover, because interventions were software-tool based, NHS/CSU analysts were more likely
to benefit from contracts with commercial and not-for-profit providers through more powerful, easier ways
of generating data. But benefits such as easier data generation often were not noticed by commissioners,
as commissioners had little knowledge of the work of the analysts. The schism between these two
professional groups meant that an appreciation and understanding of the impact of these contracts might
not have percolated through the system. However, sometimes commissioners did notice. In one contract,
NHS commissioning clients clearly identified how detailed analysis of data from invoice validation software
had led to million-pound savings.
Dependency on other factors outside control
A further difficulty in measuring the impact of contracts was that often the change indicated was outside
the influence of the external provider (and sometimes the commissioner).
For example, the purpose of many software tools was to identify populations for care interventions.
Assessment of impact depended not only on the quality of the software tool, but also on the care
intervention. If there was no care intervention, a poor-quality care intervention, or one that affected few
people, then the benefits of the tool were blunted. Moreover, the benefits often were not realised for a
long time, which frustrated short-term assessments of the impact.
Alfred: The question that I get asked most often . . . is, ‘Well where’s the evidence that having
[software tool] makes a difference?’ And er it’s an incredibly difficult question to answer because –
and my stock response is, ‘Well actually having a system that combines data, runs it through an
algorithm and provides you with a set of information on its own isn’t going to make any difference.
But if you’ve got good-quality community matrons, if you’ve got GP practices that have an integrated
care team, where GPs and community matrons and possibly social workers meet together on a regular
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basis and review patients from the [software tool] list, and you’ve then got a willingness to change the
care pathway for those patients, then you will see a change, and you will see an improvement’.
Interviewer: And is that happening anywhere?
Alfred: Um yeah there’s er – I think it’s probably more an exception than the rule.
Alfred, NHS analyst
Sometimes NHS clients accepted that the impact of the tools was dependent on the behaviour of others
and these did not negatively influence their view of the commercial provider. Elsewhere, commissioners
were less sanguine.
And they spent £5,000,000 on it and they were busy, I went down to the meetings down in [X] on a
regular basis, and every time, every meeting I went to they were saying, ‘Oh well, yeah, it’s all rolled
out across [County A] and [County B] you know, I can’t understand why you don’t use it.’ I said, ‘Well
what have they achieved?’ They said, ‘Well they’re finding – they’re finding out lots of things.’ I said,
‘Yeah but what have they actually achieved?’ and nobody could tell me a single thing that had
happened as a result of it.
Patrick, GP commissioner
Changing priorities
Another challenge in measuring benefits was the changeable nature of commissioning. Both commercial
providers mentioned contracts that initially had substantial knowledge exchange mechanisms and that
were subsequently dropped from the contract when more pressing needs arose.
And one of the biggest challenges for us around the skills transfer is the recognition of what our clients
need to do to be ready to take it. So going back to the [software] tool we are using, the process has
been designed whereby we would do the first round of audit in the setting. The next round 6 months
later, we would coach and mentor the PCT staff to do that in a community setting, so they learn how
to use the tool with a member of our team sat next to them. And they would be trained in how to get
the outputs from it. What happened in practice was the PCT said, ‘We don’t have the staff to be able to
do that so what we’d like to do is pay you extra to do the audit for us again’. So I’ve written and said,
‘Okay, we could do that, but you’re not going to get the transfer of knowledge and skills’. So we have
to be really, really careful. Our whole ethos is that they get this knowledge and skills so they get the
benefits but if a client chooses not to do what they need to do, we have to be very, very explicit.
Because if we get to the end of this and they say, ‘Well you haven’t told us how to do this; it all gets
very, very muddly’.
Lana, commercial consultant
In some situations, the commercial providers genuinely wanted to maximise knowledge exchange, but
the NHS clients were not very interested. In others, the commercial providers did not appear to value
knowledge exchange. One contract became particularly difficult because the NHS clients believed that the
commercial providers deliberately avoided transferring knowledge to keep the clients dependent.
Isolating desired consequences
Another difficulty in assessing the benefit of contracts with external providers arose from the complexity of
the NHS and the wider health and social care system. Benefits from one intervention might easily create
unintended, negative consequences elsewhere. Moreover, isolating the benefits of one particular
intervention was difficult if multiple changes were taking place within the health economy concurrently.
Sometimes you might have a very successful project, but it will be swamped by something else. For
instance, we had a pathology lab project, and I believe it was quite successful on the elements that
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they were targeting, but the overall pathology results showed a huge increase because there had been
a new policy put in around dementia testing, which involved eight different pathology tests.
Connie, CSU analyst
Benefits slow to materialise, subtle and difficult to measure
Benefits were often slow to be realised. For example, an experienced senior commissioner was brought in
about 18 months into a 3-year contract to give notice of its termination as the NHS clients thought it
was not working well. This manager thought that the difficulties were because the contract was
underfunded and forecasting of overspend ‘tended to bounce around quite a bit from one month to the
other’ (Jacob, commissioning manager). He convinced the NHS clients to continue with the contract,
arguing that 18 months was too early to reap the benefits. The volatility calmed down over the next few
months, as the commercial provider had predicted. In the following year, the full budget was allocated, the
savings target was delivered in full and the ‘overall contract envelope came in pretty much on the button
which is quite an achievement really I think for [commercial company] given the amount of change and sort
of chaos frankly that was going on in the system at the time’ (Jacob, NHS commissioning manager).
Although the success of this commercial provider was recognised, a few commercial consultants and a
Public Health consultant mentioned that sometimes the benefits from their contributions might be
overlooked. This could be because as knowledge was transformed, tracing it back to the source was
challenging, but also because often benefits were subtle, such as changes in attitudes, relationships or
dynamics. For example, a commercial consultant recounted how the use of a software tool had improved
local relationships:
I mean I think that we have added value to the organisation, and added skills and expertise. I’m trying
to think, if you went in there, would they say, ‘Oh, you know, this is what we did before and this is
what we did now’. I think they would see some changes in terms of just working around some of the
day-to-day commissioning issues. I don’t think what we have affected is some of this – well I think we
have affected the dynamic relationship with the provider actually. I think we’ve certainly added some
expertise and some clinical expertise in terms of the work around [software tool]. So an area where
they thought they had a problem but there had never been the evidence to have that kind of
discussion with the clinicians. Yeah so I think they might say that – you know, or they didn’t have the
analytics or the – so I think they would probably say that some of their – they are now almost better
equipped to make those decisions or to have the discussions.
Betty, commercial consultant
Interestingly in this case, the perspectives of NHS clients who used this commercial provider concurred with
regard to the development of better relationships with acute providers and production of evidence
informed discussions, although they categorically stated that the commercial provider had not brought
clinical expertise (see Chapter 8, External provider 2). Neither have they elected to buy the tool again.
Moreover, even when changes could be identified and agreed, quantifiable measurement was open to
extensive negotiation. For example, in calculating the savings accrued by deploying a software tool, a
participant said that nurses who were embedded into acute hospitals to check invoices had looked into
150 cases and ‘made real patient impact’. A monetary figure was put against this in terms of the savings
realised from earlier discharges and reductions in pre-operative lengths of stay. But this figure was not
convincing enough; the nurses were pulled from the hospitals and moved back into the internal audit
team because it was ‘very hard to quantify those savings’ (Dennis, commercial consultant).
In summary, there were many reasons that made demonstrating the benefits of contracting external
providers challenging. These included:
l the split between analysts and commissioners which left commissioners uninformed about the value of
external provider input
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l the dependence of benefit generation on other professional groups within the system who were
outside the influence of the external provider
l changing commissioning agendas, which led to the prioritisation of different benefits
l the complexity of the NHS, which meant that benefits in one area could lead to
disadvantages elsewhere
l the usual challenges in outcome measurement, such as difficulties in attributing causality, or in
distinguishing and quantifying the impact of earlier or more subtle inputs.
Generally, perceptions of change depended on the agenda and position of the informant. Commercial
consultants and the NHS clients responsible for their contracting understandably claimed greater evidence
of added value to justify the expense, while those with more negative views of external providers or
decision-makers who did not see directly the contribution of the external providers were more likely to
downplay or overlook external provider contributions.
Indicators of a useful contractual relationship
Given the challenges and complexities in identifying and measuring benefits, NHS clients and external
providers developed other ways of judging success.
One was that the products were still in use. An analyst described one contract as a ‘really positive
experience on both sides’ as the clients were ‘still using my stuff’ such as databases, which the commercial
company had sold for a (notional) penny (Joel, commercial analyst). But not all products were maintained.
A ‘prioritisation framework’ for one CCG was discontinued, because it was too prescriptive and the scoring
mechanism did not capture difficult judgements. Instead, the NHS clients brought in a set of prioritisation
guidelines based around ‘must dos’ and benefits for patients.
Another sign of a useful contractual relationship was that the company was recontracted because ‘if you
use a service that works well you tend to use it again’ (Tom, CCG chairperson). Several participants from
two different contracts with a particular commercial provider mentioned further work and contract
extensions as evidence of success. Further work and contract extensions were likely to come about only if
the contractual targets and the brief were met to the satisfaction of the client. In one contract, this was
clearly not the case, as the contract was docked by 25% because of client dissatisfaction with performance.
Another way of judging success was that the commercial company used the NHS clients as references.
One NHS client, who worked with multiple commercial companies, noted that one tended to refer
prospective clients to them while another did not. Moreover, no mention of this contract existed on the
commercial provider’s website.
We’re less of an important client than we were, almost. That’s what it feels like . . . It’s not a flagship
for [commercial provider A] as it had been . . . And I don’t think that they would immediately
recommend us as a reference to another client. In contrast [commercial provider B] . . . are referring
people to us . . . and I’ve had phone calls and e-mails from [CCG A] and [CCG B] in terms of people
making enquiries about what we’re using [software tool] for and how does it work and what is
[commercial provider B] like as a supplier . . . I don’t think [commercial provider A] thinks that we
would probably speak very highly of them.
Alfred, NHS client
In summary, the indicators of a useful contract were:
l Output from the contract was still in use.
l The external provider was recontracted by the client.
l The client provided positive references for the external provider for future clients.
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What does not work well
Aggressive, strategic marketing
Several factors could negatively affect the contractual relationship. As mentioned in Chapter 7, several
participants had concerns about the profit-making agendas of commercial companies. For example, a
Public Health consultant talked about attending a conference where commissioners were ‘pressurised’ to
purchase their products. Another participant was suspicious about the claims about software tools,
because he thought that these might stem more from a desire for profit rather than usefulness.
And I think there is huge value in going to the States and looking at those tools and saying, ‘Well
which one of these works in the UK?’ Not, as the management consultants are doing at the moment,
looking at them and saying, ‘Which one can we make (the biggest) profit margin on in the UK?’ And I
suspect (why) [software tool 1] have been touted fairly heavily by [commercial provider A] is because
[software tool 1] come with a much lower price tag than [software tool 2] which, you know, are
owned by [commercial provider B] and – and [commercial provider B] don’t give things away.
Harold, freelance consultant
Limited desire for external provider support
A major factor influencing success was the desire for external provider support. Being told what to do was
endemic in the NHS, and NHS professionals were used to having to try to find some merit in hierarchically
imposed interventions, programmes and tools that were unsolicited or appeared not to meet their needs.
In one contract, after a tendering process that took nearly a year, the client needs had changed and so the
‘solution’ no longer addressed a clear ‘problem’. Moreover, it was never clear whether or not frontline,
operational analysts, on whom the success of the venture depended, had been consulted or engaged. One
freelance consultant with a view from the sidelines, said that he thought that this particular contract was
‘appalling and shambolic’ on both sides. For example, he claimed that NHS staff ‘intentionally sabotaged
projects’ (although details were not provided), because of ‘anti-private sector sentiment’. Meanwhile, there
were competence issues with the commercial provider who could not deliver or ‘get the requirements
quite right’ because they had a ‘less than helpful customer’. In his view it was unsurprising that the success
of this contract had been ‘patchy’ (Randall, freelance consultant).
Participants discussing other contracts noted the difference between those clients who were ‘forced’
to work with external providers because they were poorly performing and those who were more ‘open to
knowledge’ (Joel, commercial analyst). Hostility from NHS staff stopped knowledge transfer in several
contracts, as this process was possible only if both sides were receptive.
Potentially I think what’s been challenging across the project generally is a little bit of hostility initially
from the NHS staff definitely, all blame on their side I would say. But that, I think, has created quite
a difficult relationship, and I think that is impeding what could otherwise be really good
knowledge transfer.
Paula, NHS commissioning manager
Lack of clarity around the brief
If a contractual relationship had not been desired or sought, or even when it had, a related difficulty was
lack of clarity about how to maximise the contribution of the external provider. A commercial consultant
thought that the NHS clients were not getting the best out of one contract because PCTs did not know
what they wanted.
I’m probably being unfair, but from the PCT perspective, I don’t think they’ve actually sat down and
thought, ‘How can we really get the best value for money from this particular contract in terms of
sharing knowledge?’
Georgia, commercial consultant
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A CCG chairperson also felt that the reason this contract had not turned out as intended was because
‘there was not enough intelligence in the commissioning of that set up in the first place. In other words,
the commissioners didn’t really know what they wanted’. This meant that the private providers were not
clear on what they were supposed to deliver ‘and there was not then the engagement between the
intelligent commissioner and the intelligent provider to actually deliver a product that was really useful’
(Simon, CCG chairperson).
A NHS commissioning manager from another CCG thought that commissioners overfocused on the ‘holy
grail’ among tools at the expense of thinking through what information tools might provide to create change.
Actually these things are tools and they’re not perfect. They’re giving you a clue and pointers, but at
the end of the day you have to interpret them and apply [laughs] a bit of common sense, and actually
take some action. And I suppose that’s all it is. I think people spent such a lot of time talking about
tools and not enough time in actually thinking about systems and what we needed to do.
Sandra, Public Health consultant
This lack of clarity about the purpose of external provider support was a common refrain across the case
sites. Partly this stemmed from minimal knowledge about what external providers could offer, but the
rapidly changing needs of NHS clients also exacerbated this difficulty. To redress this confusion, help clarify
the brief and generate enough work to justify the costs of the contract, one external provider held
meetings with senior commissioners and analysts attached to the contract across several organisations.
The aim was to identify three clear projects for each organisation, develop an action plan and track
progress. This resulted in several impressive, colour-coded documents with progress quantified in
percentages for each project. Moreover, the office walls of the commercial provider were covered in
different coloured Post-it® notes with information about progress and the occasional headline, for example
‘All project deliverables for April achieved!’ However, 3 months later when enquiring about these action
plans, we were told that they were out of date and no longer in use.
Sometimes another contributing factor was that the NHS client who first contracted the external provider
was no longer available, leaving a gap in terms of understanding the purpose and vision behind the
contract. This was especially true in contracts that relied heavily on one manager to develop the tender.
One of the critical things that happened, in fact it was their start day was – I became seriously ill and I
was taken out of the system for 6 months. So having done all the work up, all the negotiation . . . So
there was a steep learning curve, having built that relationship with me, and working with me and
understanding what I wanted, and I went off on the day that they arrived, and other people had to try
and pick that up. But I would say, regardless of that, I’m not saying that there wouldn’t have been
difficulties even if I had been there.
Sarah, NHS commissioning manager
Without a vision about the purpose of the brief, clients often struggled to know how best to interpret and
apply the output, so little happened. Sometimes the presentation was a ‘glossy’ document that was not
amenable to application, perhaps because of limited resources dedicated to implementation.
But I think a lot of these large consultancy firms come in, they go through the data which is corrupt
and needs uncorrupting, and then they give you a load of information. But when you try and put it in,
it doesn’t do anything. So I mean [commercial provider] so they’re very good at coming and giving you
a false sense of security as to what you’re doing . . . But they’re also not given the time to actually
make the change, you know. So they’ll keep coming in to give you a diagnosis, but it tells you what
you already know. But they’re not really given the opportunity to implement . . . there’s lots of money
been spent on that sort of information, but it doesn’t get transferred to the organisation.
Percy, freelance consultant
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Output of limited value
NHS clients also tended to not value the contributions of external providers if external provider output was
not very helpful. In addition to the many examples reported earlier, analysts from one CCG compared the
positive predictive values of several different risk predictions tools using local data. They found the results
were ‘pretty disappointing’, as in general these tools identified only one ‘true’ positive for about ‘five to
six’ false positives (meaning that for every five to six patients that the tool suggested needed interventions,
only one genuinely did). They went on to calculate the costs and found that given the number of false
positives, any intervention, to be cost neutral, would have to save around £700 a year per patient, which
was not feasible. This contributed to their lack of engagement with the tool. Reportedly, those who
undertook this work said the results were fed back to the external providers who ‘didn’t want to know’,
although there could be many reasons for this, including concerns about the robustness of the analysis.
In summary, unhelpful factors included:
l aggressive marketing by commercial providers
l limited interest in external provider support from NHS clients
l lack of clarity and vision around the contract’s purpose
l limited impact, for example owing to restricted resources, an unclear brief or departure of the client
who originally let the contract
l limited emphasis on implementation in favour of strategy
l outputs of limited value
l lack of early involvement of those expected to use the external services
l changing commissioning environment and priorities.
What works well
Understanding clients and the market
Having discussed challenges, we now focus on factors that facilitated contractual relationships between
the NHS and external providers.
In comparing and contrasting various providers, one participant said that some commercial providers ‘really
got it’, meaning that client needs and the health-care market were understood.
We worked with [commercial provider A] and it’s a struggle, if you know what I mean. And the
reason I’m thinking it’s a struggle is I’m thinking that these guys just don’t know health care . . .
They’re trying to be management consultants, they’re trying to fit – you know, they’re trying to
support CSUs as if we just ought to be generic businesses: we’re not generic businesses, we’re health
businesses and you need to understand health care. My challenge is the support we need needs to
make us the best in giving commissioning support. We need to be able to articulate the question,
you know, we think commissioning support in the future will be all about X or Y or Z or what does
transformation mean, what does outcomes based commissioning mean? And actually when you speak
to this particular advisory, they can’t really answer those questions.
Kurt, NHS analyst
He went on to say that external providers who met clients’ needs and had insight into the ‘market’ were
more likely to produce something useable and thought provoking. This participant, as well as others,
seemed to suggest that when contracting external providers, NHS clients were looking for something that
went over and above what was generally available.
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Given the rapidly changing nature of commissioning, external providers who regularly revisited objectives,
adjusted to the changing environment and contextualised their support appropriately were better placed to
meet or exceed expectations.
That was one of the things I really found was that, you know, it seemed to be that every 3 months
there was a different tune in town, you know, there was a completely different emphasis on what
needed to be figured out or worked on now and so it’s quite easy for something to be the flavour of
the month at one time and then for it to be almost accepted as standard or potentially not to be
relevant any more.
Randall, freelance analyst
Helping clients to do the work themselves
Other participants mentioned that helping clients to do the work themselves, rather than doing the work
for them, was beneficial. Of course, clients needed to co-operate for this to occur. For example, one
participant mentioned a previous experience working with commercial providers on market analysis
whereby the management consultants ‘upskilled’ the NHS staff through the use of tools ‘and we had to
do it ourselves’. She thought that this work was ‘really excellent’ (Paula, NHS commissioning manager).
A commercial provider echoed that embedding knowledge transfer through upskilling enhanced the value
of their work.
Patricia: You asked about what else do we bring to the table. I think it is that piece of our knowledge
transfer. It’s that we do like to be an organisation that it’s not that we go in there, we deliver and we
walk away, but we go in there, we deliver, we show them how to do it and then we walk away. And
that was very much a focus at [CCG].
Helen: Yeah that’s a really good point actually.
Patricia: Even though we had four work streams eventually, there was this pillar next to all those four
work streams that we had to be able to, as an organisation internally demonstrate knowledge transfer.
Helen: And we know they’ve continued to do the work that we started there. And in fact we’re going
back to do some more work with them. I’m going back to do some training with them at the
beginning of March. So we do know that they are continuing on that work . . . And that’s really – and
I think, personally for us two, we were really keen on that when we were coming towards the end of
the contract, that we’d left everything that we could possibly leave with them.
Patricia and Helen, commercial consultants
There was an interesting paradox in this account, in that the commercial providers wanted to avoid
dependency but simultaneously mentioned being recontracted for further work as evidence of success.
Developing non–threatening relationships
Not all successful contracts appeared to depend on developing longer term relationships, but some did.
Non-threatening relationships were particularly helpful.
I think sometimes we don’t have the – I don’t wanna call it a luxury – but sometimes you don’t have
the time to build that relationship. We were able to build, as a team, not just myself and Helen, but as
a wider team we were able to build a relationship with the people that we were working with and
others, so it gave us a greater understanding of being able to identify what would help them and
what wouldn’t, and then to challenge that when needed . . . And I think because we had built that
relationship, we were then seen as an organisation coming in that they didn’t feel threatened by.
Patricia and Helen, commercial consultants
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However, not all longer term contracts resulted in better relationships. Another commercial provider with a
3-year contract kept switching embedded consultants, depending on the changing needs of clients’. This
interrupted developing relationships and left some clients ‘not happy’ (Jessie, commercial consultant).
An ideal contractual relationship?
One particular commercial company stood out in that their NHS clients were uniformly very pleased. A
NHS commissioner said that the partnership with the commercial company worked well and was different
from other external providers because they went at the slower pace of the NHS and did not say ‘you’ve
got it all wrong’.
I think what made the difference was the specific individuals understood that we couldn’t change the
whole of the NHS overnight because some of their observations about how health and social care
work . . . [showed that] this is a big, enormous beast. It’s a bit like the cruise liner; you can’t turn it on
a coin very quickly. And I think sometimes the management consultants, people coming externally
from private organisations feel very frustrated and tied by what we’re trying to work within, and our
ability to make big change quickly . . . So, I think what made it work with [commercial company] was
that they were willing to go at our pace, and understand that there was some parameters we couldn’t
change rather than coming in saying, ‘oh, you’ve got it all wrong’.
Jane, NHS commissioning manager
In contrast, an ex-NHS freelance consultant working with the same CCG was struggling, perhaps because
he was given to challenging the client.
One of the things that I’m trying to do within the organisation, which has got nothing to do with this
project, is I’ve said to Abbie and to Kevin who is the MD [managing director], ‘Your method of
delivering projects isn’t working’. You know, ‘You just don’t have a project – a change of culture in
the organisation, and you need to think about that, and this is how you can do it’.
Brian, freelance consultant
Not only was the approach of the successful commercial company less confrontational, but they also
motivated senior leaders to shadow clinical teams to have ‘normative’ experiences with patients themselves
to learn the reasons for change. Patient stories were also effective in communicating difficulties with the
current system back to the organisation, as the lesson of these stories was that the organisation was
delivering poor experiences and outcomes in exchange for highly expensive interventions from health and
social care. In addition, the success of the commercial company was contingent on local commissioners
doing the work themselves and not ‘being done to’.
Yeah I think the key point here is often with external organisations there is an expectation that they will
come and do it to you . . . our approach is very much that we have expertise around the design and
management of work but we have no understanding of your particular area, and it is your responsibility
to improve your system, but hopefully we can help with that. But it’s about you doing it to yourself.
Daniel, commercial consultant
The example of this commercial provider seems to suggest that the key ingredients for success were going
at the pace of the organisation, taking a piecemeal approach, involving senior leaders ideally through
arranging encounters between senior leadership, clinical teams and patients, using patient stories to
illustrate the case for change and ensuring that the client organisation does the work. Elsewhere, we
found that commercial providers drew on some of these principles but not all.
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In summary, the key feature of successful contractual relationships between NHS clients and external
providers were:
l the providers’ ability to understand and respond to the clients’ needs and market
l flexibility as circumstances change
l facilitating activities so that clients do the work themselves and gain skills
l non-threatening, non-confrontational approach of the external provider
l working to the time frames/constraints of the clients in a piecemeal approach.
Box 12 summarises the key points in the chapter.
BOX 12 Key points of Chapter 9
l External providers who understood the health-care system and could add value to existing contributions
were more appreciated, as were those who incorporated knowledge transfer so that clients were not
dependent long term.
l Good relationships between the external provider and client also facilitated better knowledge exchange.
Knowledge exchange was possible only if both sides were receptive.
l The long-standing NHS schism between analytics and commissioning was particularly relevant in impeding
knowledge exchange. External providers in this study tended to deploy software tools for better data
generation. So, in assessing impact, commissioners often could not identify benefits because it was not
they themselves but their analysts who were the primary audience.
l Benefits were often theoretical about what software tools could do, rather than actual benefits in terms of
the production of useful information that fed into commissioning decisions and led to changes.
l Because capturing benefits was problematic, other indicators were used to make judgements such as
contract extensions, new contracts with former clients, products still in use and the client supplying
good references.
l A primary reason for unsuccessful contracts was that clients did not want to work with external providers.
Contractual relationships were sometimes ‘forced’ because of concerns around NHS performance or in
response to Department of Health directives. Other times, frontline operational staff did not identify the
same need for assistance as their colleagues who had contracted the external provider.
l Another inhibiting factor was lack of clarity around the brief, often because the client was not entirely clear
about the problem, the nature of the proposed solution or the desired outcome. The rapidly changing
nature of the commissioning environment meant that it was difficult but important to keep the brief
relevant. Successful external providers continually readdressed objectives, recognising the heterogeneity of
needs within the client organisation.
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Chapter 10 Discussion and conclusion
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise key points from the results, relate our findings to the
literature, consider the implications and present actionable messages. This chapter also covers suggestions
for future research and starts with strengths and weaknesses.
Strengths and weaknesses
This research is one of the first in-depth studies of commissioning following the 2012 Health and Social
Care Act.4 We have depicted the new landscape and captured the roles of different players in this latest
version of the NHS. In the transitional period between PCT and CCG that this study largely describes
(although two contracts pre-dated 2010), relationships between NHS commissioners and external providers
might have been operating in such disadvantageous circumstances that the report findings could err on
the side of pessimism about the workability and value of the external support to commissioners. However,
in one contract that we tracked from 2010 to 2013, although the turbulence created by the 2012 Act was
not helpful, the difficulties experienced appeared more attributable to the use of the conduits (or lack of it)
than other contextual factors.
Commercial and not-for-profit providers permitted substantial access, although more perspectives from
NHS clients, especially operational analysts and commissioners, would have been welcomed. These
views were difficult to obtain, partly because the turbulence of the 2012 Act meant that many NHS
professionals were preoccupied with the danger of losing their jobs. Entering the field via the commercial
provider may have affected NHS recruitment, as we might have been overly associated with the
commercial sector. We would have liked to have studied more ‘negative’ cases from one commercial
provider, who steered us away from less successful contracts. Nonetheless, ample data were collected,
both positive and negative, to create several coherent case studies of knowledge exchange, which we
believe offer genuine insight and provide conclusions based on carefully collected and analysed data.
In using a case study design, we generated accounts with rich, detailed transferable learning. Drawing on
multiple data sources (interviews, observations and documentation) and comparing across data sources was
a particular strength. Case studies offer the opportunity for what Stake53 calls ‘naturalistic generalisation’,
whereby ‘readers recognise in case study details and find descriptions that resonate with their own
experiences . . . [and then] transfer of knowledge from a study sample to another population’.53 A similar
notion is ‘the shock of recognition’ suggested by Meyer54 in her account of action research methodology.
The researcher’s account sparks a process of identifying with the data and comparing and contrasting
(perhaps rejecting or denying) with the reader’s own experience of, and insights into, similar situations so
that they can make valid inferences that illuminate their understanding. This type of generalisation seems
apt for a study of knowledge exchange in commissioning, given that commissioners appear particularly
proficient in recognising how evidence and experience from elsewhere apply to their own context.
As for ‘user involvement in the study’, we considered at the outset the potential contribution of patient
and public involvement in the research, but as few have understanding of commissioning, we instead
framed ‘involvement’ in terms of maximising commissioner input regularly throughout the study. This
included having two commissioners as co-applicants, who attended team meetings and played active roles
in the analysis (see Tables 7–10), asking two commissioners to take the lead for identifying ‘actionable
messages’ and organising a workshop with several different commissioners from health and social care
organisations to improve our understanding of commissioning and help to develop the actionable
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messages. Accessing and orchestrating this exceptional level of involvement of a ‘target audience’
throughout the lifetime of the study was a key part of our approach.
Summary of key findings
Our fieldwork produced a large amount of information about the disruptions and difficulties as well as the
new opportunities that the 2012 Health and Social Care Act4 created for the knowledge exchange we
were studying, but after much internal debate we had decided not to present that information beyond
allowing it to remain as a constant leitmotiv through our findings. Otherwise, this might be seen to be
transgressing important academic and political requirements for research reports. It is perhaps worth
noting that this decision was itself a poignant echo of the way that commissioners too had to transform
their data into products that would be accepted, taken seriously and used. Knowledge production and
knowledge transformations in any field are rarely free of such tensions and all knowledge exchanges
and their products – including not just commissioning briefs but research reports such as this – are
inevitably a compromise shaped by the pragmatic political and professional requirements of their context.
In this study of knowledge exchange between external providers and health-care commissioners, we found
that commissioners wanted information to try to build a cohesive, persuasive case to determine a course of
action. Knowledge acquisition and transformation were tightly interwoven, as knowledge was continually
reshaped, adjusted and repackaged. Flexible, fast media such as conversations and stories, rather than
written documentation, were especially suited to knowledge exchange with commissioners. The
commissioning landscape was ever-changing, sifting and reprioritising, and commissioners needed
knowledge providers who could keep up.
In seeking knowledge from external providers, health-care commissioners tapped into potentially helpful
sources of information from five conduits (often in combination):
l interpersonal relationships
l embedded or allocated intermediaries (people placement)
l directives, organisational structures and processes (governance)
l best practice or innovations from elsewhere (‘copy, adapt and paste’)
l software tools or non-electronic methods and training (product deployment).
Commissioners, often in partnership with others, would contextualise knowledge obtained through
these conduits to apply it to local circumstances while trying to engage the ‘right people’ to refine the
knowledge and ensure wider awareness. Thus, knowledge accessed through these conduits was
transformed through the contextualisation and engagement processes into locally applicable information.
This often happened in the very act of acquiring the knowledge.
Implicit in people placement was the intention of forming interpersonal relationships through which key
stakeholders could be engaged and opportunities for contextualisation identified. Unsurprisingly,
commercial and not-for-profit providers tended to favour people placement and interpersonal relationships
along with product deployment. Freelance consultants relied on interpersonal and people placement,
although we found one example of product deployment by an ex-NHS analyst. CSUs behaved similarly to
commercial and not-for-profit providers by utilising interpersonal relationships, people placement and
product deployment extensively to contextualise and engage, with some evidence of ‘copy, adapt
and paste’. Public Health was an interesting anomaly, as in influencing commissioners they heavily
depended on interpersonal relationships and inclusion in governance structures such as membership of key
boards. They appeared to have no recourse to product deployment and little opportunity to draw on
people placement, as Public Health staff were already stretched. Moreover, their contributions were not
quite aligned with the requirements of commissioners, some of whom claimed that Public Health
overstated the health promotion and deprivation agenda at the expense of potentially more useful service
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evaluations and evidence reviews. However, one public health department was experimenting with ‘copy,
adapt and paste’ by searching for research evidence for rapid reviews requested by commissioners.
There were several examples of commercial and not-for-profit providers depending almost exclusively on
product deployment. This was not successful for several reasons. First, focusing only on product
deployment favoured analysts who understood and appreciated the tools. But this was less helpful for
commissioners and other key stakeholders such as general practice staff and community nurses, who were
generally less proficient in database manipulation and preferred other ways of knowledge acquisition. By
privileging product deployment and, consequently, analysts, external providers were missing (and even
annoying) target audiences of decision-making commissioners. Second, the gap between analysts and
those commissioners meant that the knowledge generated by analysts was unlikely to flow through to the
right commissioners. Third, because in many cases the tools were allocated ‘top down’ rather than
purposefully selected by the actual intended users, there was no clear commissioning ‘problem’ identified
for data output to supply a ‘solution’. In fact, sometimes the outputs created a problem by identifying
more patients who needed care for whom services were already lacking. Finally, commissioners often did
not understand the output from the tool and struggled to contextualise it, not least because the tools
frequently came from North America. Consequently, the data were not used or applied, which meant that
commissioners’ assessments of external provider contribution were lukewarm.
These failings might be rectified though the incorporation of people placement and the development of
interpersonal relationships. With embedded staff, or dedicated staff at the very least, commissioners had
support in contextualising the data outputs. This was highly visible in one contract that started with
complete reliance on product deployment, with little success. The external provider then embedded
commissioning experts to help form relationships and interpret the data. This appeared to have some
success, until the contract changed again. In a different contract that was heavily based on data output
production, a commercial project manager commented that local clients relied on meetings with him
before reading and applying data outputs, even though the contract (and presumably the meetings) had
been running for 3 years. In contrast, a NHS project manager who had received advanced skills training on
a software tool nevertheless wanted interdisciplinary meetings comprising her, a tool expert and a
commissioning lead to suggest where data outputs could inform strategy. Without this, she struggled to
apply the outputs from the tool meaningfully or to engage GP practices. External providers that did not
draw on people placement and interpersonal relationships, in addition to product deployment, blunted
their impact.
Contractual relationships between external providers and health-care commissioners were improved when
external consultants mimicked the knowledge acquisition and transformation processes of commissioners
themselves. Two highly regarded commercial consultants were embedded for about 3 years in a
commissioning organisation (people placement) where they developed many longer term interpersonal
relationships. Part of their work involved rolling out a software tool (product deployment), but they also
accessed knowledge through ‘copy, paste and adapt’ by horizon scanning for examples of best practice
and identifying highly rated commissioners elsewhere for their clients to visit. In addition, these consultants
continually contextualised information received from various sources and engaged professional audiences
such as primary care clinicians. This contract was deemed a success in helping the organisation meet its
goals and was extended (see Chapter 8, External provider 3). Elsewhere, a CSU analyst was embedded
within a commissioning organisation (people placement) where she already had many long-standing
relationships (interpersonal relationships). Her job was to develop a dashboard (product deployment), and
contextualise the outputs from this tool in formal and informal meetings that engaged the potential users.
This dashboard and the analysts’ input were considered a great success, although the commissioners had
some reservations about the CSU more generally. In both these cases, these external providers, who
had excellent interpersonal skills, went further than utilising known commissioner conduits; they ‘went
native’ by closely approximating commissioner behaviour. However, they still provided a welcome channel
to and from the outside, bringing in expertise and additional support when needed.
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Not all successful contracts depended on consultants ‘going native’. In another partnership, the external
providers allocated consultants (people placement) to teach a business-system approach (product
deployment) that relied on ‘principles’ rather than ‘rules’ and prioritised the experience of the ‘customer’
(i.e. the patient). The engagement aspect was particularly notable, as senior commissioning and provider
managers, in another form of people placement, shadowed frontline clinical staff, observed care needs
first hand and talked to patients, which led to powerful ‘normative’ experiences making a persuasive case
for change. External consultants were not embedded, but were available to support and guide, while
commissioners and other stakeholders were responsible for contextualising and hence learnt how to use
the method themselves. In reflecting on the elements of success, NHS clients mentioned external
consultants’ acceptance of the slow pace of change in the NHS and their non-threatening approach
whereby external consultants did not criticise. Commissioners highly rated this contractual relationship
because they learnt a valuable skill which they could apply elsewhere and they saw that the work made a
difference to patient care.
In these successful contracts, key ingredients were that the external consultants, through placement and
relationships, had an excellent understanding of clients’ needs by becoming embedded in the client’s
world and produced highly valued output that the clients would not have generated on their own. These
external consultants continually went back to clarify the brief to ensure that output was relevant to the
ever-changing commissioning context. Of course, many external providers would relish the opportunities
afforded by this level of access, but clients needed to trust the motivations of external providers and/or be
persuaded by the usefulness of their output. This was difficult if the products were mainly aimed at
analysts rather than commissioners. Moreover, sometimes external providers just did not deliver what the
clients expected to even their minimal levels of satisfaction, much less produce something of value
beyond expectations.
Theoretical underpinnings
In understanding our results, several theoretical frameworks proved appropriate, as they have grappled
with, and provided enlightening accounts of, similar phenomena in other contexts that are germane to this
study. We make no claim that these are the only potentially useful frameworks [e.g. we do not refer here
to Nonaka’s widely cited ‘SECI spiral’ (see Chapter 2, Data analysis), which ultimately seemed less relevant
to our findings than the models discussed below]. Nor do we assert that the frameworks we adduce below
are anything approaching a comprehensive attempt to link our findings with all the relevant literature.
Such an exercise would be massively beyond the scope of this work, even as regards the core topic of
knowledge exchange, let alone wider matters such as organisational decision-making, the private–public
sector interface, innovation theory, improvement theory, the impact of central policy on local services,
change management, absorptive capacity of organisations and management styles, to name just a few of
the possible candidates raised by our findings. We therefore limit ourselves here to explicating the
theoretical frameworks that most informed our thinking because they were the most relevant and
illuminating as regards our main research questions.
The social psychologist Karl Weick, in his highly influential studies of organisations, has characterised
sensemaking – which is usually a retrospective justification of a decision rather than a proactive
deliberation – as a process of enactment followed by selection and then retention of some new
information that the actor needs to understand in context.22 By ‘enactment’, he means that people
recreate in their own minds (perhaps collectively) the situation to which the new information pertains, and
at the same time ‘bracket’ some (not all) of the raw new information for further inspection. What gets
picked up in this way (and what gets ignored to a greater or lesser degree) depends on both the mental
models that people already possess and on the environment or situation in which or for which they are
processing the information. Enactment is an active process; people do not just passively receive data, they
question and explore in ways guided by their mental models and their environment (which to some extent
they are also enacting through the very process of sensemaking, e.g. by using the new information to help
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to recreate, consolidate or alter their situation). ‘Selection’ is about choosing meaning for the new
information, which can be interpreted in all sorts of ways; but people tend to select interpretations
(often guided by past interpretations) that best fit both the new information and the circumstances they
are enacting. ‘Retention’ is about holding on to the most successful interpretations of the new information
in that context. The result of these processes is that people retrospectively recast the new information so
that it can fit their (partly newly enacted) circumstances – hence the term ‘retrospective sensemaking’.
Within an organisation, these interpretations become shared mental models that, among other things,
guide future enactment and selection, shaping not only how future decisions are made and justified but
also the organisational context in which they are made.
Many of our findings were phenomena that seem to correspond to the enactment and selection phases of
Weick’s model. We regularly observed how participants compared, tested and queried new information,
sometimes using a clinical lens (GP commissioners), sometimes using a managerial one (commissioning
managers) and sometimes using a technical one (analysts). In doing so they were ‘enacting’ the data and
the circumstances they interpreted as being relevant to it, for example what the audit results in vignette 2
meant and how they were or were not valid in their hospital. Selection was also evident as our participants
interpreted the data and gave it meaning. For example, in understanding data on unscheduled hospital
admissions, several GP commissioners discussed clinical reasons that patients with cellulitis might be
admitted and alternative care provided for these patients that had a quite different meaning and
implications from the analysts’ and the managers’ interpretations.
The partly shared mental model that an organisation (e.g. a CCG or subgroups within it, such as analysts
or GPs or boards) successfully develops, consciously or otherwise, will be one that fits both their local
context and their way of doing business (what one is supposed to do and how). Thus, each organisation
worked out its own unique set of shared mental models (including acceptable ways of doing things),
for example with one commissioning organisation focusing on integrated health and social care and
another emphasising the importance of good governance, but with subgroups or communities whose
shared view might vary from each other’s and the espoused mental models. Moreover, any such set of
mental models depended on a continuing process of negotiation between the key actors within the
organisation(s) that might or might not result in a consensus. (Compare, for example, the rifts that
developed after the first audit in vignette 3 with the all the key parties’ acceptance of shared view after
the second audit.) At an individual and a collective level, we observed participants drawing on what
Gabbay and le May have called their ‘mindlines’.20,21 Mindlines are described as internalised, collectively
reinforced and often tacit guidelines about handling complex situations. They are informed by training,
experience, interactions, reading, local circumstances and a host of other sources, including the collective
views of colleagues on how things should be done (‘collective mindlines’).21 Originally described as the
means by which clinicians adduce, combine and use different kinds of evidence when deciding how to
manage patients, they are also applicable to other complex but routine decision-making situations. Among
commissioners, their mindlines allowed them to weave their way through an uncertain maze of often
contradictory tensions, constraints and demands, and arrive at politically and organisationally satisfactory
solutions. This recalls Gabbay and Le May’s analogy in which new knowledge in a health-care system
is like a soft and malleable ball, which not only changes direction every time it is hit, sometimes
unpredictably, but also morphs each time it is hit or transferred from one actor (one component of the
system) to another.21 The image in Figure 4 conveys a similar idea.
The notion of mindlines was evident also in the way that participants accessed, transformed and applied
knowledge. For example, GP commissioners would refer to patient stories, articles that they had read and
conversations with colleagues when interpreting data and making decisions about potential interventions
to judiciously build the case for the action they were proposing. Mindlines, which are often shared through
such informal means, help to explain why the same information was processed and understood in
different ways, as it was combined with different information by different individuals in different
professional and organisational groups. For example, the potential of risk profiling to allocate general
practice budgets on the basis of multimorbidity was exciting to analysts because this was a new way to
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use a tool, but some GPs reacted with weariness, as previous risk prediction tools had not been very
helpful. Both analysts and GPs were using the given knowledge about risk profiling (and/or the tool) to
solve different sets of problems and were drawing on their own (but different) mindlines based around
past experience, adeptness at software usage and understanding of local priorities.
Mindlines and sensemaking activities take place within ‘communities of practice’ and other knowledge-based
groups. Communities of practice consist of groups of people with a common purpose or passion who
‘1) connect pockets of expertise, 2) diagnose and address recurring problems, 3) analyse knowledge related
sources of uneven performance, 4) link and coordinate unconnected activities and initiatives addressing similar
knowledge domain’.19 Communities of practice, which are ubiquitous in health service organisations,55 can
foster the creation of new knowledge and ways of doing things, and in the course of sharing knowledge also
develop a shared understanding and sense of identity. While much of the activity that these groups undertake
will be in the form of discussing knowledge, some also work with tools, and the group learns from its
experience with the tools. This relates to another distinction we have observed, namely that between
knowledge-sharing and knowledge-nurturing communities.56
Examples of communities of practice included groups of analysts within and across organisations, the
community of decision-making commissioning managerial staff and some communities of GP commissioners.
Such groups were an important part of what Brown and Duguid17 have called the ‘social life’ of knowledge,
a concept relevant to our findings not only because it deals with the influence of social networks on the
processing of knowledge, but also because it touches on innovation theory – how such knowledge does or
does not lead to new ways of doing things in an organisation. The commissioning knowledge that was
being exchanged (or not) within and between the communities of practice clearly had its ‘social life’. Ideas
were shared, stories exchanged, knowledge modified and reshaped or even rejected as the participants
learnt from and reinforced the mindlines within their own communities. But as is often the case with such
communities, the knowledge also tended not to cross over between some communities (e.g. GPs to analysts;
commissioners to commercial providers), which obstructed its flow. This may be why people placement and
product deployment played such an important role as knowledge conduits; they helped to cross the barriers
between the different (and differing) communities. This problem resonates with the now widespread
acceptance that practitioners should be involved in knowledge creation and, vice versa, that researchers
need to engage practitioners early in their research if they want their results to be implemented – the
argument for coproduction,57 or what van de Ven calls ‘engaged scholarship’.58 Not only knowledge
creation, but also knowledge acquisition and transformation may be similarly improved by closer working
between the two camps of, say analysts (external or internal) and commissioners.
As far as the tools are concerned, it was not so much the tools themselves as the underlying models
they implied that were the key aspect being transmitted and transformed through product deployment.
The tools, or the underlying models, may become boundary objects,59 enabling understanding,
communication and sharing between different groups (such as NHS/CSU analysts and tool providers but
not – unfortunately – between the communities of commissioners and analysts). Where NHS clients felt
that a tool was not working, this might indicate a breakdown in sensemaking, as the framework of
meaning on which the tool was based did not fit well with the commissioning organisation’s framework of
meaning. This could lead to either the dismissal of the tool (which we observed with general practices
around risk stratification tools) or to some kind of synthesis into a new framework of meaning (such as
the scenario generating tool that was modified by NHS analysts). The data resulting from the tools could
also of themselves be boundary objects that allowed better dialogue and joint decisions. This happened for
example in vignette 2, after the second set of mutually acceptable audit data had become a means to
achieving a useful dialogue between groups that had hitherto been at loggerheads.
Choo’s four-way classification of decision-making was also useful.60 His two-by-two table (low/high
uncertainty about goals vs. low/high procedural uncertainty) suggests four ideal types of modes – ‘rational’
decision-making (high certainty on both axes), ‘process’ decisions (high certainty on procedure, low on
goal), ‘political’ decisions (low procedure, high goal) and anarchy (both low) – helped to make sense of the
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data, as did his suggestion that an organisation’s decision style can be a hybrid of these modes, which
alters over time. With some commissioning and external provider organisations the process mode seemed
to dominate: goals were clear, but the alternatives to reach them were not, and the organisation was
working through a process of searching for (or creating) and evaluating alternatives. Choo suggests that as
the organisation becomes more familiar with the alternatives open to it, the process becomes more
routinised and moves towards the rational mode. Many of our data suggested that commissioning
organisations operated in the anarchic mode (high uncertainty for both the goals and the procedures,
which was exacerbated by the reorganisation of commissioning that was underlying the activities).
Problems met solutions fairly randomly and there was also perhaps something of the political mode, where
much effort went into setting out cases for alternative goals (low goal uncertainty due to ‘must do’ targets
but high procedural uncertainty about how best to achieve them). Arguably, some external provider
organisations such as Heron were in the rational mode while most commissioning organisations aspired to
be, where everything was routine, so that they would have the luxury of straying into the political mode
every now and then to question what they were doing. This was especially evident in one commissioning
organisation where we were asked to inform the chief accountable officer if we found any software tool
to manage all of commissioning activity in real time linked to financial data with the robustness of
prescribing analysis and cost prescribing data. In effect, the organisation wanted the ‘holy grail’ of
commissioning with this magical, non-existent tool. But most commissioning organisations were probably
operating in the process mode, or even the anarchic mode (which might, or might not, be regarded as
dysfunctional under the highly uncertain circumstances in which they were operating).
Choo’s anarchic mode is also related the much earlier ‘garbage can’ model of decision-making,61 which
was originally proposed as an empirically based counterpoint to the predominance of over-rational and
theoretical notions of managerial behaviour. It suggests that organisational decisions are often made in a
kind of organised anarchy in which managers, their goals, the problems, their causes, the effects and
the alternative solutions are all poorly defined, as are the processes by which the managers, who may
themselves be in a state of flux, have to make decisions, often hurriedly, under pressure and in the face of
competing and irreconcilable interests. This complex of circumstances, so frequently described for
managerial or policy decisions in other sectors, is redolent of the situation sometimes described by the
commissioners in our case studies. It may help to explain the kind of (sometimes serendipitous) satisficing
that we suggested characterised the knowledge utilisation and transformation entailed by many
commissioning decisions (see Chapter 3, Figures 3 and 4).
Recent literature on commissioning
Our study was commissioned in a call with several other studies that explored knowledge exchange with
health-care commissioners. In addition, a call a year earlier focused on how health-care managers used
evidence. Many of those studies are now published.
Swan and colleagues explored the use of evidence by health-care commissioners in PCTs.9 They found
that evidence and decisions were coproduced and identified several ‘inter-dependencies’ that mediated
evidence. ‘Process interdependencies’ included role, project, management, governance, expertise and
relational. Furthermore, another set of interdependencies were categorised under ‘task’. Their key findings
were that information does not speak for itself and that experts were needed to translate evidence. There
is overlap between Swan’s ‘process interdependencies’ and our knowledge conduits, and in both studies
the importance of translation and contextualisation was highlighted. Swan and colleagues concluded that,
in transferring knowledge to commissioners, case studies might be a more effective medium and make
information more usable.
Checkland and colleagues’ work on the role of middle managers in PCTs collected data on clinical and
commissioning managers. They found that commissioning was ‘messy’ and ‘fragmented’.62 They identified
the role of the ‘animateur’ defined as someone who managed disparate groups of professionals over
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which the commissioner had little control to engage in a particular course of action,63 which appears
similar to our concept of engagement. Checkland and colleagues also found that middle managers
managed information in several directions: up, down, internally and externally. This concurs with
our research.
Smith and colleagues12 studied commissioning for long-term conditions, finding that commissioners
balanced two commissioning ‘cycles’. One was relational and the other was transactional. They identified
skilled managers and accurate and timely data as the keys to helping and hindering effective
commissioning. They also developed indicators of effective commissioning.
Dopson and colleagues10 explored health-care managers’ use of management research in six ‘knowledge
economies’, including a commissioning organisation. They found that managers were most oriented to their
own experiential knowledge and that of others within their community of practice. ‘Knowledge leaders’
tried out, tested, transposed and contextualised evidence from elsewhere10 and, in close accord with our
own findings, the researchers noted the social processes of evidence acquisition and transformation.
Our study and the ones named above draw out similar points in terms of the importance of relationships,
the social processes of knowledge acquisition and transformation, the multiple ways and directions in
which managers accessed and spread knowledge and the fundamental ‘coproduction’ of both evidence
and decision-making.
Outsourcing in the NHS
This study and others9,12,62 have stressed the importance of interpersonal relationships for commissioners to
acquire, transform and apply useful information. But these relationships are harder to create and sustain
across organisational boundaries. With the 2012 Health and Social Care Act, many more organisational
boundaries were created with the transfer of public health departments into local authorities and new
organisations such as CSUs. Numerous commercial and not-for-profit providers with competitive mindsets
also entered the market offering data management and information services. This curtailed exchange of
knowledge, as providers were reluctant to share knowledge and information with rivals.
Effectively with this panoply of information providers, not only did the 2012 Health and Social Care Act create
more conducive conditions for competition, but it also introduced outsourcing to health-care commissioning.
Outsourcing is common in the private sector. The conventional wisdom is that ‘organisations should choose
to outsource carefully selected, non-core activities that can be accomplished quicker, cheaper and better’
elsewhere.64 This raises questions about the role of information in commissioning, predominantly delivered by
CSUs and other external agencies. Our findings confirmed that the provision of information is not, and cannot
be considered, an activity that is ‘non-core’ to commissioning. Our study casts doubt on the expectation that
the expertise of those supplying locally usable information could be regarded as a commodity independent
of the work of commissioning, either now or in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, the acquisition and
transformation of knowledge remained central to the decision-making required of the commissioners that we
interviewed and observed. We did not obtain information on the financial costs of outsourcing, that is external
organisations, whether CSUs, commercial or not-for-profit agencies, were ‘quicker, cheaper and better’ than
in-house facilities. However, any such cost–benefit calculation should take account of the additional
opportunity costs of the time and effort that was needed for the information exchange to be maintained
effectively across the new organisational boundaries, not to mention the costs of the failure of that
transformation to occur satisfactorily, as well as the benefits of the external agencies’ contributions, which as
we showed in Chapters 7 and 9 were difficult to quantify.
External providers were often brought in without much thought to fostering knowledge exchange or
longer term benefits. Our case studies revealed that NHS commissioners could become reliant on outside
organisations, whether from commercial or not-for-profit organisations, to satisfy the information needs
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that were fundamental to their decision-making. The result of this trajectory could be that commissioners
face the risk of long-term dependency on external providers, particularly if no explicit knowledge transfer
mechanisms exist and/or can be made to work effectively. We found some evidence that this was
occurring already. In one contract between a CCG and a CSU, the reallocation of the embedded CSU
analyst to other work, besides that of developing a dashboard for an unscheduled care subcommittee,
meant that the subcommittee became severely stalled over the weeks that the analyst was missing.
Moreover, despite the analyst’s regular attendance at the meetings, the subcommittee members appeared
unable to interpret data from the dashboard without her input. In another contract, the commissioning
function was completely outsourced to a commercial provider who installed information systems, utilised
their own commercial analysts to undertake ‘forensic analytics’ and delivered substantial savings by ‘doing
the basics really well’. After renewing the contract for 5 years, the NHS clients had become used to a really
well-performing team. After a further tendering exercise the contract was extended for another 3 years
with an additional 2-year option. The benefits of this possibly 10-year contract could be that the NHS
clients will have received a high-quality service (hopefully), but the disadvantages could be that, should this
contract be discontinued, no one else has been trained to deliver the same service. Nor are the NHS clients
able to capitalise on the commercial provider’s expertise in replicating this success elsewhere. Although in
the first few years of the contract, NHS analysts worked alongside the commercial team, and so could have
been given these skills, this component of the contract was too expensive and the NHS client declined.
With the latest contract, knowledge exchange mechanisms were difficult to incorporate, as it was not clear
to whom commercial analysts would transfer their skills. Their former NHS colleagues were now housed in
rival organisations – CSUs.
Thus, outsourcing seems to have made the transfer of valuable knowledge and skills from commercial and
other external providers to NHS clients even more difficult than it was. Ironically, although the 2012 Health
and Social Care Act eased the way for greater commercial, not-for-profit and other external provider
involvement in the NHS, the same Act may have established substantial barriers to NHS clients actually
learning from these external providers to benefit the NHS.
Alternatively, instead of commercial and not-for-profit providers taking over functions of NHS
commissioners through outsourcing, they could genuinely add value to help strengthen and improve the
NHS by skilling up NHS professionals. Particularly useful knowledge transfer would be around ‘forensic’
approaches to data analysis, novel ways of interpreting data, teaching commissioners how to interpret
data and helping NHS/CSU analysts gain greater understanding of how data can inform commissioning.
Commercial providers also have useful knowledge in project management, in terms of clarifying the
‘problem’ first before producing data to identify the ‘solution’. Drawing on people placement, external
providers could embed external consultants with the right combination of experience, skills and personality
types to complement those missing in NHS client organisations, so that when the contract finishes, the
organisation is better equipped than before. Knowledge transfer should be a core component in contracts
between NHS clients and external providers, where the NHS clients have the capacity to take on board
new skills.
Actionable messages
To identify actionable messages from our study, we carried out two processes with some of the main
potential target audiences. The first was that two team members, both with commissioning backgrounds
who had worked in various organisations including PCTs, CCGs, CSUs and commercial consultancies, read
through the eight case summaries and identified actionable messages for each one (see Appendix 1). The
second was an event where a group of commissioners, information managers and a few of the team
academics listened to the ‘stories’ presented in Chapter 8. The group then commented on how these
stories matched their own experiences and contributed further key actionable messages for commissioners
and information specialists. In combining across these two sets, the following messages were the common
ones that emerged.
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Commissioning managers
1. Before purchasing a tool or external support, a clear problem of importance to commissioners and/or
analysts needs to be identified with a shared understanding of how the tool or external support can
resolve the problem and contribute to the solution.
2. Those drawing up contracts with external providers need to fully engage from the start the staff who
will be the recipients of the external expertise or expected to utilise it, ensuring that all parties
understand and agree about the nature the problems being addressed and the proposed approach to
their solution. Contracts with external agencies coproduced by all of the actively interested parties may
have a greater chance of successful results.
3. Commissioners may need to take note of, and make better use of, the knowledge conduits and
transformation processes that we have elicited (i.e. interpersonal, people placement, governance, ‘copy,
adapt and paste’ and product placement).
4. Careful thought is needed when embedding individuals, considering not only skill set, experience and
knowledge but also personality type. Commissioners need to be clear about what type of individuals
are missing or poorly represented from their organisation.
5. With many service change and transformation projects as much focus needs to be given to
implementation as to the process and deployment of the tool itself. Commissioning organisations need
to acknowledge this in their plans with their knowledge exchange partners (e.g. external providers,
hospital managers, clinicians, etc.) and make decisions with this in mind.
6. Commissioning organisations need to build in knowledge transfer as a key requirement to contracts
with external providers, which may help to retain and develop in-house skills. This is a vital step for
commissioners using external providers to take full advantage of the potential for knowledge exchange
and training on offer.
Commissioning support units
1. Commissioning support units or equivalent public organisations with a mandate for ‘business
intelligence’ need to develop and maintain cultures that value staff – focusing on individuals, teams and
organisations in terms of drive, performance and contribution, to foster healthy conduits for
knowledge exchange.
2. External providers, and particularly CSUs, need to help their commissioner clients define the scope and
detail of the support they require. Having loose service-level agreements based on individuals and
long-term support to programmes is unlikely to deliver the outcomes needed or sustainability
for commissioners.
3. The role of commissioning analysts may need to be reconfigured to ensure that their training and
activities includes interpreting and contextualising data outputs. This may help to make NHS analytics
a more credible profession with their commissioner colleagues. There is also a need to upskill
commissioners so that they know how to use their analysts better. Better structures and processes to
encourage interpersonal interactions between the two ‘camps’, including widespread use of people
placement, may be a useful way to help achieve better mutual understanding, if not actual
‘coproduction’ or ‘engaged scholarship’ in the knowledge transformations that result.
4. Commissioning support units should understand that most valuable knowledge transfer occurs via good
personal relationships, and set up their structures and processes in such a way as to ensure that their
staff can develop such relationships with their local clients.
5. It may also be useful to prioritise knowledge management and knowledge exchange within
organisational development work, ensuring that attention is paid to this when reorganisations are
planned and rolled out.
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External providers
These findings are relevant for all types of external providers we encountered within the study, be they
freelance, not-for-profit, commercial or CSUs.
1. Ideally, knowledge transfer drawing on the five conduits should be a core offer from external providers.
2. It would be helpful to provide interpretation of data and practical (not merely technical) assistance with
tools to drive change. We found that transferring operational or technical knowledge of a tool alone is
often not enough.
3. When working in the NHS, external providers might be more successful if they adapted their
expectations to fit clients’ reality and negotiated mutually acceptable understandings and time frames
about the use of the techniques and knowledge they are purveying. Pressing the contractor’s own
values and time scales onto the client rarely yielded the desired result.
4. It would be useful if external provider staff, including CSUs, regularly asked clients to define (and
redefine) the problem and intended outcome and were amenable to adapting and adjusting the project
timetable accordingly.
5. Where possible, external providers could helpfully ensure that the work was carried out by or jointly
with clients, so the clients took ownership, and skills were more likely to be transferred. Although this
may appear to undercut the future for the external provider’s services, it is also likely to increase the
chances of the outputs being trusted and useful, which may actually increase the prospects of
repeat business.
6. Costing in the resources needed for genuine knowledge exchange and implementation of change
might mean more contracts were successful, for example by acknowledging and allowing the time
needed to build local relationships.
7. The commissioning organisations in our case studies preferred the following from external providers,
who may consider making them a core part of their work with the NHS:
i. long-term contracts/relationships
ii. continuity of workforce/relationships
iii. flexible and adaptable capacity
iv. experienced staff
v. clinical knowledge/subject matter experts with good interpersonal skills rather than just technical or
project management skills
vi. contextual understanding.
Implications for future research
Future research evolving from this study has already been commissioned. The study lead obtained a NIHR
Knowledge Mobilisation fellowship with the aim of increasing collaborations between NHS commissioners
and primary care academics. This will run from June 2014 to June 2017. Specifically, she will develop
communities of practice consisting of patients, clinicians, researchers and commissioners to evaluate
health-care services, drawing on researchers’ methodological knowledge. This work will be heavily
informed by the learning from this study. Furthermore, we have identified several areas where further
research would be helpful.
Replication
There would be some merit in repeating this work, given that it was carried out at a time of particular
turmoil in the NHS, to see the extent to which those organisational exigencies affected some of
the findings.
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Knowledge exchange
l To what extent do clinicians and managers from primary, secondary and community care draw on the
conduits and transformation processes identified in our study? What is their impact and how is that
affected by different circumstances?
l Are these knowledge exchange conduits amenable to deliberate and productive manipulation and, if
so, to what extent do such interventions improve the process and outcomes of knowledge exchange?
Commissioning
l Can and should NHS and commercial health-care providers be commissioned in the same way?
l What are the ‘core skills’ required for the commissioning of the health service and where should
they reside?
Public Health
l What are the characteristics of public health departments that successfully meet commissioners’ needs?
Commissioning support units
l How do the role, training and skills of health-care analysts need to change to make working in CSUs
an attractive option?
l How can CSUs and commercial/not-for-profit providers work together to maximise
knowledge exchange?
Commercial, not-for-profit and freelance providers
l What are measurable outcomes of utilisation of commercial and not-for-profit agencies and how do
they compare?
l Given that this study focused mainly on commercial providers who offered software tools, what is the
contribution of commercial providers that primarily provide management consultancy?
l How successful is the ‘Lead Provider Framework’ in identifying and securing effective collaborations?
Conclusion
Commissioners had to influence and collaborate with many external and internal parties to build a
cohesive case for taking any particular commissioning decision. Amid a web of competing agendas,
priorities and power relationships, as well as their own professional, organisational and political norms,
commissioners had to make the ‘best’ decision that the often conflicting pressures, constraints and
tensions allowed. The ‘art’ or ‘craft’ of commissioning was, in essence, pulling together the appropriate
knowledge and information, including the tools for producing it to satisfy competing agendas, and
manoeuvre it through a complex system. That process inevitably meant that knowledge was continually
being altered to meet those multifaceted requirements.
We identified three models of commissioning in our particular case studies: clinical, integrated health and
social care, and commercial provider commissioning. Different types of knowledge were privileged in the
different models. Local clinical knowledge from GPs was prioritised in the clinical commissioning model,
service user knowledge was key in the integrated health and social care model, and analysts’ knowledge
of capturing and interpreting data was crucial in the commercial provider model. All commissioning
organisations displayed various blends of these models.
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Commissioners were highly pragmatic in their use of knowledge. Research evidence usually appeared in a
digested format such as NICE guidelines and often required further contextualisation, such as locally
devised clinical briefings or reviews, before being considered. Commissioners did not appear to consider
the ways that negative research evidence that could inform disinvestment opportunities.
We identified five main conduits that commissioners used to access and transform knowledge. They were:
l interpersonal relationships
l people placement (embedded staff)
l governance (e.g. national directives, local procedures)
l copy, adapt and paste (best practice from elsewhere)
l product deployment (software tools).
Within those conduits, media such as conversations and stories fitted particularly well with the
fast-changing, flexible world of commissioning, and often ‘trumped’ hard data that could be questioned or
sidelined on account of their low perceived usability. Local data often were more persuasive than national
or research-based information.
As knowledge was exchanged through these conduits, it was iteratively refocused, reshaped or rejected,
largely through two transformative processes:
l contextualisation (amending it to suit local circumstances), and
l engagement (involving the key players for whom the knowledge would have an impact).
This was true both in the act of obtaining the knowledge, and subsequently when it was being actively
reshaped and repackaged as moved between and within organisations and key personnel. These processes
were redolent of some of the notions that underpinned our analysis, especially collective organisational
sensemaking, ‘the social life of knowledge’, the development of collective mindlines, and the role of
communities of practice.
External providers that maximised their use of these conduits and transformation processes were more
successful. Interpersonal relationships were especially important to help contextualise the knowledge for
local application and engage the ‘right people’ to refine the knowledge further. External providers that
mainly targeted NHS/CSU analysts (e.g. through product deployment alone) were less likely to influence
commissioners, because of the long-standing schism between analysts and commissioners. Some
commercial providers bridged this gap by creating interdisciplinary teams of analysts, project managers and
clinicians. But elsewhere, because of this split, the sporadic use of the knowledge conduits and the variable
production of output over and above what was already available, many contracts within our case studies
were perceived by our research participants as being only partly successful. Success was, however, difficult
to define or assess, let alone quantify. Trust and usability influenced client views on usefulness of external
provider contributions.
An impact of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act was to further distance information producers
(i.e. health-care analysts) from information users (i.e. commissioners) by creating organisational boundaries
that were barriers to knowledge exchange. Consequently, commissioning organisations often did not
capitalise on contractual relationships with external providers by learning new skills. If the NHS is to benefit
from the expertise that external providers have to offer, then wherever possible, knowledge exchange and
development of skills within commissioning teams should be components in every contract.
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Appendix 1 Actionable messages
External provider analysis
TABLE 14 Swallow/Tern key findings and actionable messages
Key findings Actionable messages
The approach by Swallow shows limited understanding of
the local context, drivers and needs of the PCTs/CCGs. This
may have been in part to do with a regional group acting as
the intermediary, but not completely
Before bidding for work, try to understand context, needs
and drivers within the client organisations as much as
possible from different levels. Trusting in the perspective of
those who contract you alone may not be sufficient. Better
contextual understanding will assist in:
l the writing of a realistic bid
l achieving results and adding value
l fulfilling the contract
The processes and systems within Swallow did not seem
strategic, as any member of the PCT was able to initiate a
project. This policy may have come about because Swallow
had so little buy-in from the commissioning organisations
that they were willing to take on any work, regardless of
relevance, to build relationships and show value. But this
lack of strategic focus made it difficult to show how the
projects undertaken contributed to the delivery of the
contract
With longer term contracts on which payment is
dependent on delivery, systems and processes primary
focus needs to be on contract delivery for the client and
the external provider. External providers could consider
discussing how to manage tangential work during the
procurement process to manage client expectations
Swallow believed their tools to be superior to any in use
within the PCTs, but from information provided did not
evidence how. They therefore encountered resistance from
PCT staff to use the new tools
Understand clients’ use of tools and their ongoing needs,
and provide tools that meet these. This could be pragmatic
use of the tool, as well as the strategic use of the tool.
Again, obtaining information from all levels of client
organisations, including operational analysts, is key
Commissioning engagement leads were often moved
around between different PCTS. Yet one of the key findings
is that these leads stressed that building relationships and
trust were integral to success in engaging clients
Providing consistency for clients and staff where
relationships are good might need to be prioritised over
other considerations, possibly even consultant skill sets
Scenario generating tool was being marketed to assist
commissioners in understanding the impact of
commissioning decisions on the system. However, the tool
included only acute sector data. This, therefore, is not able
to assist commissioners to understand the impact on the
whole health system for which they are responsible
A generic tool should be marketed for what it can deliver
and not over sold. Loss of credibility is a risk if this happens
Best place of care tool is a North American tool that
Swallow has not adapted for the UK market. This highlights,
again, the one-size-fits-all mentality
As tool providers there is a need to adapt tools from
abroad to ensure that they reflect the systems in which
they will be used. Not only do these need to be adapted
nationally for the UK market, but also locally for each
health-care economy where they are used
Knowledge transformation processes to NHS clients outlined
how Swallow focussed on GP practices. This shows a lack of
understanding of the complexities and enormities of local
health systems, as well as lack of strategic thought. If the
organisation had focussed on PCT staff as a train the trainer
model, PCT staff could have then been used to transfer the
knowledge to GP practices, in which they had established
relationships
If transferring knowledge to ensure independence after you
have left is a driver, then a clear strategy on how this can
most easily and sustainably be achieved is essential
Slow decision-making cycles in the NHS is noted as
problematic to delivery, and, therefore, payment to the
external provider. As Swallow had numerous ex-NHS staff
why was this not known and planned for?
When working in the NHS build processes, systems and
expectations that fit with the decision-making cycles of the
NHS. This appears to be key to successful contracts
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TABLE 15 Swallow Tool key findings and actionable messages
Key findings Actionable messages
There was no translation into commissioning impact. There
is no point in having a tool without knowing how it will be
used effectively
Do not just provide a tool and training. Make sure you
work with clients to maximise its use effectively.
Presumably, Swallow have learning from others areas that
could be drawn on
The phase I audit used Swallow staff solely. Was this the
provider’s advice/experience on what works best?
Involvement of the PCT/CCG is not clear in the planning of
the audit
Tool providers need to bring expertise in tool deployment,
but ultimately work collaboratively with clients to ensure
the tool deployment and use is agreed by all parties
When conducting the second audit the evidence notes that
reviewers without a clinical background, as well as all
auditors being new to the tool, had a process of
familiarisation throughout the audit period
To ensure that the mistakes of the first audit were not
repeated, the provider could have provided a person with a
strong clinical background to ensure the consistent use of
the tool
TABLE 16 Jackdaw key findings and actionable messages
Key findings Actionable messages
The tool was allocated to commissioners who had no input
into which tool was selected or a priori information need
that the tool was meeting. Consequently, NHS users were
left to puzzle out not only how to use the tool but what
problems the tool could address
CCGs need to understand the problem that needs solving
and their key requirements for a solution. Do not jump to
buying the tool without understanding its potential or the
impact of its use in practice. Ask for examples of how it
has been used elsewhere and contact several previous
users – not just champions suggested by the consultancy.
This investment of time may save substantial money later
The content and delivery of the training did not suit all
clients
External providers need to consider clients’ needs for
learning, rather than providing recycled training used for
other clients. The training should include how the tool can
be used in health-care transformation, preferably in a
similar context
Technical training was not sufficient for clients to
understand how best to use the tool
External providers should work collaboratively with clients
to devise strategies for using the tool, help interpret the
data and demonstrate how the interpreted data can be
used
Jackdaw worked through other suppliers to market their
tools
Tool developers need to be aware that working through
other suppliers may impede skills transfer, which in turn
will reflect poorly on the reputation of your tool
Jackdaw noted that ‘there are “implementation studies”
which use “action research” to get the tool into practice,
which are less likely to be published because concerns
around breaching confidentiality of the site or patients’
External provider should be able to provide solid examples
of the implementation of the tool and its effectiveness,
even if these are not published in peer-reviewed press.
CCGs should request this
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TABLE 17 Heron key findings and actionable messages
Key findings Actionable messages
All those interviews came across as confident; from the
data provided this could be perceived by clients as
arrogant and patronising. There was a consistent
underestimation of the skills, abilities and knowledge of
NHS commissioners and analysts
External providers as organisations and individuals within
them need to constantly be sensitive to how their confidence
and clear preconceptions and opinions of NHS staff could
come across negatively to clients. The external provider will
need to avoid being tarnished with being predatory and
overly controlling/influencing of CCG clients
Kristen talks of her experience of being a commissioner in
the NHS and Heron working with her. She noted the
power of her Heron colleague asking pertinent questions
such as ‘why do they do it like that?’
External providers are not asking anything remarkable. CCGs
need to question whether or not they listen more to external
providers than to their own staff. Who should be asking the
same questions?
Heron note that they offer using ‘data to drive decision
making’. This is very different from the other cases looked
at as the other examples have focused on use of tools,
rather than the data/intelligence gleaned from them to
influence/drive decisions
Using ‘data to drive decision-making’ is a unique selling point
for the external provider in comparison with other commercial
providers whose main focus was the selling of products/tools.
Other external providers could consider this line of approach,
using the tools as the key to extracting the intelligence/data
Heron have a model for project delivery in teams, the
contrast being made that NHS staff work in silos
CCGs and CSUs need to make matrix working a reality and
break down departmental boundaries that can hinder project
delivery
Heron employees talked about their organisation having
‘value’ and ‘drive’. This is predominant in the culture of
this organisation. Contrasting the NHS, which certainly is
value based, it lacks a systematic culture on drive
CCGs and CSU need to foster a culture for their organisations
where values and drive for individuals, teams and the
organisation as a whole is developed and prized
Performance management of staff was clear within
Heron. The NHS could learn a lot from this, where
success and failure is often attributed to an individual,
rather simplistically and dangerously
CCGs could learn from external providers in terms of
performance management of staff, where the focus is on
affirmation and acknowledgement of contribution, not on
success or failure of an individual
‘What clients want are people to help them understand
the data’
External providers need to understand CCG clients often want
not only the data, but assistance in how to use it
‘You can’t give them the answers without knowing the
question’. This has strong echoes of Carnford
External providers can help CCGs to understand their local
context through asking the right questions and eliciting the
answer
Dennis notes knowledge transfer was an element of the
Westhide contract with Heron; however, it was removed
owing to cost pressures
Knowledge transfer could be argued to be the most
important aspect of the Westhide contract. For external
providers this may be advantageous as it creates reliance.
For CCGs it shows a lack of strategic thinking on skills needs
and gaps in the future
Knowledge transfer is mentioned as a factor to help
success, as NHS staff learn new skills but also understand
the local context
External providers need to consider knowledge transfer as
an offer to CCGs; this would be attractive. CSUs need to
consider how they market as they have knowledge
to transfer, but also know the local context
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TABLE 18 Norchester CCG key findings and actionable messages
Key findings Actionable messages
The decision support unit/CSU is viewed by many senior
leaders as providing the ‘mundane stuff’ – analytics/
intelligence
CSUs need to be able to communicate the breadth of skills
contained within their staff, selling the extent of their
capabilities rather than transactional processes. If they do
not there is a real risk to CCGs not seeing the added value
they bring, and pull staff in house/or CSU staff leave as not
being used to their full potential
Randall (freelance analyst) was highly regarded for ‘providing
timely, useful information . . . a real understanding of GP
needs . . . and the flexibility respond to commissioners’
iterative, evolving demands.’ This should be the standard
rather than the exception
External providers, including CSUs, should understand the
CCG environment, being adaptable and responsive, as well
as understand their needs will be a key to success
The size of the CSU working with Norchester discussed by many
outlining the differing views on advantages and disadvantages
Advantages:
l ‘Economies of scale’ from working across counties
l ‘Easier to spread learning’
Disadvantages:
l Use the scale to keep skills in house
l ‘Wanted more support in house’
The size of a CSU could provide opportunities for economies
of scale and spread of ideas; however, being able to offer
skills transfer as part of the offer to CCGs will be attractive
to CCG leaders who are keen to ensure that skills are
retained within their organisation
A CSU staff member noted that other external providers were
‘quite removed from day to day business and worked to
specifications’. This could be viewed as an advantage as
external providers can concentrate on the project/work they
have been defined, and not pulled in different directions, as is
the risk with CSUs
CSUs need to take advantage of local knowledge/networks
but still need rigour of an external provider to define work
packages with clients, to ensure delivery
Angus reflected that ‘some individuals are particularly good at
understanding what you need and delivering it’
Clients find it hard to hire for projects and not for people.
External providers therefore need to understand this and use
methods to communicate the benefits of a team-based
approach to delivery
Angus noted that to trust the information provided by
external providers he required two things:
l belief the external provider is aligned with the CCGs
goals/aims
l a long-term relationship with the provider
When going through procurement and after winning the
contract, external providers need to have a strategy around
how their contribution aligns with the clients’ goals and aims
and how they plan to develop a long-term relationship
This case study noted caution in relation to primary care data
sharing, and reflects the debate/view held nationally in primary
care. Adrian noted that ‘practice managers are beginning to see
themselves as “guardians of patients’ data”‘
External providers need to understand and consider this
carefully when bidding for work. The assumption is often
data will be shared, whereas this is most often not the case.
Contingency plans should be developed during procurement
to address the situation if the external provider cannot get
access to the data
Throughout the case study there is wariness from a number of
CCG staff and local GPs in the use of the commercial external
providers. However, it is interesting to note that a number of
organisations are emerging using the NHS logo and brand but
are in fact non for-profit/profitable organisations. The
concerning aspect of this is that they are not being transparent
in the fact that they are non-NHS organisations
CCGs need to have robust systems and processes to decide
which organisations to work with to ensure the appropriate
use of public funding. A lot could be learned from systems
used by medicines management teams in working with the
pharmaceutical industry
Simon noted that ‘the private providers weren’t clear on what
they were supposed to deliver and there was not then the
engagement between the intelligent commissioner and the
intelligent provider to actually deliver a product that was really
useful’
External providers and particularly CSUs need to help CCGs
define the scope and detail of the support they require.
Having loose service-level agreements based on individuals
and long-term support to programmes, will not deliver the
outcomes needed, or sustainability for CSUs
Simon commented that tool ‘was probably just what we
need’ but that there is not clarity about ‘what I can do
differently because I know this’
External providers must understand that selling a tool is not
enough; clients (meaning all stakeholders, not just senior
leaders who have contracted you) need to understand the
benefits offered by the tool and how it will be implemented
and its impact evidenced
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TABLE 19 Carnford CCG key findings and actionable messages
Key findings Actionable messages
A key finding was the suspicion and belief in the predatory
behaviour of external providers
External providers are usually aware of this common
mind-set within the NHS. Could you sell the benefits, but
also be honest about the current limitations with clients?
Roger, the GP lead for integrated care teams, reflected the
commonly held view emerging from many case studies that
CCGs and clinical leads want the answer to problems they
face, as he states ‘nobody seems to be able to say that this
or isn’t the right way of doing it’
External providers need to robustly evaluate implementation
in order to build the body of evidence
Roger expresses a view that CCGs have a desire to have
skills, knowledge and capacity to do the majority of work in
house, as he states ‘so we could do it all locally. But when
you look at the enormity of the task, you just wonder
whether – or I just wonder whether the resources are there’
External providers could explore knowledge transfers as a
credible part of their offer to clients. Consideration needs
to be given about the sustainability of this as a model,
particularly for CSUs who are currently more geographically
constrained
Mike’s view that CSUs could act as gatekeepers/contractor
for CCGs working with commercial providers, despite his
insistence that it was a role to ‘protect CCG from the
commercial provider.’ It could conversely be seen as
creating dependency on the CSU, by the CCG
Despite CSU currently being part of the NHS, they are arm’s
length and are external providers. Consideration needs to
be given to how they therefore interact with CCGs and
other external providers alike, so as not to alienate potential
clients/partners
The emerging theme of collaboration came up with Tom
saying ‘come and work at our desks. Come and meet the
team and feel part of the team. Though you are working at
arm’s length and for a different employer, what you do is
absolutely integral to what we’re doing’
CSUs and other external providers need to consider the
benefits of short- and/or long-term colocation, ideally
having staff embedded within the CCG
The tools being derived originally from America was raised
once again in this case study. However, as the tool was to
predict the accuracy for insurance companies, this is still
relevant for the NHS, as a publicly funded organisation.
However, the CCGs view is that this discredits it
External providers need to consider how they market the
tool and its origins. The fact that the tool would work in
the NHS to keep costs down could be sold as a benefit
Discussion on focus of tools thresholds of 1% and 25%,
5% still small numbers at the top of the pyramid. One
Public Health consultant wanted to look at lower down the
pyramid for preventative interventions. He acknowledged
that this was unlikely as CCGs were ‘trying to fire fight’
External provider risk prediction/stratification tool providers
should assess and advise CCGs on short-term/longer term
goals/interventions and which will have the biggest impact
Harold had done statistical analysis on the risk prediction
tool’s predictive value and found it to be low. When he
approached, regional group and Jackdaw, both were
resistant to acknowledge the analysis or do further analysis
CCGs need to ensure they have the appropriate skills to
assess the effectiveness of the tool they use preferably
independent analysis of the algorithm behind the tool
(if available)
One freelance consultant acknowledged that a lot of
business within the CCGs and former PCTs was generated
because of the NHS inability to share knowledge –
‘knowledge management in the NHS is very poor. And
particularly with all the changes so with the PCT
disappearing there’s no work stream about, you know
knowledge management being transferred’
CCGs and CSUs could add value and save duplication of
effort by working effectively across NHS organisational
boundaries to share knowledge. As well as establish
effective knowledge management systems for the
organisation
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TABLE 20 Penborough CCG key findings and actionable messages
Key finding Actionable message
Sarah states that ‘you can have all the technical skills you like,
if you haven’t got relationship management skill in terms of
managing the system, the technical skills won’t get you
anywhere’
CCGs, CSUs and external providers can all benefit from
understanding that good tools, good data and crucially
good translation/communication are key to success.
Not mutually exclusive, but a combination of these
‘The role of these agents was the credibility and
“independence” they brought to the process’
CSUs need to consider and be aware of how they are
viewed by CCGs. Will they be seen as independent and
credible or more of the same NHS? How they market
and evidence this may be key to success
Consultants noted that NHS staff had lots of ideas but they
didn’t have ‘the actual discipline of completing it and
measuring it was not there.’ Could this explain the NHS brain
drain to external providers?
CCGs and CSUs need to develop performance cultures
where staffs are valued for their contribution,
performance and drive
‘Hilda expected the CSU to have data analysis and health
economics skills and experience’
CSUs should consider how they can improve their offer
for these services
Penborough had retained a large internal team, so had
reduced reliance on the CSU. Alan went on to note that for
service redesign it was important to retain local input, and he
did not seem to see this as something the CSU could provide
CSUs need to consider how they market themselves to
maximise their client base. Key messages may be for
some local CCGs ‘local and responsive’
Penborough CCG set expectations that knowledge would be
transferred as part of the hand over process. This is the first
example seen of a CCG proactively stating and expecting this
CCGs need to build in knowledge transfer as a key
requirement to contracts with external providers
Vidur talks about presentation from PWC costing lots with lots
of flow charts, but that ‘I don’t think it’s a good use of my
time, or my learning style’ (Vidur)
External providers need to understand the multiple ways
to present findings to CCGs/clinicians. What would work
well and why, as well as what did not work well?
TABLE 21 Deanshire CCG key findings and actionable messages
Key finding Actionable message
From reviewing the people interviewed working for
consultancies with a NHS background. Why is there a NHS
brain drain to external providers?
CCGs should consider proactive recruitment and
retention policies which value individuals’ contribution,
drive and performance (see Penborough above)
‘What made it work was external provider were willing to go
at our pace and understand that there were some parameters
we couldn’t change, and worked at our pace with us, rather
than coming in and saying, oh you’ve got it all wrong’
External providers/CSU should note this clearly effective
approach of working with CCGs, at the pace and style
they have
External provider used patient stories to communicate
effectively. This seemed to work well, with only one person
noted as saying it was ‘anecdote’
CCGs, CSUs and external providers should consider the
use of stories as an effective technique, backing up
messages with data could be a powerful combination
Outlines a situation when Brian (freelance consultant)
articulated the problem, but Kevin (CCG accountable officer)
found a solution
External providers need to not just define problems, but
find realistic solutions. Be realistic with yourselves and
clients in terms of what is possible to change as well as
the timeframe to do this
Brian (freelance consultant) is noted as needing ‘some
guidance’
CCGs/CSUs need to look for and test for technical and
interpersonal skills for internal and external recruitment
processes
‘If we actually did the right things for patients first, then we
find we get those outcomes as a secondary consequence’
Focusing on quality patient improvements rather than
money-saving efficiency schemes will be attractive to
clinically-led CCGs
External provider notes that they are ‘principles drive versus
rules driven’. This is very clever marketing, as they are one of
the few case studies to show a clearly defined methodology
Having a few clear and simple messages that are
marketed well can be a highly effective strategy for
external providers
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